TRANSACTIONS of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch

Volume 58

1983

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[page 1]

**The Centenary of Korean-British Diplomatic Relations: Aspects of British Interest and Involvement in Korea 1600-1983\***

by J. E. Hoare

INTRODUCTION

At the end of October 1883, Sir Harry Smith Parkes, long the doyen of British diplomats in East Asia, arrived in Seoul to complete the negotiations for a treaty which was to replace that negotiated in 1882. That had aroused widespread opposition and had finally been abandoned. The negotiations in Seoul were successful, and a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was signed in the Kyongbok Palace on 26 November 1883. Parkes left Seoul the next day, before the Han River froze for the winter, but he was to return the following April to exchange ratifications.

Thus began formal relations between Korea and Britain. To mark the anniversary, numerous events were planned. The first ever official visit by a member of the British Royal Family took place in May, when His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester came at the same time as the Royal Ballet. There was a second Royal visit in October, when the Duke of Kent led a British Overseas Trade Board mission to Korea. Other British visitors to Korea included the novelist Iris Murdoch, the playwright Arnold Wesker and the economist Professor Frank Hahn. From both countries, there were ministerial and other official exchanges. If the Royal Ballet is the major British cultural manifestation to mark the centenary, the exhibition of Korean art in London from February 1984 is a fitting reminder of Korea’s cultural importance. In addition to these high-level contacts, there have been numerous others, covering the whole range of contacts between the two countries.

This paper traces the history of British interest in Korea from long before Parkes’s treaty to the present. It seems particularly appropriate that such a paper should be given to a Royal Asiatic Society audience, for the British in Korea were very much in the forefront of the move to found the

\*This article was presented before the Royal Asiatic Society-Korea Branch on November 9, 1983 in commemoration of the Korean-British centennial.

[page 2] RAS, and were certainly in the forefront of its activities until the Pacific War. Since then, the changes in Britain’s position in East Asia have been reflected in the RAS, no less than in other fields.

The paper does not claim to be a piece of original research. Others have covered the ground, sometimes indeed in front of RAS audiences1. But it does include some new material, and attempts to bring the story up to the present, which has not been done before.

KOREAN-BRITISH RELATIONS BEFORE THE TREATY

British interest in Korea dates from the beginning of the seventeenth century. News of Korea, and its reputed wealth, reached Europe through the Portuguese, and appears to have first been made known to the English in Richard Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation,* published between 1598-1600. It may have been this compilation which aroused the interest of Sir Edward Michelborne, a founder member of the East India Company established in 1600,and which led him to seek a charter from King James I to enable him to trade with various eastern countries, including Korea. Michelborne set out for the east, but he got no further than the Malay peninsula.2

As the East India Company itself became established in East Asia, it was natural that its members should take an interest in Korea. The setting up of a factory at Hirado in Japan in 1613 not only brought members of the Company close to Korea, but also raised the possibility of actual contact with Korean envoys in Japan. In spite of high hopes, and even knowledge of Korean products such as ginseng, however, nothing came of these early attempts, which ended with the withdrawal of the English from Hirado in 1623.3 The East India Company turned its attention to China, though there was a brief flurry of interest in Korea again in 1702. But that too quickly died.4

It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that British interest was again awakened. The growth of the China trade led to an increase in British (and other western) shipping in East Asian waters, which in turn led to the need for survey work. It was this need which lay behind Captain William Broughton’s voyage around the North Pacific and the Asian region in HMS *Providence*, from 1794 to 1798, and which brought him to Korea’s northeastern coast in 1797.5 Broughton’s account of his voyage, published in 1804, sparked off further interest in Korea, and in 1816, HMS *Alceste* and HMS *Lyra* engaged in survey work off the west coast of Korea. Attempts to land were discouraged. The Korean officials encountered made it [page 3] clear that they would be in great trouble if the foreigners persisted. Two ac-counts of this voyage were published.6

During the next forty years, the number of British and other foreign ships in Korean waters increased year by year. In 1832 the East India Company, whose control over Britain’s China trade was rapidly slipping away, sent a ship along the northern shores of China in search of new trade. Not only did this ship, the Lord Amherst, visit Korea, but it had on board the Rev. Charles (or Karl) Gutzlaff, who hoped to explore the possibilities for Christian missionary work, as well as the prospects for trade. Gutzlaff succeeded in distributing some Bibles, but the visit to Korea was not generally successful, the Koreans displaying the same sort of hostility they had shown in 18167.7

No further attempts at trade took place, but the survey work went on. Increased China trade after the Opium War of 1839-1842, and the opening of Japan to the west in the 1850’s, also added to the shipping in or near Korea. By the early 1970’s, British naval vessels were regularly visiting Port Hamilton (Komun-do) off the south of Korea, and there were those who advocated its permanent occupation by Britain.8 The British government declined to do so in 1875,however, since “...it was not desirable to set to other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain had no title...”.9

The British were disappointed in trade and not inclined to annexation; instead, missionary interest, never followed up after Gutzlaff’s 1832 visit, began to revive in the 1860’s.10 A Welsh missionary in China, the Rev. R. J. Thomas, beset by personal worries, found his way to Chefoo in the autumn of 1865. There he met Koreans, and began to study the language. He also visited Korea, and distributed Bibles. His Korean contacts promised to take him to meet senior officials if he returned the following year, and thus it was that he took passage on the ill-fated American ship, the *General Sherman*, in September 1866. The ship was under charter to the British company, Meadows and Co., of Tientsin, and there are those who suggest that Thomas’s involvement, like that of Gutzlaff some thirty years before, was not entirely concerned with spreading the gospel. Whatever his motives, Thomas, like all on the *General Sherman*, was killed when the ship tried to force the barriers on the Taedong river below Pyongyang in September 1866. Although this was to be a contributory factor to America’s “little war” with Korea in 1871, the British government took no action.11

The next major British missionary involvement with Korea came via Scots missionaries in Manchuria. The Rev. John Ross and his brother-in-law, Rev. John Mclntyre, made the acquaintance of Koreans across the Yalu [page 4] border in the early 1870’s. Ross in particular seems to have felt that it was essential to learn Korean in order to talk with the Koreans whom he met, and in order to produce Bible translations.

His efforts were successful. By 1879, the Gospel of St. Luke had been translated, and work was underway on the rest of the Bible. Ross’s translation was later deemed to be too full of provincialisms and Sino-Korean words, but it was widely used after 1879,and opinions today are less harsh than they once were. Ross continued to work with Koreans in Manchuria until his retirement in 1910. He died in Edinburgh in 1915.12

By this stage, the opening of Korea to the outside world was well ad-vanced. There had been the French expedition of 1866, the American of 1871,and finally the Japanese success with the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876. The British authorities had watched these developments with interest, but did not seem inclined to take any initiative themselves. There were exceptions, as we have seen, but, as far as Korea was concerned, the British were very reluctant imperialists.

However, the British were busy gathering information about Korea. Sir Harry Parkes, British Minister in Tokyo from 1865,had long had an interest in Korea, and his had been one of the most prominent voices advocating the occupation of Port Hamilton. It may well have been his interest which prompted a number of his consular officers in Japan to begin Korean studies. Certainly, even before 1883,some of these had begun to acquire the language, and to publish works on Korea.13 The Minister in China, Sir Thomas Wade, also had a history of interest in Korea.

The first British diplomat to visit Korea was Joseph Longford, then Consul at Nagasaki, in 1875. Longford met the same hostility as had earlier visitors.14 The most comprehensive account of Korea before 1882 came from W. D. Spence, of the British Consulate in Shanghai, who was allowed to accompany the Duke of Genoa in July 1880. Before he went, Spence, having rejected books by Ross and others as worthless, received what he regarded as more useful works from W. G. Aston, Consul at Kobe, who was by then well advanced in the study of Korea and the Korean language.15 Parkes and his government were also learning about Korean politics from Koreans in Japan, including Kim Ok-kyun.16

TREATY MAKING 1882-1883

While the British were content to let the Japanese “open” Korea, they were more concerned by Russian and American moves in the same direction. Anglo-Russian rivalry was a major factor in international affairs, and [page 5] the British feared that the Russians, by establishing themselves in Korea, would pose a threat to British imperial interests.17 In the American case, the British concern was largely over what were believed to be mistaken ideas about trade and tariffs, most recently shown in Japan.18 Thus when the British learnt that the Americans intended sending Commodore Shufeldt to Korea to negotiate a treaty, they deemed it prudent to send Vice-Admiral Willis, Commander-in-Chief of the China station, to Korean waters, to monitor American moves. Willis was also given discretion to negotiate a treaty, if he thought it necessary. Given previous British experience of the diplomatic negotiations of naval officers in East Asia, this was a surprising move.19

Following Shufeldt’s successful completion of negotiations at Inch’on in May 1882,Willis concluded a treaty at the same place a few days later. Although Willis was accompanied by Aston, his treaty owed nothing to Aston’s experience or knowledge. Instead, he took over Shufeldt’s treaty. The only addition was a letter from King Kojong to Queen Victoria, which cast doubts on the Korean ability to make treaties independently of China and was not regarded as useful.20

Willis’s treaty aroused a storm of opposition. It was well known by 1882 that British goods were available within Korea, and British merchants in the East argued that the proposed treaty, which contained the same high tariffs as the American one, would do nothing to help the growth of trade. The Secretary of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce, for example, wrote that “...little or no commerce could be conducted by British merchants under this treaty...”.21 Parkes, though he had been in favour of sending Willis to Korea, also expressed his disapproval of the treaty. Willis’s own protective attitude to his treaty, and the steady souring of his relations with Parkes, added an extra dimension to the debate.22

As Parkes and Willis exchanged barely polite letters, a steady stream of diplomatic officers visited Korea. At first they sought ways to modify Willis’s treaty, but gradually it became clear that a completely new treaty would be necessary to meet the British objectives and to take account of the objections. The German government, whose representative had concluded a treaty similar to Shufeldt’s, was also persuaded to abandon it and to reopen negotiations.23

These negotiations came to fruition in November 1883. Parkes, now Minister to China, arrived in Seoul with Aston from Japan, and Walter Hillier and C. T. Maude, both from the China consular service. They were joined in Korea by Herr Zappe, German Consul-General at Yokohama, who had been appointed German plenipotentiary, and who was an old [page 6] friend of Parkes’s, from Japan days. The negotiations were tough, but came to a successful conclusion, from a British and German point of view, with the signing of the new treaty on 26 November. Parkes had found his companions congenial, and had found both Seoul and its people congenial.24 There are many analyses of this treaty, and there is no need to go over its terms here. Parkes’s efforts were highly praised by London, and widely welcomed by the foreign communities in East Asia. Sir Philip Currie, the Under-Secretary concerned in the Foreign Office, wrote that: “Your treaty has given entire satisfaction, and we are very grateful for the admirable way in which you have managed the business...”25 In many ways, as Parkes himself admitted, the treaty had less to do with Korea than with other British interests in China and Japan. Certainly Parkes took the opportunity offered by the negotiations to avoid problems which had arisen in those countries because of careless or unclear drafting.26 Although Shufeldt’s treaty holds a symbolic importance, as Korea’s first with a western country, it was Parkes’s treaty which formed the basis on which American and other foreigners lived in Korea until 1910.27

IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY 1884-1890

Parkes returned in April 1884, to exchange ratifications of the treaty. On that occasion, he was accompanied by his eldest daughter—his wife had died while he was Minister in Japan—and she, together with the wife of the United States’ representative, was received by the Queen and the ladies of the court. This was to be Parkes’s last visit, for he died in 1885.28

Meanwhile, steps were in hand to implement the treaty. Even before November 1883,there were a number of British citizens in Korea. Some were employed by the Korean government, while others were engaged in various commercial activities. Jardine Matheson, for example, the most famous British trading company in China and Japan, had interests in both mining and shipping before the treaty.29 Problems were also beginning to arise which required the involvement of British consular officers. The British already had the most comprehensive legal system of any western power in East Asia, and this was extended to Korea by the Order in Council of 26 June 1884,which was to come into force in October 1884.30

There was also the question of how this system was to be administered and the form of British representation in Korea. The treaty allowed the appointment of diplomatic and consular representatives, and the British authorities were anxious that this should be done. But there was the question of cost, coupled with uncertainty about how trade would develop and [page 7] what size British community might establish itself in Korea and where. In these circumstances, Parkes argued that “...it would be unnecessary, at the outset at least of our intercourse with Corea, to incur the expense of appointing to that country a special Legation.” Instead he proposed that he should be accredited as British Minister to Korea, while continuing to reside in Peking, and that a number of temporary appointments should be made to consular posts in Korea. The Koreans and the Chinese would both be willing to accept such an arrangement.31

It was a proposal which fell on fruitful ground in London, where the Treasury was already making it clear that it was most reluctant to make any new money available for the setting up of diplomatic or consular establishments in Korea.32 It is also a proposal which has caused much confusion in assessments of British views of Korea’s relations with China ever since. It is frequently asserted that this arrangement, which was to last until almost the turn of the century, was made in order to take account of Chinese claims to suzerainty over Korea. Parkes and his colleagues who negotiated the 1883 treaty were of course well aware of the Chinese and Korean positions on this matter, but one reason for the rejection of Admiral Willis’s treaty was precisely because Willis had, whether knowingly or not, conceded the Chinese position. Though the British position may have been obscured by later actions—for example, during the Port Hamilton affair of 1885-87— the original position taken by Parkes is clear. Sir Robert Hart, Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, who was in favour of supporting the Chinese claim over the status of Korea, noted in March 1885, just after Parkes’s death: “...he had insisted on the King of Corea describing himself (which he did not want to do) as independent (which he is not)...”33

There were more immediate concerns, however. Parkes, no doubt anticipating the acceptance of his proposal in London, set in motion the search for suitable premises from which the British would operate. W. G. Aston, who was Parkes’s proposed candidate for the post of acting Consul-General, began the search even before the exchange of ratifications. In May 1884, soon after King Kojong had allowed foreigners to settle on land inside the Seoul city walls, Aston concluded an agreement to buy a tract of land in Chong-dong, in the area of a decayed former royal palace. The land, bought for Mexican $1200—then worth some £225—is the land on which the British Embassy still stands today. In addition, during 1883 Aston had obtained first refusal on a number of other sites at the places now opened to foreign trade.34

There was some reluctance on the part of the Treasury to spend any money on Korea, but they were eventually persuaded that Aston had a [page 8] bargain. So offices and living quarters were set up in the 10 or 12 Korean-style houses on the site, and the British Legation began to function. At Chemulp’o also a consular post was functioning soon after the exchange of ratifications, under an acting vice-consul. The first of these vice-consuls was W. R. Carles, from the China consular service, who was to spend much time in Korea, and who published a book about the country. Chemulp’o had scarcely existed before 1882,and it was impossible to find anything suitable for either consular offices or a residence. Parkes suggested the construction of a special building in Shanghai but in fact the first premises used seem to have been an old public house or saloon, the “Royal Oak,” which was purchased in Nagasaki and brought over on the Jardines, steamship, the Nanzing, in September 1884. Great efforts were also made to ensure that there was a consular jail, another sign of the British determination to provide for the good government of their community.35

The British were the prime movers behind efforts to have the new foreign settlements in Korea established on a proper footing. Here, as in treaty making, Parkes, Aston and the others brought with them years of experience in China and Japan, and a determination to learn from mistakes which they thought had occured in the setting up of foreign settlements. This approach was one which did not always find favour with their colleagues. Indeed, one American official claimed that the British insistence on proper regulations for land holding at Chemulp’o was “...an attempt to freeze out other foreigners by the investment of the more abundant English capital in the far east.”36

If that was the object, it was unsuccessful. Parkes had been under no illusions when he had set about renegotiating the 1882 treaty that Korea would prove to be a great source of new trade. Korea’s long seclusion, he noted in June 1883, and the “consequent stagnation of industry which this has occasioned...” meant that the economy was largely self-contained.37 He did not add, though he might have done, that the existing trade in British goods was already well taken care of by Chinese and Japanese merchants. Jardines, whose expectations were quickly disappointed, pulled out early on, and none of the other major British trading companies attempted the Korean market. Such British trade as there was was small-scale. As a consequence, numbers of Britons, too, remained small, though the British residents were the main group of westerners well into the twentieth century.38

For the diplomats, there were plenty of other things to keep them occupied during the turbulent years of the ‘80’s. During the Post Office coup in December 1884, Aston, his colleagues and family all took refuge in the [page 9] American Legation.39 Dashing about the streets in the depths of the winter had a serious effect on Aston’s already poor health, and he was unable to work for some six months.40 Even without such excitements, there were problems to be sorted out for British employees of the Korean government, for British merchants and for the occasional traveller who met with hostility. After the signing of the Italian treaty in June 1884, the British also looked after Italian interests.

There was also the immense amount of work created by the British oc-cupation of Port Hamilton. By 1885, Lord Derby’s view of the propriety of Britain occupying bits of Korea had given way to a decision to occupy Port Hamilton, in a move which, it was claimed, would prevent the Russians taking a port on Korea’s northeastern coast. Whether or not the Russians ever intended to act as others said they would is open to question. What is not open to question is that the British Navy, on the instructions of the Cabinet, sent three ships to Port Hamilton in April 1885, although at first the British flag was not hoisted over the islands. This move took place without any consultation with Korea. Neither were the Chinese or Japanese governments informed, though, as quickly became apparent, both considered that this was a matter which directly concerned their interests.41

The story of the diplomatic manoeuvres which followed this action have been well told elsewhere, though, surprisingly, there is as yet no full-length study of the subject.42 What matters in this paper is that for nearly two years, British sailors and marines lived at Port Hamilton. The islands then had few Korean inhabitants, but those who were there seem generally to have been friendly. They were willing to make land available for buildings and, occasionally, to work. The British erected barracks, a hospital and some other buildings, as well as several jetties. Attempts to close off some of the harbour entrances by booms and other devices were unsuccessful. A cable was laid to Hong Kong, but there were great difficulties in keeping it in operation.43

For those stationed on the islands, life cannot have been very exciting. They had occasional visitors from Seoul and elsewhere, and from time to time the regular garrison was reinforced by visiting ships. But life in general must have been dull, and dangerous in the autumn and winter gales. An enterprising Japanese, no doubt well aware of the habits of sailors the world over, brought in five Japanese women in May 1886. Strong—and probably illegal—measures were taken to get him and his ladies off the islands, especially after one marine died when a boat turned over as a party of marines returned after visiting the makeshift brothel.44

By then there were already growing doubts in British official circles [page 10] about the wisdom of the continued occupation of the islands. The commander of British naval forces on the China station, Vice-Admiral Vesey Hamilton, who visited the islands at the end of May 1886,sent back a report in which he said that he could not see “...a single point in [the occupation’s] favour, and very many objections against it.” Rather than strengthening the British naval presence in East Asian waters, it weakened it, for it tied up too many men, ships and stores. The anchorage was not good, and there seemed to be no commercial advantage.45

For these practical reasons, and because of the continued diplomatic complications caused by the occupation, plus a reduction in Anglo-Russian tension, the decision was taken late in 1886 to end the occupation. A Chinese undertaking that they would allow no foreign occupation of any Korean port was a further major consideration. The decision was announced in Parliament on 2 and 3 February, and on 28 February 1887 the Admiralty received a cable from Vice-Admiral Hamilton: “Flag hauled down Port Hamilton 27th. Cable under charge of Chief.”46 A suggestion that a Korean official should be taken to the islands to witness the British withdrawal, which came from the British Minister in Peking, was turned down by the Admiral “...as from their not very cleanly habits these officials were far from acceptable guests on board a man-of-war...”47 The British left Port Hamilton, as they had come, with no official Korean involvement.

All that now remains of the occupation is a grave dating from 1886. Another grave dates from 1903, for British and other foreign ships continued to visit the islands regularly after 1887. The local inhabitants say that other graves were destroyed during the Japanese colonial period. It is also said that the remains of one of the British jetties lies at the base of an existing jetty. But, the grave apart, nothing can be seen which dates from 1885-1887. In the 1970’s, the British government agreed to lease the land on which the graves stand, and to mark the centenary of Korean-British diplomatic relations, a commemorative plaque was erected in 1983, paid for partly by the British government, and by various Korean and British societies.48

Thus, by the end of the 1880’s, British interest in Korea, and belief in its strategic importance, had led to actual occupation. Further signs of British interest in the country were also available. The consular establishment in Korea had remained on a temporary basis, with staff drawn from either the Japan or China consular services, receiving only additional allowances for serving in Korea. By the late 1880’s, this arrangement was no longer satisfactory. The needs for new buildings in Seoul to replace the existing buildings—which Aston had described in 1884 as all being “...of [page 11] wood, old and in an indifferent state of repair”49―had been recognised for some years, but the Treasury had refused to sanction the erection of new buildings as long as the temporary arrangements of 1884 continued. Now, in 1888,the Minister in Peking, still of course side-accredited to Seoul, put forward a proposal whereby Seoul and Chemulp’o would become substantive posts. This in turn led to the Treasury’s approval for the erection of new buildings in Seoul, to serve both as the Legation and the Consulate- General. It also led to a decision to provide more satisfactory accommodation at Chemulp’o.50

In 1890-91, therefore, the majority of the old buildings on the Seoul site were torn down, and work began on a set of standard nineteenth-century British official buildings, to provide residential and office accommodation. There were conflicting views about the merits of the buildings, but they were seen by contemporaries as a sure sign of continued British interest in Korea.51 At Chemulp’o, where a site was purchased in 1887, work went on more slowly, and it was not until 1897 that the buildings there were completed.52

THE BRITISH CONSOLIDATE 1890-1900

Further evidence of this British interest, both official and private, was forthcoming in the 1890’s. Additional consular sites were selected at Chin-namp’o, Mokp’o, Pusan and Masanp’o, as these ports were opened. Although in some cases buildings were leased with the sites, there were never permanent establishments at these places. Consular officers visited from time to time, however, and the sites were kept well into the twentieth century.53

The turbulent years of the 1890’s saw British marines brought up to Seoul from time to time, in order to protect the legation. The officers and men were often a welcome addition to the small foreign community.54 Other visitors were also important. Chemulp’o was a regular port of call for the British naval detachments in East Asian waters, and not infrequently, senior naval officers went up to Seoul. Many British sailors are buried in the Inch’on Foreign Cemetery, including eighteen of those lost when one of the boats from HMS *Edgar* capsized in November 1895.55

There were of course happier occasions. In May 1893, the British Minister at Peking, Nicholas O’Conor, sailed up the Han river to Seoul, to present his credentials as British Minister to Korea, the first Minister to do so since Sir Harry Parkes in 1884. He stayed a week and as well as his formal audience at the Palace, he gave a grand dinner to mark the Queen’s [page 12] birthday.56 In 1897, his successor, Sir Claude McDonald, also presented his credentials in Seoul.57 Two other important visitors during the 1890’s were the celebrated lady traveller Mrs. Bishop and the future Lord Curzon. Both wrote valuable books about Korea, with Mrs. Bishop in particular arguing for a much stronger British presence in a “...country rich in underdeveloped resources and valuable harbours, and whose possession by a hostile power would be a serious threat to [British] interests in the Far East...”58

One of Mrs. Bishop’s biggest complaints was the lack of British commercial activity in Korea. Sir Harry Parkes’s predictions had on the whole proved accurate. It was not that British goods did not reach Korea. They did and in reasonable quantities, but the trade remained as it had been in 1882, in the hands of Chinese, and especially after 1894-1895, Japanese merchants. The British merchants established in China and Japan showed no inclination to develop the Korean market. Not that they were alone in this, for the total number of foreign firms established in Korea by the mid-1890’s was pitifully small. However, in 1896, the British firm of Holme, Ringer and Company, set up originally at Nagasaki in the 1860’s, established a branch at Chemulp’o, the first British firm of any standing to test the Korean market since Jardines in 1883-4.59 Before long they were acting as agents for other British companies including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and, somewhat later, the Glasgow-based Singer Sewing Machine Company.60

There was another area of British commercial interest—gold mining. This scarcely got under way before the turn of the century, but the British were as keen as other foreigners to obtain concessions from the Korean government, though it was not always British companies which exploited the concessions obtained.61

It was also the 1890’s which saw the establishment of a British missionary presence in Korea. Given the interest in Korea aroused through contact in Manchuria, it is not surprising that a number of missionary societies sought to have special clauses inserted in the 1883 treaty to facilitate missionary work. In fact, no special arrangements were made, Parkes and others believing that the treaty system would allow a certain amount of missionary work and that any attempt to seek a special status for missionaries would only meet with Korean objections. But although the Anglican church in Japan and China took an early interest in the possibility of establishing a mission in Korea, nothing happened for some years. There were a number of Britons working with American and other groups, but no formal British missionary presence in Korea until 1890. It was then, following the recommendation in 1887 of the Anglican Bishops of North China [page 13] and Tokyo, that an Anglican missionary bishop, Charles J. Corfe, arrived in Korea. He purchased various pieces of land, including one just in front of the British Legation, and set about organising his mission.62

It had been difficult to get this project under way. There were some doubts in Anglican circles about the stretching of resources which Corfe’s mission would represent, and also about appearing to compete for converts in a country where there was already a well-established Roman Catholic mission. Corfe had also found great problems recruiting others to work in Korea. Nevertheless, Corfe persisted, and by 1900, the Anglican mission was a well-established and highly-regarded one. Corfe set high standards. He insisted on the need to learn the vernacular, and did not attempt the conversion of Koreans until he and his colleagues were able to operate in the Korean language. Instead, the mission concentrated on its three small hospitals, two in Seoul and one at Chemulp’o and on other activities such as its printing press, which did secular printing as well as work for the mission. In addition Corfe began a programme which was unique among missions in Korea, of missionary work among the Japanese.63

The 1890’s also saw a marked increase in the number of Britons employed in one section or another of the Korean govenment. Probably the earliest such employee was W. Du Flon Hutchinson, who acted as Secretary to P. G. von Mollendorff from 1883-1885. Hutchinson then left Korea to run an English school on Taiwan, but returned in 1892 as a teacher in the naval school established on Kanghwa island. He later transferred to Seoul.64 Other teachers included Messrs. Hallifax and Frampton. For a short time, in the late 1880’s, a British engineer was in charge of the electric lighting in the Royal Palace. In 1896, Mr. Stripling, formerly of the Shanghai police force, became adviser to the Korean government’s newly formed police department.65

The most famous of these British advisers were those in the Korean customs service. The Korean customs service was in a somewhat anomalous position until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, for it was to all intents and purposes part of the Chinese customs sevice. Not only were all its personnel appointed by the British head of the Chinese service, Sir Robert Hart, but they and the ports at which they served appeared in the Chinese customs’ published lists. After 1895, there was a change. Although in practice, all appointments were made in Peking, matters relating to Korea no longer appeared in the Chinese customs’ publications.66

There were British members of the Korean customs from its inception, but the most famous of them was J. McLeavy Brown, an Ulsterman like Hart, who was Chief Commissioner of Customs in Korea, with one short [page 14] break, from 1893 to 1905, and who also acted as chief financial adviser to the King of Korea from 1896. Not only was he responsible for helping to put Korea’s finances on a reasonably sound footing, but he was widely credited with responsibility for much of the improvements which took place in Seoul around the turn of the century. It was McLeavy Brown who designed Pagoda Park and who set in hand the work on the Stone Palace in the Toksu Palace.67

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE JAPANESE TAKEOVER OF KOREA

By the end of the nineteenth century, British interest in Korea seemed strong. The British government had thought Korea important enough in 1885-1887 to occupy Port Hamilton as a preventive measure. It was jealous of the rights of British traders and of British employees of the Korean government. Although its position on Chinese claims over Korea was perhaps ambiguous, its original treaty position had been designed to assert Korea’s independence. Publicly, the British position was to encourage Korean independence, and there were those who argued firmly that Britain should increase its commitment to Korea by increasing its diplomatic and consular coverage.68 The growing signs of Korea’s willingness to take its place in the world, e.g. by the despatch of diplomatic envoys, were wel-comed.69

In 1898, the British position seemed to be reinforced, for a decision was made to break the link between British representation in Peking and that in Seoul. The then Consul-General, John Jordan, was at first appointed charge d’affaires, and then in 1901,Minister Resident.70 Yet this post was to last only until 1905. In spite of all appearances to the contrary, by 1900, and even more so by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Britain had come to believe that its interests in Korea were so slight that they were not worth a struggle. Britain’s continued preoccupation with Russia had led to a search for new allies, and in 1902 to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The logic of that Alliance was that it was better to have Japan in Korea than Russia, a position further emphasised when the Alliance was renewed in 1905. Although the British position was no different, in effect, from that adopted by other countries, including the United States, the sanction given to the Japanese takeover by the two Anglo-Japanese Alliances, has caused much bitterness to Koreans ever since.71

There were few changes for the British community after 1905, when Japan established a protectorate over Korea. The British Legation formally [page 15] closed but it re-opened immediately as a Consulate-General, whose exact status was to remain somewhat anomalous for a few years longer.72 Japanese pressure was brought to bear to oust McLeavy Brown from the customs service,73 but at least one other Briton continued to work for the customs for several more years. Indeed, by 1910, the British community, excluding known Canadians and Australians, who were then and indeed until the Pacific War listed as British, still numbered well over a hundred. As well as the customs, other Korean government departments employed Britons at least up to 1910. There were still teachers in government establishments, and others were employed in areas such as the waterworks. In trade and industry, too, the years 1905-1910 saw a modest increase rather than a decrease in the number of British companies operating or represented in Korea. The British-American Tobacco Company set up a factory under British management at Chemulp’o. Other Britons were employed in more humble capacities, such as governess and hotel keeper. Even the constable at the United States, Consulate-General in 1910 was British.74

The years immediately after 1905 saw an expansion of British missionary activity. The Anglican mission continued to grow at a slow pace. Corfe left in 1904, the burden of trying to learn Korean, and the lack of funds and interest in Britain for his mission, proving too much for him to bear any longer. His place was taken by the second Anglican bishop, Arthur Turner, whose approach and interests were different.75

The Anglicans were joined in 1908 by quite a different brand of missionary, the Salvation Army. The Salvation Army’s message first reached Korea through Koreans in Japan, and when the first representatives arrived in Korea, they were amazed and delighted by the reception they received. When it was realised that some of this Korean pleasure was the result of a mistaken interpretation of the form which “salvation” would take, the delight faded. Criticism from other missionary groups at what was seen as the naivety of the Salvation Army also led to some early soul-searching. But the newcomers persisted and survived.76

Not all Britons accepted the Japanese takeover, although in general, most foreigners accepted the change after 1905. But one or two did not. Most prominent of these was a British journalist, Ernest Bethell.

Bethell originally arrived in Korea in 1904 to cover the Russo-Japanese War for a British newspaper. He decided to stay on, and began his own local newspaper, which appeared at first as a bilingual publication. The English name was the *Korean Daily News*, and in Korean it was *Daehan Maeil Shin-bo*. Not knowing Korean himself, Bethell relied on his Korean colleagues to produce the Korean-language version of the newspaper.  [page 16]

Bethell early on took an anti-Japanese stance, which was perhaps stronger in Korean than in English, for he had, in effect, no control over what appeared in the Korean-language edition of his paper. The Japanese authorities, stung by Bethell’s constant attacks, sought redress through the British consular courts still operating in Korea. Bethell was convicted, and eventually spent a spell in jail in Shanghai. On release, he returned to Korea, where he died in 1909. He is buried in the Seoul Foreigners’ Cemetery, and his grave, defaced during the Japanese colonial period, has become a place of pilgrimage.77

THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD 1910-1941

In 1963, Mr. Whitwell gave it as his opinion that after 1910, the subject of British involvement in Korea “...seems to shrink and become less interesting.”78 That is a view which I do not share.

There were of course changes after 1910. As Whitwell pointed out, the Japanese, having made Korea a colony, were not keen to share it with others. But the British community did not fade away. Inevitably, with Korea no longer an independent country, but an appendage of Japan, the focus shifted, but there is much of interest about the British in the colonial period, and probably much more to be discovered by research in a variety of archives.

Among the first changes after 1910 was abolition of extraterritoriality and the other privileges which foreigners, including Britons, had enjoyed in Korea since the 1880’s. Although some were concerned at this change, for most it made as little difference as had the similar changes in Japan in 1899. The Japanese courts and Japanese officials were, on the whole, careful of foreigners.79

These changes led the British government to look carefully at its representation in Korea. The somewhat unusual position in which the Seoul Consul-General had been left after 1905 was rectified in 1910-1912. Thereafter, Seoul was part of the British consular service in Japan, staffed by Japanese-speaking officers and certainly in the late 1930’s, and probably before, with Japanese locally-employed clerks.80

The transfer to the Japan service also led to a close look at Chemulp’o and at the other places where there was consular property. Chemulp’o had been made a substantive vice-consulate in 1904 and a consulate in 1908. But even then, there were doubts about its continued usefulness. Although it was true that such British trade as there was generally came through Chemulp’o, this had proved to be never very much. Major trade rivals such as [page 17] the United States and Germany had not felt a need to maintain consular posts there. There was some hesitancy about abandoning the post altogether, however, and in 1914, it was decided to leave it vacant for the moment. In the event, Chemulp’o was never reopened as a British consular post, and the site and buildings were sold in the 1920’s. The building survived the Pacific War, doing duty as a community arts centre in the late 1940’s. During the Inch’on landing in September 1950, “British Consulate Hill” was a major objective, and the old building was destroyed. Today the Olympus Hotel stands on the site.81 During the 1920’s, the other sites which had been leased or purchased for possible use, were all disposed of. For a time, it looked as though Pusan might be retained, because of the potential of that port, but in the end, that too went.82 The official British presence after 1914 was confined to a Consul-General, plus two or three assistants in Seoul and, occasionally, an unpaid honorary appointment elsewhere.83

Britain’s official presence may have been reduced after 1910, but Britain’s official interest in Korea was not. The British government, having accepted the Japanese moves to assert control over Korea after 1905, had not taken a very serious view of allegations of Japanese atrocities during the period when the Japanese were consolidating their position. But some twelve years later, at the time of the March First Movement in 1919, the British authorities were far less tolerant of Japan’s behaviour in Korea.84 Later, in the 1930’s, as tension grew between Japan and the western powers, the British watched with concern the growing Japanese rigidity and xenophobia which hit Koreans, and often the poorest Koreans, even more than they affected the foreigners at whom they were supposedly aimed.85

British trade and traders did not disappear from Korea after 1910, but some found it difficult to operate. The British American Tobacco Company withdrew in 1914 after the introduction of the tobacco tax.86 Holme Ringer and Company closed its Chemulp’o branch but there were at least two other British general trading companies up until the Pacific War. One was W. G. Bennett and Company, which held a number of important agencies, including that for Lloyds. The other belonged to H. W. Davidson, last British employee of the Korean customs after the Japanese takeover and supervisor of the building of the Stone Palace in the Toksu Palace. Others ran small businesses at a variety of places throughout Korea.87

In mining, too, British interest remained strong right up to 1940. The Chosen Mining Corporation was registered in London, and at least one of the other major mining enterprises, the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company, although nominally American, was in fact partly dependent on British capital, and also imported its equipment from Britain. Only at the [page 18] end of the 1930’s, with growing Japanese pressure, did these companies abandon the operations they had been conducting since at least the turn of the century.88

Missionary activity also showed no signs of a decline during the colonial period. No new groups joined those already established, and some of the small British missionary organisations withdrew from Korea.89 The British and Foreign Bible Society, whose interest in Korea went back to the beginnings of missionary activity, became the sole publications agency for several Bible societies in 1919. It operated in Korea until, like other missionary organisations, its foreign staff were forced to withdraw in 1940.90 The two major British missionary groups, the Anglicans and the Salvation Army, not only remained active but expanded their respective activities until they too, were compelled to withdraw.

The second Anglican Bishop, Bishop Turner, died in 1910. He was succeeded by Mark Trollope, who had been the first priest to follow Corfe in 1890. Trollope was a scholarly man of considerable dynamism. (Not the least of his achievements was the resurrection of the RAS, which after an initial spurt of activity, had fallen on evil days. Trollope did much to reactivate it, and was its president for many years.)91 He set about building up the church in his charge with great energy. He continued the work among the Japanese, encouraged expansion into areas not previously covered, ordained the first Korean Anglican clergy, established a theological college, and laid the foundations for an Anglican religious sisterhood. All this was achieved against the same lack of resources which had beset his predecessors.92

In addition, Trollope, having decided that the Anglican church needed a cathedral, sought and obtained the required funds. The foundation stone was laid in 1922 and the cathedral consecrated in 1926. It was fitting that when Trollope died in 1930, permission was sought and obtained for his remains to be placed in the crypt of the cathedral he had built.93 In addition to these rather grand scale activities, the Anglicans continued to build attractive Korean-style churches, and ran small country hospitals in places where few other missionaries operated. Trollope’s successor, Bishop Cooper, continued his work. The wholly Korean order of Anglican nuns, the Society of the Holy Cross, received its first fully-professed member at the beginning of 1932, and several others were added in the next few years.94 Bishop Cooper also took various measures to ensure better financial arrangements for the church.95 By 1935, there were some 7,000 baptised members, 27 priests and 54 catechists.96

The Salvation Army had a similar story of activity. From its some- [page 19] what hesitant beginnings, it grew rapidly. Although there were officers from many countries, the British continued to be the main foreign group. As well as evangelisation, it quickly took on the sort of social work for which it had already become famous. It began winter relief work in 1918 among destitute boys in Seoul, and this led to the establishment of a “Beggar Boys Industrial School.” In 1926,it established, with the Federal Council of Missions, an institution “...for the rescue of fallen women... euphemistically called ‘The Women’s Industrial Home.’ “97

Both these missionary bodies took the decision after 1910 not to oppose the Japanese takeover of Korea. In this their approach differed from that of many other missionaries. This does not mean that they were indifferent to developments in Korea, but rather that they did not think that overt political activity formed any part of their function. This did not stop them expressing their opposition to Japanese policies, either in reports back to Britain to their headquarters or sometimes to the British government. How effective these unpublicised efforts were in influencing policy makers in either Britain or Japan it is hard to say, but the fact that the attempts were made should not be forgotten.98

THE COMING OF THE WAR 1940-41

By 1940,the war clouds were gathering in Korea as elsewhere. There were Japanese-inspired anti-British demonstrations in Seoul. In the countryside, the Anglican mission hospitals found it more and more difficult to operate. The “shrine question,” and the whole problem of the relationship between Christianity and Japanese demands affected the British missionaries and their flocks, just as they did all other Christians. Japanese suspicions of the military flavour of the Salvation Army, always there but dormant during most of the colonial period, now flourished again.99

As tension grew, the British missionaries, like most others, decided that it was best for expatriates to leave, a move which was encouraged by the British Consul-General. The Anglicans left behind one of their number, Arthur Chadwell, who had been imprisoned by the Japanese in retaliation for the imprisonment of a Japanese in Shanghai.100 When war came in December 1941, there were offically 58 British subjects in Korea.101 Exactly how this figure was arrived at is impossible to say, but it would have included Canadians, Australians and other empire and commonwealth citizens, and may also have included Irish missionaries. There were also two British consular officials, their wives and a typist.  [page 20] This latter group was detained on the compound in Seoul, while the others were usually held, in varying degrees of discomfort, in the areas where they had initially been detained In summer 1942, all were repatriated via Portuguese Africa.102

THE BRITISH RETURN 1945-1950

Korea did not play a great part in British planning during the second world war. Though until 1941 Britain was still the most important western power in East Asia, this was no longer the case by 1945. The British forces fighting in Burma were joined at one time by a Korean unit from Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, but otherwise there was little or no contact between Britons and Koreans.103

Korea did of course begin to feature in the Great Power discussions which began in 1943, as the focus of the war shifted from Europe to Asia. None of the participants in those discussions seem to have given much thought to Korea or indeed to other parts of the Japanese Empire until then. Britain’s role vis-a-vis Korea seems to have been limited to opposition to the idea of a long period of trusteeship before independence. It was thus at British insistence that the reference to Korea becoming free and independent “in due course,” became part of the allies’ stand on Japan’s colonies. This had more to do with Britain’s own colonial empire than with concern for Korea.104

British forces played only a small part in the occupation of Japan and none at all in Korea. Nor did Britain play any part in administering Korea below the 38th parallel. But Britain was anxious to reestablish its representation in Korea, and this was encouraged by the Americans. An official visited from Tokyo in December 1945. This led to the appointment of a British naval officer for liaison duties and to look after British official property. Consular work proper, which was then effectively limited to looking after the property of British subjects, remained with the Swiss representative, as it had during the war.105 Although the original plan was for the naval officer, Lt. Lury, R.N.V.R., to take up his post in December 1945, it was not in fact until mid-February 1946 that he arrived in Seoul. Lury had been charged to set in hand repairs to the residence and the offices, which had deteriorated badly during the war, but he did not have time to do much before he was replaced in May 1946,by D.W. Kermode, a consular officer. Kermode was “British liaison officer.” rather than a consular officer, until the Americans agreed to recognise consular officers in the autumn of 1946.106 [page 21]

He must have seemed a good choice for a rather difficult task, for he had originally joined the Japan consular service in 1922. But he clearly found the conditions under which he had to work very trying. He asked for a considerable number of staff to help him, but raised frequent objections to those offered. Faced with a constant barrage of complaints from Seoul—which were even raised in the House of Commons in London, following a visit by Fitzroy Maclean, M.P.―one of Kermode’s colleagues in London noted that “… Mr. Kermode liked to have a grievance to nursed.”107

Even as Mr. Kermode’s complaints were being aired in Parliament, things began to improve. As well as occasional visitors, a more permanent British community began to reestablish itself. The expatriate Anglican missionaries had been anxious to return to Korea as soon as the war ended, but it was not until autumn 1946 that first Bishop Cooper and then Fr. Charles Hunt reached Seoul. They found the Anglican church still functioning well, in spite of the war. The cathedral was in good condition, as were many of the country churches, though that in Kanghwa town had lost one of its bells, taken by the Japanese for scrap, since it had been cast in England.108 The Salvation Army sent an officer from Japan about the same time, but it was not until 1947 that Commissioner Lord’s arrival marked the permanent return of foreign Salvationists. Like the Anglicans, Lord found his Korean colleagues in good shape.109 For both, of course, there was the sadness of the country’s division and the loss of contact with those in the north.

The years 1946-50 thus saw a gradual reestablishment of the Britons in Korea. The Consulate-General was repaired and functioned normally. Following the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, it again became a Legation, with Capt. Vyvyan Holt appointed the first Minister in March 1949. (A Korean Legation was opened in London about the same time.) By 1949, there was once again a British commercial presence, with both Jardines and Swires represented.110

The Britons, like most foreigners outside the American net, lived a somewhat hand-to-mouth existence, especially in the early days. Everything was run down after the years of war. Repairs were costly, and difficult to finance. Indeed, financing was to prove a great complication in many instances. Thus some of the Anglican church’s funding in 1948 came from money collected in Korea to finance the Korean team for the London Olympics, the team’s expenses in London being met by the Church of England. All concerned were happy and no exchange control regulations were broken.111

[page 22]

THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

A member of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office said in 1945 that “Korea... is not worth the bones of a single British grenadier.”112 But when war came to Korea in June 1950, the British response was altogether different. The British government at once condemned the North Korean action. The Prime Minister took account of criticisms which had been levelled at President Syngman Rhee’s government, but said that this was beside the point: “I am not concerned to defend the [Korean] Government, or to estimate if it is a good or bad Government, but I never knew that an occasion for assaulting someone peacefully pursuing his way was that his character was not very good...”113

In spite of military commitments elsewhere, the British quickly provided forces for the United Nations Command. British ships were in action off the north in July, and the first British ground forces landed at Pusan on 29 August 1950. British ships took part in the Inch’on landing in September 1950, and the British 27th Infantry Brigade entered Pyongyang in October 1950. By the end of that same month, British troops were at T’aech’on, some forty-five miles from the Yalu River, and the furthest point north they reached during the war. The British land forces operated independently, as did other British Commonwealth forces, until the summer of 1951. Then all the Commonwealth land forces joined to form the First Commonwealth Division.114

During the course of the Korean conflict, and immediately afterwards, over 1,000 British servicemen lost their lives. Many more were wounded or captured. There were, of course, many engagements involving British forces, but the most famous was the stand of the First Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment during the battle of the Imjin river in April 1951. In that engagement, which lasted from 22 to 25 April, this battalion, supported by C Troop 170th Independent Mortar Brigade, Royal Artillery, held off some 30,000 men of the Chinese 63rd Army. The action left the “Glosters” with some 59 dead and 526 prisoners. It held up the Chinese advance for a sufficient length of time to allow the main UN forces to regroup for the defence of Seoul. Only 67 officers and men escaped capture, and 34 died as prisoners of war. The Chinese 63rd Army was withdrawn from the battle and did not fight again in Korea.115

The British had been quick to respond to the invasion of the Republic of Korea, but as the war progressed, doubts arose about the way in which the UN Commander, General MacArthur, was conducting it. In particular, the British government, which had extended diplomatic recog- [page 23] nition to the People’s Republic of China in January 1950, was concerned at the drive to the Yalu and at the airing of the possibility of using nuclear weapons. At the same time, the unanimity which had appeared immediately after 25 June 1950 in British political circles, began to break down as the war continued. MacArthur’s dismissal helped to restore Anglo-American agreement to some extent, but as the war dragged on, voices of dissent grew louder in Britain.116 At the outbreak of the war in June 1950, the British Minister was still Vyvyan Holt, appointed in 1949. He did not leave the city, believing that it was his duty to remain and that his diplomatic position would protect him. Two other members of his staff also stayed.117 Others who remained in Seoul included the Anglicans, Bishop Cooper, Fr. Hunt, Sister Mary Clare (the only one of the Sisters of St. Peter to return to Korea after the Pacific War), and Commissioner Lord of the. Salvation Army. In July 1950, they were all detained by the North Koreans and were taken on the notorious death march. Fr. Hunt and Sister Mary Clare died during this ordeal. Another expatriate Anglican, Fr. William Lee, disappeared without trace from Inch’on in 1950, as did many Korean Anglicans and Salvationists. It was not until early 1953 that it was confirmed that Holt and the others had survived. These survivors were released just before the 1953 armistice.118 Two other casualties of the war should also be mentioned. These were the war correspondents, Ian Morrison of *The Times* and Christopher Buckley of the *Daily Telegraph,* who were killed, together with an Indian officer, on 12 August 1950.119

Following Holt’s capture, the British Legation moved first to Taegu and then to Pusan, where it remained until the end of the war. It was headed at first by a charge d’affaires, but from 1952 a new Minister was appointed.120

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 1953-1957

Though the war went on, Britain and the Republic of Korea continued to do normal business, though it had to be conducted in the crowded conditions of Pusan. One sign of normality was the visit of the Korean Prime Minister, Mr. Too Chin Paik, to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in June 1953, even before the end of the war.121.

It was not only the diplomats who functioned at Pusan. The Anglican mission, deprived of its Bishop, did so also, under an assistant Bishop, Arthur Chadwell. To their other works, the Anglicans, like all other missionary bodies, now added urgent relief work. The needs of the [page 24] refugees also brought new British organisations to Korea, such as the Save The Children Fund.122

The prospect of the end of the war allowed both the missionaries and the Legation to return to Seoul. The Anglican headquarters moved back there from Pusan in March 1953. The cathedral had survived, but both it and the buildings nearby, including the convent of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, were in urgent need of repairs.123 Again, as in 1946, finance was a major problem. Bishop Cooper, somewhat restored after his detention in North Korea, returned to his diocese in November 1953. The strains he had undergone, however, proved too much for him, and a year later he resigned as Bishop.124

The Legation buildings, too, survived the war, though damaged. There was some reluctance on the part of the Office of Works to begin repairs for fear that a renewal of the fighting might take place, but eventually, following the move of the Korean government back to Seoul, the work was set in hand.125 By autumn 1953 the main buildings were usable, and the Legation formally reopened in Seoul on 27 January 1954. The first social function to be held after the return was an informal reception, attended. by the Foreign Minister, among others, on 12 February. That year, the Queen’s Birthday Party was again held in Seoul.126

As reconstruction got under way, so life returned to something like normal. British relief organisations were still active in Korea, and British government aid was also forthcoming. A provisional Air Services Agreement was signed between Korea and Britain in 1954, which provided for flights between Korea and Hong Kong. 1954 also saw the resumption of normal commercial activity, though on a very small scale at first. It also saw the establishment of the Korean-British Society, to further friendship between the two countries.127

THE PRESENT 1957-1983

Perhaps a twenty-year span is a long time to count as the present, yet in some ways it makes sense. The raising of the two countries, diplomatic missions to Embassies in 1957 can be seen as the symbolic opening of new relations. All the elements which had been present in Korean-British relations since the 1880’s remained, but recent years have seen some changes. Perhaps least changed is the diplomatic side. In both Britain and Korea, the size of diplomatic missions had increased, but there have been no fundamental changes except that, in the British case, a new dimension was added in 1973 with the opening of a British Council office in [page 25] Korea.128 During the period 1969-1980 there was an additional form of British official presence in Korea—technical assistance teams. These included advisers at the Ulsan Institute of Technology, which was established in 1969 partly with British financial and equipment assistance, and others engaged in a variety of rural development projects, a geological survey and a medical research project. All have now come to an end, though there is still a residual British involvement with Ulsan Institute of Technology.

As well as this type of assistance, British finance and technology from the private sector played a major role in at least two important areas of Korea’s recent development—shipbuilding and the automobile industry.129 Reviving an old tradition, British banks have established themselves in Korea in large numbers and have recently begun to operate in Pusan as well as in Seoul. Recent years have seen the establishment of a number of joint venture companies, a trend which seems likely to grow. Two-way trade, minimal in the 1960’s, has expanded rapidly in the last ten years, with the balance heavily in Korea’s favour. A British Chamber of Commerce was established in Seoul in 1982.130

Britain has been a major supporter of the Republic of Korea in the international scene. The Commonwealth connection has enabled Britain to assist the Republic of Korea to establish links with a large number of former British colonies as they have reached independence. At the United Nations and in other international arenas, Britain has been a firm supporter of the Republic of Korea.

Cultural links between the two countries have been close. A number of Koreans studied in Britain even during the colonial period and since the end of the Korean War the number has increased considerably. As well as scholars of English literature, who understandably wish to go to Britain, many Korean engineers and scientists have attended British universities, especially to study subjects such as aeronautical and nuclear engineering. There have even been a few historians, though rather more political scientists.131

In Britain, the great promise of the early days was not kept up as far as Korean studies were concerned. Though many of the early diplomats and missionaries did good work in the field of language, history, botany and other areas, Korean studies did not take off in Britain. In recent years, however, that has begun to change. Partly as a spinoff from Chinese and Japanese studies, or from occasional visits to Korea by people with other interests, Korean studies are now beginning to take root in the British academic world. For the most part, they are confined to language, history and political science, but there are some more exotic developments, [page 26] such as the study of Korea music. A British Association for Korean Studies was established in 1982.132

More traditional links also continue. Both the Salvation Army and the Anglican church remain active in Korea, but there have been major changes in their links with Britain. The Salvation Army still has occasional British officers, but its expatriate officers are now more likely to come from elsewhere in the world and, in any case, it finds the majority of its officers from among Koreans.

The last British Anglican Bishop, Richard Rutt, left Korea in 1974 after twenty years. The Anglican church now has only two Britons working with it, plus two other expatriates. Its links with Canterbury remain strong. Two Archbishops of Canterbury have visited Korea since the Korean War, and many Korean Anglican clergymen have studied at the Church of England’s theological colleges in Britain. Interest in “the English Church Mission to Korea” is still kept alive in Britain, most notably through the quarterly *Morning Calm*, whose origins date back to the very first years of the mission.

Recent years have seen newcomers from Britain to the Korean missionary field. One of these is the Overseas Missionary Fellowship, successor to the China Inland Mission. Its links with Korea go back to 1951, and the establishment of the evangelical Far Eastern Broadcasting Corporation on Cheju-do, but its real work began in the 1960’s.133 Mention might also be made of the one non-Protestant religious worker—she did not claim to be a missionary―Miss Younger, who worked with Roman Catholic organisations in Korea during the 1960’s.134

One other group of people interested in Korea also deserve a mention, the Korean war veterans. They visit, and in some cases their interest in Korea has developed well beyond their own involvement in the war.135

CONCLUSION

This is inevitably only a sketch of a vast subject. As I have indicated, there is plenty of scope for more work to be done on a whole variety of issues in Korean-British relations. This is particularly true the closer one gets to the present, though it is then of course that the wealth of material available can become swamping. As the archives have opened on the Korean War years, there has been something of a boom in studies of that period in Britain, and no doubt the fruits of that work will soon begin to hit bookshops all around the world. But there are many other subjects of equal fascination which deserve attention. Some of these go back to the [page 27] very first days of Korean-British relations, such as the question of why the British decided to accredit their Minister in Peking to Seoul. What is needed is careful reinterpretation of the archives, not unsubstantiated assertions. There is also a need for proper studies of the British and other roles during the colonial period, again with dispassion and a desire to find as much of the truth as is possible, rather than to make a polemical case. Similarly, there is a need, and plenty of scope, for studies of the British and other contributions to Korea’s recent development.

Since the end of the Pacific War Koreans have, understandably, tended to focus on the relationship with the United States and with Japan, and have lumped everything else together. What is needed now is a look again at other countries’ contributions. In the British case, that is no small amount, as I hope I have shown in however an inadequate way.

**NOTES**

1. S. J. Whitwell, “Britons in Korea,” Transactions of the Korea Branch, Royal Asistic Society TKBRAS, vol. 41 (1964),1-56; A. W. Hamilton, ‘‘British Interest in Korea, 1866-1884,,,Korea Journal,vol. 22,no. 1,(Jan. 1982),24-41. A recent Korean account is: Kim Ki Yeol, ‘‘The Early Anglo-Korean Relations in the 19th Century,” Sahakchi, no. 17, (Nov 1983), 47-86. ; “ ‘

2. Michelborne’s charter was in breach of the East India Company’s monopoly. That, plus the fact that he had not paid his share to the Company, made him unpopular with his erstwhile fellow merchant-adventurers: Sir G. Birdwood, editor, (assisted by W. Foster), The Register of Letters etc. of the Gouvernor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies, 1600-1619,(London, 1873, reprinted London, 1965), p. 134, note 2. The text of the charter can be found in State Papers Docquets (SP38)/7.

3. J. H. Longford, The Story of Korea (London and Leipzig, 1911),pp. 196-98; G. N. Curzon. Problems of the Far East, (London, revised edition, 1896) p. 168,note 2.

4. Curzon, Problems of the Far East, p. 178, note.

5. Longford, Story of Korea, p. 225. See also Augus Hamilton, Korea, (New York, 1904), p. 169.

6. Basil Hall, Account of a Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Corea and the Great Loo-Choo Island, (London, 1818,reprinted Seoul 1975); J. M’Leod The Voyage of the Alceste to the Ryukyus and South East Asia, (London, 1817, reprinted Rutland, Vt., 1963). A Korean account of this visit can be found in G. Paik, “The Korean Record on Captain Basil Hall’s Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Korea,” TKBRAS, vol. xxiv, (1934), 15-19.

7. Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of Three Voyages Along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, and 1833; With Notices of Siam, Corea and the Loo Choo Islands (London, 1834, reprinted New York, 1968). See also Kim Key-huick, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (Berkeley, 1980), p. 40.

8. Komun-do may have been named Port Hamilton in 1845 after the then Secretary [page 28] of the British Admiralty, by Captain Belcher of HMS Sam a rang: Longford, Story of Korea, p. 266. For regular visits by the British Navy, see H. C. St. John, Notes and Sketches from the Wild Coasts of Nipon (Edinburgh, 1880), pp. 247-48. Both the Russian and the United States’ navies were interested in the islands: G. A. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884-1899, (Talahassee, 1982), 1, 8; R. E. Johnson, Far China Station: The US Navy in Asian Waters, (Annapolis, 1979),p. 131.

9. Park Il-keun, editor, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866-1886, (Seoul, 1982), p. 488, “Memorandum by Sir E. Herslett on the Importance of Port Hamilton (Corea)”, 5 Feb 1885.

10. J. E. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest in Korea before 1910”, International Studies, (Papers of the International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics) 1984/1,pp. 1-14.

11. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 1-2; M. W. Oh, “The Two Visits of the Rev. R. J. Thomas to Korea”, TKBRAS, vol. xii (1933), 95-124.

12. Korean Mission Field, vol. xi, no. 11 (Nov. 1915). A new book, by Dr. James Grayson, gives an account of Ross’s life and reproduces some of his writings. Kim Chong Hyon(J. Grayson), Han’guk ui ch’ot son’gyosa (Korea’s First Missionary), (Seoul, 1982).

13. The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (TASJ), for example, contain a number of such works, published in the 1870’s and early 1880’s: D. M. Kenrick, ‘‘A Century of Western Studies of Japan”, TASJ, 3rd series, vol. 14, (Dec. 1978),especially appendix 10.

14. Longford, Story of Korea, p. 226.

15. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 82 et seq., Sir T. Wade, (Peking) to Earl Granville, no. 5,confid., 18 February 1881,enclosing a memorandum by Mr. W. D. Spence, Sept. 1880.

16. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 70-72,J. G. Kennedy, (Tokyo) to Granville, no. 131,very con fid., 27 July 1880,forwarding a memorandum by E. M. Satow, 26 July 1880; see also Kim “Early Anglo-Korean Relations”, pp. 60-64.

17. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, I,17. See also, Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 64-65, Kennedy to Granville, no. 131, very con fid., 27 July 1880.

18. K. Morinosuke, Nichi-Bei gaikoshi, (“History of Japanese-American Diplomatic Relations”) (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 27-32; I. H. Nish, “The Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1883”, International Studies, 1984/1, p. 17.

19. It has been written of Admiral Stirling’s 1854 treaty with Japan that “...his results were disappointing to almost everybody except himself”: W. G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858, (London, 1951), p. 113.

20. Nish, “Anglo-Korean Treaty,” pp. 17-18. For a more favourable view of the Willis treaty, see A. R. Michell, “The Abortive Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1882”, Anglo-Korean Society Bulletin (Autumn/Winter 1982), pp. 15-20. A contemporary British voice in its favour, at least privately, was that of Sir Robert Hart, head of the Chinese customs service in Peking: J. K. Fairbank, K. F. Bruner and E. M. Matheson, The I G in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907,(Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1975), I, 455-57, Hart to J. D. Campbell, A/47, 24 March 1883.

21. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 141-43, J. Mollison to Granville, 9 Jan 1883. Similar letters were received from the Shanghai, Hong Kong, and London chambers.

22. Parkes told the Korean envoys in Japan in December 1882 that the Willis treaty [page 29] was ‘‘...of no value to my country...”, a view with which he said they had agreed. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 134-38, Parkes to Granville, no. 176,confid., 29 December 1882.

23. Nish, ‘‘Anglo-Korean Treaty”, pp. 18-24. See also Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Diplomacy of Korea, 1875-1885, (Seattle and London, 1975), pp. 162-63. The assertion is made from time to time―e.g. Han Woo-keun, History of Korea (Seoul, 1970), pp. 385-86; Dong A Ilbo 31 Jan 1983—that one British objection to the treaty was its failure to allow the import of opium. This is not the case, as Parkes himself made clear in discussions he had with the Chinese statesman most involved with Korean affairs, Li Hung- chang, when they met as Parkes was on his way to Seoul in October 1883: Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 375-78, Parkes to Granville, no. 37, confid., 3 Nov 1883.

24. Parkes’s official report on the final stages of the negotiations is in Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 388-97, Parkes to Granville, no. 42, 6 Dec 1883. He recorded more informal views and impressions in letters to his eldest daughter: S. Lane- Poole, Sir Harry Parkes in China, (London 1900, reprinted Taipei 1968), pp. 357-60.

25. Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, pp. 362-63, Currie to Parkes, 22 Feb 1884.

26. As well as in major areas such as tariffs, Parkes was extremely careful over apparently minor matters such as foreigners’ cemeteries: J. E. Hoare, “The British in Korea: Graves and Monuments”, Korea Journal, vol. 23, no. 3, (March 1983), 28-29.

27. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen, pp. 180-81. This was through the use of the “most-favoured-nation’’ clause, a device whereby the benefits gained by one treaty power were automatically extended to all others.

28. Longford, Story of Korea, pp. 316-19. Parkes’s official account is in Park, Anglo- American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 483-84, Parkes to Granville, “No. 1 Corean Mission”, 28 April 1884.

29. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen pp. 189-90.

30. The system is explained in F. T. Piggott, Extraterritoriality: The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and to Residence in Oriental Countries, (London, 1892), pp. 108-15. The system in Korea was taken over from that operating in China and Japan. I have examined its operation in Japan in J. E. Hoare, “Extraterritoriality in Japan, 1858-1899”, TASJ, 3rd series, vol. 18, (July 1983), pp. 76-79, 79-83.

31. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 410-12, Parkes to Granville, no. 54, confid., 16 Dec 1883.

32. The Treasury’s reluctance to spend any money on Korea became apparent from the very first: see Treasury Records (T/l)/14809, for the minutes on Parkes’s first letter on consular sites, 16 Oct 1882.

33. Fairbank, et. al., The I G in Peking, I, 590-91, Hart to Campbell, 2/212, 23 March 1885. There is a brief discussion of the point in A. W. Hamilton, “British Interest in Korea, 1866-1884, Korea Journal, vol. 22, no. 1, (Jan 1982), 27-28, but more research needs to be done on the subject.

34. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 230-35, Parkes to Granville, no. 66, 28 April 1883, enclosing W. G. Aston to Parkes, 24 April 1883. For the history of the area, see G. Henderson ‘‘A History of the Chong Dong Area and the American Embassy Residence Compound”, TKBRAS, vol. xxxv (1959), 1-31’ especially pp. 15-16. The Korean government’s agreement to the transaction was given on 10 May 1884: Asiatic Research Cen- [page 30] tre, Korea University, Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, English Version (Seoul 1968), I, 33-34.

35. Diary of Horace Allen, quoted in unpublished notes issued by KBRAS March 1971 on “Chemulp’o Revisited: a Tour of Inch’on City”. The saga of the jail can be followed in Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 470-72.

36. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, p. 968, George C. Foulk, U.S. Naval Attache, to Secretary of State, 10 Oct 1884.

37. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 277-78, Parkes to Granville, no. 97, 9 June 1883, Report on Trade for 1883.

38. In 1897, there were 33 British heads of household in Korea—this included some Canadians and Australians―compared to 22 Americans, 17 Germans and 8 French. There were then 10,711 Japanese and 477 Chinese: I. B. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbours, (London 1898, reprinted Seoul 1970), pp. 469-70, Appendix D.

39. Foreign Office China (F017)/996, Aston to Granville, no. 1, 3 Jan 1885. The American Minister’s account is in Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials p. 988, L. H. Foote to Secretary of State, no. 128, 17 Dec 1884.

40. F017/996, W. R. Carles to Granville, no. 1, 9 Jan 1885; F017/1084, N. O’Conor (Peking) to P. Currie, private, 22 Dec 1885.

41. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, p. 490, Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell to Admiralty, tel., 15 April 1885.

42. Kim Yung Chun, “Anglo-Russian Crisis and Port Hamilton, 1885-1887”, Journal of the Korean Cultural Research Institute, vol. 18 (1971), 243-71; A. W. Hamilton, “The Komundo Affair”, Korea Journal, vol. 22, no. 6 (June 1982), 20-30.

43. The Graphic, 12 Feb. 1887, has a brief illustrated account of the occupation.

44. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 682-84, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 21 July 1886, enclosing Vice-Admiral Hamilton to Admiralty, 31 May 1886.

45. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 680-82, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 17 July 1886, enclosing Hamilton to Admiralty, 1 June 1886.

46. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, p. 758, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 28 February 1887, enclosing Hamilton to Admiralty, tel., 28 Feb 1887.

47. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 757-58, Sir J. Walsham, Peking, to Earl of Iddesleigh, no. 324, confid., 28 Dec 1886.

48. J. E. Hoare, “Komundo-Port Hamilton”, Bulletin of the Korean-British Society, no. 3 (1983), 48-53.

49. F017/1308, Aston to Parkes, accounts no. 1, 30 May 1884.

50. Works 10/389, Sir J. Walsham, Peking to F. J. Marshall, Office of Works, Shanghai, Public accounts no. 10, 27 August 1888. For Treasury approval, see Works 10/389, Treasury to Board of Works, no. 7504, 30 April 1889. Walter Hillier, who was appointed acting Consul-General in May 1889, last seems to have used the term “acting” in April 1890: Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, I, 694, Joint letter from the diplomatic and consular corps to Korean Foreign Ministry, 26 April 1890.

51. S. J. Palmer, edit., Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1963), II, 241-43, A. Heard to Secretary of State, no. 301, 12 Sept 1892.

52. Works 10/342, W. A. Robinson to Treasury, draft no. 6177, 18 August 1914, enclosure, “Consular property in Corea”. See also The Independent 6 July 1897.

53. Works 10/342, “Consular property in Corea”. [page 31]

54. In 1896, they provided drill masters for the government’s English school: The Independent, 5 May 1896.

55. Morning Calm, May 1896, Bishop’s letter, 13 Nov 1895.

56. J. E. Hoare, “The Centenary of Korean-British Relations: The British Diplomatic Presence in Korea 1883-1983”, Korea Observer, vol. xiv, no. 2, (summer 1983), 137-38.

57. The Independent, 25 and 27 March 1897.

58. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbours, p. 457.

59. Incheon [Inch’on] City, Inch’on kaehang 100-nyon sa, (“100-Year History Since the Opening of Inch’on Port”), (Incheon 1983), p. 173. For the origins of Holme, Ringer and Company, see G. Fox, Britain and Japan. (Oxford 1969), p. 330,note. 6.

60. Korea Review, Jan. 1901, pp. 14-15; Korea Daily News, 23 August 1904. A German firm, E. Meyer and Co., were the agents for another British bank, the Chartered: Korea Daily News, 4 Aug 1904. The American Townsend and Co. were agents for Nobel’s Explosive Co. of Glasgow: Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, II, 148-49, J. N. Jordan to the Korean Foreign Office, 7 Dec 1899.

61. Korean Repository, December 1898; Korea Review, Feb. 1901. See also E. W. Mills, “Gold Mining in Korea”, TKBRAS, vol. vii, pt. 1, (1916), especially pp. 23-29, and Lee Bae-yong, “A study on British Mining Concessions in the Late Choson Dynasty”, Korea Journal, vol. 24, no. 4 (April 1984), 23-38.

62. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 3-6.

63. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 6-7. The hard-pressed Korean mission also looked after Newchang in China for a number of years,

64. See the obituary in Korea Review, July 1901.

65. Korea Daily News, 19 Sept. 1904; Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, I, 292 et seq., C. M. Ford, acting Consul-General, to the Korean Foreign Office, 26 Sept 1889, and subsequent correspondence; Bishop, Korea and her Neighbours, pp. 441-42.

66. Fairbank, et al., The I G in Peking, II, 1022, note 2. This, as Hart had foreseen in 1882, helped to maintain China’s claim to suzerainty over Korea; I, 429, Hart to Campbell, no. 2/94, 30 Oct 1882.

67. For contemporary accounts of McLeavy Brown, see Morning Calm, May 1899, and Bishop, Korea and her Neighbours, pp. 2, 381 and 453.

68. Interview with Sir C. McDonald, in The Independent, 1 April 1897 and a speech by Curzon quoted in The Independent, 11 September 1897. For a voice raised for an increased diplomatic presence, see Hamilton, Korea, p. 135.

69. After a number of abortive attempts, partly sabotaged by the Chinese, the Koreans finally sent a resident mission to London in 19이, with Min Yong Tong as Minister Resident, the same rank as that of the British representative in Korea. The post closed in 1905. From 1900 to 1906, W. P. Morgan, a former M. P. who was involved in gold mining in Korea, was Korean Consul-General in London. See Foreign Office List, 1900-1906.

70. Dictionary of National Biography, “Sir John Jordan”.

71. This is a theme discussed in I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907, (London 1966), pp. 233-34, 320-22, and 329- 30.

72. Discussed in Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, pp. 139-40.

73. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 352.

74. Embassy and Consular Archives, Japan (F0262)/1065, H. C. Bonar to Sir C. McDonald, no. 47, 20 July 1910. I am grateful to Dr. A. Michell, University of Hull, for [page 32] drawing my attention to this reference.

75. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, p. 7.

76. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 8-9. See also P. Rader “Seventy Years in Korea”, Salvation Army Yearbook. (London 1978), pp. 13-16.

77. For the most recent account of Bethell, see Chong Chin-sok, “E. T. Bethell and the Taehan Maeil Shinbo”, Korea Journal, vol. 24, no. 4 (April 1984), pp. 39-44. The Japanese authorities were able to use the precedent of a famous case involving a British newspaper publisher in Japan in the 1870’s: J. E. Hoare, “The Bankoku Shimbun Affair: Foreigners, the Japanese Press and Extraterritoriality in Early Meiji Japan”, Modern Asian Studies, 9 no. 3, (1975), 289-302. In the 1960’s, Korean journalists, (to whom Bethell is still very much a hero), tracked down some of his descendants living in Britain: Chung’ang Ilbo, 7 Sept 1969.

78. Whitwell, “Britons in Korea”, p. 49.

79. G. Herslett, edit., Herslett’s Commercial Treaties. (London 1913), vol. xxvi, 92- 95: Japanese proclamation, 29 Aug 1910, and British Order in Council, 23 Jan 1911.

80. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, pp. 139-40.

81. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, pp. 140-41. By 1912, Japanese was the language being used for much if not all official work: Records of the Consular Department (F0369)/484, Sir C. McDonald to Earl Grey no. 11 cons., 22 Jan 1912.

82. Works 10/24/1 contains papers from 1889 to 1925 on the acquisition and disposal of these other sites.

83. foreign Office List, various years.

84. The whole question is discussed in Ku Dae-yeol, “Korean Resistance to Japanese Colonialism: The March 1st Movement of 1919 and Britain’s Role in Its Outcome”, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1979.

85. See F0371/31845, G. H. Phibbs, Seoul, to Sir R. Craigie, Tokyo, no. 184, 29 Sept 1941.

86. Ku, “Korean Resistance”, p. 34.

87. Bennett was originally manager for Holme, Ringer and Co. Both he and Davidson engaged in general wholesale trade, and both served as British pro-Consuls at various times.

88. Mills, “Mining in Korea”, passim; G. C. Allen and Audrey Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan, (London 1954), p. 224, note

89. For example, the British Evangelistic Mission: Korean Mission Field, vol. xi, no. 7 (July 1916).

90. J. C. F. Robertson, The Bible in Korea, (London, no date [1954]), pp. 45-46.

91. R. Rutt, James Scarth Gale and His History of the Korean People, (Seoul 1972), p. 40.

92. C. Trollope, Mark Napier Trollope: Bishop in Corea, 1911-1930, (London 1930), is a biography by his sister.

93. There is a brief account of the Cathedral in B. F. L. Clarke, Anglican Cathedrals Outside the British Isles, (London 1958), p. 120. Trollope’s visions and struggles can be traced in his own papers, now in the archieves of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in London.

94. Anon., The Society of Holy Cross, (n.p, [Seoul] n.d.).

95. A. D. Clark, A History of the Church in Korea, (Seoul 1971), p. 331.

96. L. V. Beere and W. E. Lees, SPG Handbook: Corea, (Revised Edition London [page 33] 1935), p. 72.

97. Korean Mission Field, vols, xvii, no. 1, (Jan. 1921), xxii, no. 12, (Dec. 1926), and xxiv, no. 1, (Jan. 1928).

98. This point is discussed in Ku, “Korean Resistance”, pp. 290,294-95. For somewhat opposing view, see A. Hamish Ion, ‘‘British and Canadian Missionaries’ Attitudes to Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 1910-1925”: Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, Vol. I (1976) Part I: History and International Relations, pp. 60-77.

99. Something of the atmosphere can be found in the report of Dr. Anne Borrow, the doctor at the Anglican hospital at Yoju. The report, from the SPG archives, 1940,is marked: “It is inadvisable to print anything from this report”. (Copy of the report supplied by Miss A. J. Roberts, MBE, Taejon.)

100. S. Hall, With Stethescope in Asia, (McLean, Va. 1978), p. 582; Morning Calm, June 1947.

101. F0371/31736/F217/33/61, Minutes relating to the number of British subjects in Japanese territory and Japanese in British territory, Dec. 1941.

102. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, p. 142; F0371/31839/F7551/867/23, “Treatment of British Subjects in Japanese Controlled Territory”.

103. Han Woo-keun, History of Korea, p. 497.

104. W. R. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945, (Oxford 1977), pp. 235-36; B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberalism and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-47,(Princeton 1981), 104-06.

105. Records of the Chief Clerk’s Department (F0366)/1778/xS3K/23/19. D. M. McDermot, Tokyo, to Foreign Office, no. 76, confid., 29 Dec 1945.

106. F0366/1778/XS3K/23/19, Washington tel. no. 2233, 19 Sept 1946; Tokyo tel. no. 1271, 30 Oct. 1946. See also, Foreign Relations of the United States, (1946), vol. viii, pp. 685 and 735.

107. F0366/1778/XS3K/23/19, Minute by M. S. Henderson, 6 Sept. 1946, recording a conversation with Mr. A. De la Mare, Japan Department, FO. The saga of Mr. Kermode’s complaints can be followed in this file.

108. SPG Archives, D. Korea, 1945, Bishop Cooper to Bishop Roberts, 13 May 1945; D. Morrison, The English Church, 1890-1954, (London 1954), pp. 12-14. For the unfortunate bell, see Morning Calm, March 1948.

109. Rader, “Seventy Years in Korea”, p. 15; Clark, The Church in Korea, pp. 238-29.

110. The Trade Yearbook, (Seoul 1949).

111. H. P. Thompson, Into All Lands: The History of the Society for the Propogation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, 1701-1950, (London 1951), p. 209.

112. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, p. 488, note 65.

113. D. Rees. Korea: The Limited War, (New York 1964), pp. 33-34. Attlee’s position was supported on all sides. Even the left-wing Tribune said that the U.S. government was right to take action in Korea, and the British government right to support them: P. Lowe, Britain in the Far East: A Survey from 1819 to the Present (London and New York 1881), p. 205.

114. There is still no official British history of the war. The best account remains C. N. Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of the British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot 1954). The British role is also covered in Ministry of National Defence, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, (second edition Seoul 1981), vols, II, 585-730; VI, 405-446.  [page 34]

115. There is an account of the battle in Korea Times, 22 and 23 April 1983. See also the account by the Glosters’ adjutant of the fighting and his captivity: A. Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword (London 1955).

116. H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952, (London 1954), pp. 968 et seq. See also B. Porter, Britain and the Rise of Communist China, (London 1967), pp. 83-132 for a full discussion of strands in British attitudes to the Korean war. For the role of the press in this, see P. Knightley, The First Casualty, (London 1982) pp. 320-340.

117. H. J. Noble, Embassy at War, (Seattle and London 1975), pp. 259-61; P. Deane, I Was Captive in Korea (New York 1953), p. 79.

118. There are many accounts of the “death march.” As well as Deane’s, cited above, see P. Crosbie, March Till They Die, (Westminster, Md. 1956). This contains testimony to the heroism of Cooper and Lord, in particular. Bishop Cooper gave his own account in an interview on his return to Korea in November 1953: Korean Republic, 21 Nov. 1953.

119. Knightley, The First Casualty, p. 324.

120. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, p, 143.

121. Korean Republic, 14 March 1954.

122. R. Rutt, The Church Serves Korea, (London 1956), p. 29. For the Save the Children Fund, see Korean Republic, 13 May 1954. It began operations in Pusan in 1952.

123. SPG Archives, DS 1954 Korea, Report on 1953 by Bishop Chadwell, 20 Jan. 1954.

124. SPG Archives, DS 1954 Korea, Bishop Cooper to Bishop Roberts, 19 Nov. 1954.

125. See F0366/3024 for papers on this, especially XCOI/81/853, R. B. Marshall to R. H. G. Edmunds, 8 June 1953.

126. Korean Republic, 27 Jan., 13 Feb., and 1 June 1954.

127. Korean Republic, 14 Aug., 6 Oct. and 16 Dec. 1954. For the Korean-British Society, see J. E. Hoare, “The Korean-British Society: Some Past Events, 1954-1974”, Bulletin of the Korean-British Society, no. 2, (May 1982) pp. 7-10. There has been a London equivalent since 1957: Morning Calm, Dec. 1967.

128. “British Council Plays Active Role as Link for Cultural Exchange”, Korea Herald (Supplement), 26 Nov. 1983.

129. Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 Nov 1976. See also “ROK Trade with UK rises sharply”, Korea Herald (Supplement), 9 June 1983.

130. “British Chamber Contribute to Trade Boost with Korea”, Korea Times (Supplement), 26 Nov. 1983.

131. Early Korean graduates of British universities include former President Yun Po- sun (Edinburgh) and Dr. Kim Sang Man, KBE, (London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London).

132. “UK Interest in Korean Studies”, Korean Newsreviews, 18 Feb. 1984; A. R. Michell, ‘‘Korean Studies in the UK”, Korea Journal, vol. 24, no. 4 (April 1984) pp. 76-77.

133. Overseas Missionary Fellowship, One Small Flame, (Sevenoaks 1978), pp. 22-24; L. T. Lyall, A Passion for the Impossible, (London revised edition 1976), pp. 189, 200.

134. S. Younger, Never Ending Flower, (London 1967).

135. The British Korean War Veterans Association publishes its own journal, the Morning Calm.

[page 35]

**Travelling for Her Health: The Extraordinary Life of Isabella Bird Bishop\***

**by James Huntley Grayson**

Mrs. Bishop was, perhaps, the quintessential example of that species of Victorian woman, the lady traveller. She was also in two senses the perfect Victorian lady, for not only did her lifetime fit nearly perfectly into the years of the reign of Queen Victoria, but she was, at least in Victorian Britain, very much a well-mannered lady. Her exploits to then exotic parts of the globe make quite a contrast to the image of the life of a Victorian gentlewoman, and for this reason, if no other, she excites our interest. I first became acquainted with Mrs. Bishop during my period of missionary training when I read with enthusiasm her absorbing account of Korea at the end of the 19th century. I came to have the highest regard for her powers of observation and her ability to sympathize with the Korean people while at the same time maintaining a critical distance. This lecture represents the fruits of some research pursued as a hobby about this interesting figure. The books upon which this lecture is based are listed at the end of the written article. A special word of thanks is due to the Manuscripts Department of the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh and to Miss Elspeth Yeo of that department for her generous assistance in supplying useful materials. From 4 December, 1981 to 13 February, 1982, the library held an exhibition of materials relating to the life of Mrs. Bishop entitled “A Curious Life for a Lady, Isabella L. Bird, 1831-1904.” Materials in that exhibit formed the basis of this paper.

**CHILDHOOD**

Isabella Lucy Bird was born on the 15th of October, 1831, the first daughter born to Edward Bird, a minister of the Church of England. Although the family background and the early experiences of Isabella do not totally explain the woman she was to become, they do help us to

\* This article was first presented as a lecture before the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

[page 36] understand the source of many of her ideas and beliefs. Her family on both sides could be described as a high-minded, activist Christian family passionately committed to Christian causes. Her father came from a well-to-do Warwickshire family and he had originally been a barrister before the Supreme Court of Calcutta, India. Following the death of his first wife and his son, he returned to Great Britain to seek ordination in the Church of England—he married the daughter of the prebendary of Ripon Cathedral in 1830. Edward Bird was a strict Sabbatarian, probably as much for social reasons as for theological reasons. On her mother’s side, Isabella’s family were related to the abolitionist William Wilberforce and were strong supporters of the movement to abolish slavery. Some of them even refused to use sugar in their tea because it came from plantations employing slave labor. In the modern age, this is the kind of family which for reasons of Christian faith would be in the forefront of the movement to ban nuclear weapons, or involved with other high-minded causes. Isabella gained from her family not only a strong sense of the social implications of Christian faith, but also an early training in the disciplined observation of the world around her. From the age of four, her father would take her around the countryside in which they resided pointing out to her the various things which were about them. He would then ask young Isabella to tell him exactly what he had told her. At an early age, she learned the value of close observation and the ability to recite to others what she had seen.

Although there is no diary which remains from the years of Isabella’s childhood, there are several incidents which have been recorded from that time which give us some insight into the kind of woman she was developing into. One characteristic of Isabelia was a dislike for cant and rhetoric and she seems to have had this trait from a very early age. When she was in her sixth year, a local political hopeful came to pay a call on the parson, Edward Bird During his visit, this gentleman made some flattering observations about the parson’s younger daughter, Henrietta. Isabella, by chance overhearing these fulsome remarks, flew in to the room and addressed herself to the candidate thus:

Sir Malpas de Grey Tatton Egerton, did you tell my father that my sister was cute because you wanted his vote?1

Another characteristic of Isabella’s personality which manifested itself from an early age was her intellectual curiosity. One luncheon during her seventh year when she could not be found in the normal places in the home, the family discovered her in the loft of their stable engrossed in [page 37] Archibald Alison’s *History of Europe during the French Revolution, Embracing the Assembly of the Notables of 1789 to the Establishment of the Directory in 1795* (1833). This may not be quite the ordinary fare of the average seven-year-old, but it is indicative of the inquiring mind which Isabella had. She was precocious and was encouraged to be so. This pre- cociousness resulted in the authorship of a short book on *Fiscal Protection and Free Trade* written in her sixteenth year. One can readily imagine the intellectual vigor which must have characterized Edward Bird’s parsonage, but in doing so one must not overlook, as has one recent biographer, the high moral tone of that environment. It was not simply knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but knowledge and effort for a moral purpose. In this respect, the Bird household undoubtedly represented the best of the Victorian character.

In her later youth, Isabella had two experiences which were important in molding the course of her future life. When she was nineteen, she underwent the first of many operations for “spinal problems”. Exactly what these problems were, I have not been able to discover precisely, but it is a fact that painful problems with her back caused her to be virtually an invalid during her years of residence in Britain. It was because of the severity of these ailments that her doctors recommended she take long sea voyages for her health. One would hardly have guessed that this petite invalid at home would become a Goliath among world travellers. Her remarkable courage and ability to make quick and conclusive decisions is illustrated by an incident which took place in 1852 when she was twenty-one. During a solitary journey to London, the cab in which she was riding was stopped briefly in the traffic, at which juncture a bundle of leaflets was thrown inside. Stooping to pick them up, Isabella discovered another package which contained a plan for the assassination of one of the members of the Cabinet. While she was mulling these matters over, a strange and suspicious looking individual put his head through the cab window and asked if there was a package which had been left in the vehicle. With great presence of mind, Isabella gave the man the bundle of leaflets and quickly instructed the driver to go straight to the Home Office. Arriving there, this diminutive girl demanded and was granted an immediate interview with the Home Secretary. The latter was so impressed by Isabella’s remarks that he listened with close attention and concluded the session by granting Isabella a police escort for the remainder of her stay in London. At the end of her youth, we find Isabella a young woman with a keen intellect, an ability to closely observe the scene around her and describe it clearly to other people, and great courage in the face of dangerous cir- [page 38] cumstances. These qualities and others would seem to indicate that she had a bright future before her. Were Isabella’s prospects to be undermined by her painful health problems?

**THE YOUTHFUL TRAVELLER**

Although Isabella Bird was to be one of the most peripatetic of Victorian travellers, she did most of her travelling, at least initially, for her health. In the spring of 1854, her family sent her to Portsmouth to recuperate from a case of insomnia which must have been in part related to pains in her back. While there she watched the fleet depart for the Baltic Sea as part of maneouvers for the Crimean War and wrote two articles about the wartime appearance of Portsmouth. Her stay in that seaside city did not seem to result in the restoration of her health and her physician recommended that she take what was to be the first of many long sea voyages. Her family gave her £100 and sent her off to North America telling her to come back only when the money ran out. On this first jaunt abroad, Isabella made an extensive tour of the North American continent, visiting Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Boston, Cincinnati, and Toronto. She travelled by what were the most modern forms of transport at that time, the steamboat and the railway. Her observations of the young American republic and its frontier, as described in the book which she wrote about her experiences, are in refreshing and frank contrast to the myths which have developed about that time. On her travels west by rail she had another experience which called forth her resourcefulness. She discovered that a fellow passenger had picked her pocket. When the conductor came round she merely remarked that the gentleman next to her had her tickets. Isabella always had great presence of mind. When she returned to Britain, she wrote up her travel observations into a book and attempted to have it published. It was at first rejected, by Blackwoods, but finally accepted by John Murray, who was to become her lifelong publishing agent. The book, *The Englishwoman in America*, was published in 1856 and became an immediate success. Isabella’s career as a literary traveller was successfully launched.

From 1850 onward, her family had taken to summering in the Highlands of Scotland, from which experience Isabella gained her permanent interest in the livelihood and welfare of the Highlander. Mr. Bird also was favorably impressed by the dour, strict northern Scot. Isabella’s father, being a strict Sabbatarian, had been forced to leave one parish after [page 39] another and found that the Sabbatarianism of the Highlander was much to his liking. Isabella donated the proceeds of her first book to buying deep sea fishing boats for the Highlanders, the first of what were to be many benevolent donations.

In 1857, her back began to give her problems again and Isabella set off on her second journey to North America, this time seeing more of the United States than on the previous journey, making a trip of more than 2,000 miles. In the course of these travels she went both to the Deep South and as far north as Hudson’s Bay. Her father was very interested in reports of the religious revival which was sweeping the United States at that time and had asked Isabella to make some notes on what she saw of it. In her precise manner, she listened to and made copious notes about 130 sermons, which resulted in a further book, *The Revival in America by an English Eye-witness* which was published in 1858. Her father used her notes to write his own book on the subject, but he died before he could complete this project. Isabella worked to finish this book of her father’s and it was published in the following year under the title *The Aspects of Religion in the United States of America*. The death of her father and the family’s subsequent removal to Edinburgh closed the early period of adventure in Isabella’s life. It did not close off her activity but only redirected it into new channels.

**THE SOCIAL ACTIVIST AND THE WORLD TRAVELLER**

The family’s move to the Scottish capital placed Isabella in a vital cultural center dominated by two important social forces, the Kirk and education. The home which the Birds were to occupy for the next twelve years at 3 Castle Terrace immediately adjoined the headquarters of the non-established United Presbyterian Church of Scotland. This physical proximity is symbolic of the intellectual similarity of many of Isabella’s views with those of leading ministers of that church and the other free churches. In 1861,she first made the acquaintance of Dr. Thomas Guthrie, minister of Free St. John’s Church in Edinburgh and the founder of the “Ragged Schools” for what Dr. Guthrie described as the city’s arabs. It was through men such as Dr. Guthrie and other members of the Edinburgh intellectual establishment that Isabella got her first taste of social work. Although she always maintained an interest in the destitute of her adopted city, during the middle years of the sixth decade of the nineteenth century she resumed her interest in the welfare of the Highlander. She [page 40] became acquainted with and worked with Lady Gordon Cathcart, a wealthy land-owner in northern Scotland, who tried to alleviate the poverty of the northern crofters by assisting emigration to Canada. This scheme involved not only assistance with transport to the New World but help with the purchase of land in Canada. Isabella, representing Lady Gordon Cathcart, made her third trip to the other side of the Atlantic in 1866 to visit the settlers in their new homes. Upon her return she toured the Outer Hebrides and wrote a series of five articles which compared the destitution of life in the Highlands with the comfortable life which the settlers had made for themselves farming in Canada.

In 1867, she again took up her cudgels on behalf of the poor of Edinburgh. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Edinburgh was two cities, one the elegant and sophisticated New Town and the other the ugly, filthy relic of the Scottish Middle Ages, the Old Town. The Old Town, built on the rocky outcrop which is topped by Edinburgh Castle, was a composite of many tall, cramped and decrepit tenement buildings, some of which attained a height of nine or ten stories. It was not for their height for which they were renowned, but rather for their squalor. Isabella and several of her friends were moved to investigate the situation of life in these tenements. The results of their thorough investigations were written up in a book which Isabella authored*, Notes on Old Edinburgh*, which was published in 1869. In this tract she castigated the city fathers for their lack of interest in the welfare of the lowest stratum of society in their city, and challenged them to do something about the appalling conditions.

Even after their mother’s death in 1866, Isabella and her sister Henrietta continued to reside at Castle Terrace and to summer, as had their parents, in the Highlands. However, Isabella’s health continued to deteriorate so that by 1871 her physicians were recommending that she take a voyage, preferably to the Mediterranean Sea. She took this advice and extended her journey to include a fourth visit to North America, this time only to New York. This voyage had little effect on her health and a further journey was suggested in 1872. Isabella decided to take her first lengthy sea voyage and chose to go to Australia and New Zealand. Not only did this trip not seem to influence her health favorably, but she found the Antipodes boring and took a strong dislike to them. While contemplating her return to Britain, it was a chance remark by a fellow traveller that led Isabella to include the Sandwich Islands in an extended itinerary. This was to have a lasting influence on her life.

For her return voyage to Britain, Isabella arranged her journey so that she could spend an anticipated three weeks in the Hawaiian Islands. [page 41]

This diversion extended itself into a stay of six months during which time the bored invalid showed her mettle as a world traveller of great daring. Her book which records her adventures whilst sojourning in Hawaii shows that she accurately perceived the political and cultural problems of a primitive society adjusting to the impact of European imperialism. But more interesting to the ordinary man, perhaps, was Isabella’s description of her adventures mountain climbing for the first time. As an experiment, she climbed the volcano Kilaeua, which rose to a height of 4,008 feet, in preparation for her assault on Mauna Loa. After experiencing the exhilaration of ascending the smaller mountain, she then set out to conquer the peak of Hawaii’s most famous volcano. She attained the summit at 13,675 feet and established herself as a woman mountain climber, a rare being even among Victorian lady travellers.

Reluctantly leaving the Sandwich Islands, she continued her journey home by travelling across the continental United States, her fifth visit to the New World. Arriving in San Francisco, she immediately boarded the first train going east, stopping off at Estes Park in Colorado where she was to spend the next six months. During her sojourn in the Rocky Mountains she was in the company of one of the most notorious frontiersmen, Rocky Mountain Jim, who was to be her guide and mentor for most of her stay. A rough friendship between them blossomed when Isabella and Jim made the assault on Long’s Peak. It seems incredible that a woman who was considered an invalid at home could have made the ascent of this mountain, which at 14,255 feet was some 600 feet higher than the great volcano on Hawaii. Mountain climbing was clearly in Isabella’s blood. Isabella wrote two books about her experiences in Hawaii and the Rockies, both of which proved to be great successes. These were *The Hawaiian Archipelago* (1875) and *A Lady’s Life in the Rocky Mountains* (1879). The title of the latter book suggests that notwithstanding her arduous outdoors life, Isabella thought of herself very much as a lady and not as a rough and ready traveller.

For much of the seventh decade of the nineteenth century, Isabella devoted most of her time to social work and began to take a particular interest in medical missions, both within Britain and abroad. Upon her return to Edinburgh in 1873, she immediately threw herself into the work for a Grand Bazaar to support the work of the Livingston Mission in Central Africa. Her interest in the work of medical missionaries led her to take up an interest in medicine and medical research. She studied the use of the microscope, which is an important fact not only because it symbolizes the seriousness of her interest in medical research, but also be- [page 42] cause it shows how Isabella invariably kept herself abreast of the latest scientific and technical knowledge. In 1876, she became closely acquainted with Dr. John Bishop who was her sister’s physician and was soon to become her own. Dr. Bishop was very much interested in medical missionary work and Isabella and he found that they had many interests and causes in common. Her interest in the destitue of Edinburgh was re- invigorated and was linked with interests in medical work. During the period 1876 to 1877, she threw herself into the creation of a dispensary and clinic which was to be located in the Cowgate area of the Old Town. In the nineteenth century as today, this section of the Scottish capital was one of the poorest and roughest parts of the town. The clinic which was created in that area was maintained by an organization to which Isabella gave her wholehearted support, the Edinburgh Medical Missionary Society. Her interest in helping her fellow man was not limited to concern for their health. In 1874 to 1875, she waged a vigorous battle in support of a rest and refreshment house for the cabmen who drove the carriages in Edinburgh. At first the city fathers paid little attention to the demands made by this diminutive lady, but Isabella was not easily put off. She deluged the City Chambers with letters and requests until, overwhelmed, the city fathers gave in and granted her request. By the end of the seventies Isabella again began to experience problems with her health and it seemed time for another voyage to regain her strength.

**THE MATURE WORLD TRAVELLER**

In 1878, she set off on another long journey abroad, this time to Japan where she was to spend seven months. Today we think of Japan as one of the most advanced nations in the world. In the nineteenth century, Japan was a developing nation. When Isabella visited the Island Empire, it was only ten years after the Meiji Restoration had brought the progressive party to power. At the time of her visit the world thought of Japan as an advancing nation, and the government of Japan sought to show this progress to the world through its modernized cities such as Tokyo and Yokohama. Isabella was not the least interested in these areas, but in the “real” Japan, the lesser visited parts which rarely if ever saw a European face. She in fact scorned those who concentrated their interests only on the bright lights. In the introduction to her book Unbeaten Tracks in Japan she says:  [page 43]

From Nikko northwards my route was altogether off the beaten track, and had never been traversed in its entirety by any European. I lived among the Japanese, and saw their mode of living, in regions unaffected by European contact. As a lady travelling alone, and the first European lady who had been seen in several districts through which my route lay, my experiences differed more or less widely from those of preceding travellers...2

Her interest in Japan, however, was not merely confined to the Japanese, but included a strong interest in the aboriginal inhabitants of the islands, the Ainus. When she travelled, Isabella utilized an approach that would be familiar to modern anthropologists, participant observation. Although she did not use this term herself—it was not invented until much later―she did exactly what an anthropologist on a field study would do: live with the people and observe closely their way of life. In the same preface, she says:

I am able to offer a fuller account of the aborigines of Yezo, obtained by actual acquaintance with them, than has has hitherto been given.3

and goes on to add that:

In Northern Japan, in the absence of all other sources of information, I have to learn everything from the people themselves, through an interpreter, and every fact had to be disinterred by careful labour from amidst a mass of rubbish. The Ainos supplied the information which is given concerning their customs, habits, and religion; but I had an opportunity of comparing my notes with some taken about the same time by Mr. Heinrich Von Siebold of the Austrain Legation...4

These remarks also indicate that Isabella was not a hasty or sloppy researcher, but carefully sifted and sorted her material, comparing her observations with others for accuracy. Unbeaten Tracks in Japan is still an important resource on conditions in Japan during the early Meiji Period, and deservedly so.

En route to Britain, Isabella stopped in Singapore where she was encouraged by acquaintances to see Malaya before returning home. She spent some five weeks there and her observations about the Malay states which had come under the protection of the British Crown are very [page 44] astute. Her book describing her travels there, *The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither* (1883) is composed of thirty-three letters which she had written to her sister, Henrietta, relating her journeys not only on the Malay Peninsula, but in Hong Kong, Canton, and Singapore. This information allows the reader to compare the impact of British imperialism on its major centers in the Far East. It also makes for interesting comparisons with her observations on early Meiji Japan, which also appear in letter form. Although not principally a political commentator, she did have strong views on how colonial governments should be conducted. She said:

If I may venture to give an opinion upon so controverted a subject, it is, that all Colonial authorities in their dealings with native races, all Residents and their subordinates, and all transactions between ourselves and the weak peoples of the Far East, would be better for having something of “the fierce light which beats upon a throne” turned upon them. The good have nothing to fear, the bad would be revealed in their badness, and hasty counsels and ambitious designs would be held in check.5

Although a child of her time insofar as she accepted the fact of colonialism, passages such as this leave no doubt that Isabella regarded colonial governments to be at the service of the citizens of the colonies.

On the 25th of February, 1879, Isabella sailed from Penang for home making stops in the Near East before arriving on her native shores. Passing through the Red Sea, she stopped off on the Sinai Peninsula for four days, camping in the vicinity of Mt. Sinai. She also paid a visit to Cairo before pushing on for home, which she reached in May. Her work for the next few years consisted in preparing the manuscripts of her trips to Japan and Malaya for publication as books. She was saddened greatly by the death in May of 1880 of her sister Henrietta to whom she was very devoted. During the course of her sister’s final illness, Isabella grew close to Henrietta’s attending physician, Dr. John Bishop. Isabella had, of course, known Dr. Bishop for many years, but it would appear that it was the devotion which both of them had for Henrietta that led Isabella to accept John Bishop’s proposal of marriage. They were married on the 8th of March, 1881, when Isabella was fifty. As devoted as they were to each other, life with the extrovert Isabella could not have been easy for the more introverted John Bishop. He often used to tease Isabella by saying that she had a tiger’s appetite and an ostrich’s digestion. Although un- [page 45] doubtedly secure in Isabella’s ultimate devotion to him, John used to say that his only rival was the plateau of Central Asia and he was probably right.

During the scant five years of their marriage, both John and Isabella suffered from various ailments―John more so than Isabella. On the recommendations of their own physicians, the Bishops made several trips to the Riveria for rest and relaxation, but to no avail. As Isabella’s back continued to give her problems, she agreed to an operatioan by John’s mentor, Sir Joseph Lister, the inventor of chloroform for surgery. Apparently, Isabella found this experience so interesting that she recorded her sentiments in a poem, “Under Chloroform, a Psychological Fragment”, in 1885. John did not improve and the Bishops made yet another trip to the Riviera in 1886,this time to Cannes, where John died. Within five years’ time, the death of two people to whom she was greatly devoted had a strong impact on Isabella. She resolved to devote the remainder of her life to the cause of medical missions, which had been a major concern of her late husband. To this end, she studied medicine during 1887 in St. Mary’s Hospital in London, while at the same attempting to organize a mission hospital in Nazareth in the Holy Land. The Turkish government which ruled Palestine at that time refused to give permission to build the John Bishop Memorial Hospital, and Isabella sought to apply her efforts elsewhere. At the end of the year, she went to Ireland to help with famine relief there, returning to Britain in 1888. In that year, she was consecrated for service by the great preacher Charles Spurgeon, which became another turning point in her life.

**FINAL JOURNEYS**

In the last fifteen years of her life, Isabella, now popularly known as Mrs. Bishop, was to undertake three major journeys―to India, the Far East, and Morocco―any one of which would have taxed the energies of a younger person. In the course of each journey she applied the same method of travelling amongst the people to closely observe their ways of life which had proved effective on earlier trips. Most of these trips were undertaken not only for the adventure of discovering knowledge about distant places, but with the additional, if not primary, aim of founding mission hospitals. Whatever Isabella did, she did it with enthusiasm, so it is not surprising to learn of the number of institutions of this sort which she was responsible for founding.  [page 46]

Her first lengthy journey taken after the death of her husband was to India and Persia. She sailed in February of 1889 for India and after journeying through the western part of that country, she went north to Kashmir and Lesser Tibet (the Ladak region) from where she peered for the first time into Tibet and the Himalaya Mountains. She reached Simla in October and proceeded from there to Amritsar and on to Karachi. She left the subcontinent and attempted to enter Persia by going first to Iraq. On her journey up the Tigris River to Baghdad, she met Herbert Sawyer who was on a diplomatic and military mission to Persia for the British government. Travelling with this adventurer and later by herself, she made a circuitous journey from Baghdad to Tehran and from thence south to the holy city of Isfahan. From there she journeyed north through the Baktiari country and Kurdistan, finally coming out on the Black Sea at Trabzon. She arrived in London in December, 1890. This journey had been as full of adventure as any of her previous trips. Once, in Kashmir, her guide was arrested for murder just as she was making a sketch of him. Isabella furthered her concerns for medical missions on this trip by founding two hospitals, the John Bishop Memorial Hospital in Islamabad, and the Henrietta Bird Hospital for Women in Amritsar. She had seen first-hand the oppressive treatment of the Christian Armenians in Islamic lands and went immediately to speak to Prime Minister William Gladstone about the matter, later speaking to a Parliamentary committee on the same subject. From these journeys there resulted two books, *Among the Tibetans* published in 1894 and *Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan* published in 1891, the year after her return from the East.

While working on the manuscripts for these two books, Isabella found herself to be a lecturer very much in demand. In 1891, she lectured at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and in the following year at the Royal Scottish Geographical Society and the Royal Geographical Society in London. In 1891, she had been made a Fellow of the R.S.G.S. and when it became known that the London counterpart was contemplating the same move, some misogynist admirals of the old school created such a brouhaha that *Punch* was prompted to satirize the issue. During these years, Isabella entered into an agreement with a friend, a certain Miss Cullen, who set aside two rooms for Isabella’s use when she was not travelling abroad. It is an interesting comment on Isabella’s movements that during the five years from 1892 to 1897 that they had this arrangement, Isabella was at Miss Cullen’s residence for a total of eighteen weeks. She continued to keep abreast of the more modern scientific technology and spent time learning photography. However she [page 47] did not seem to think that she would undertake any further overseas trips. On August 23,1893, she wrote to her publisher John Murray:

I am thinking of going to pay a few visits in Japan next winter, and may possibly go on to Korea, but I am too old for hardships and great exertions now.

When she made these comments she could little know that some of the longest and most arduous journeys of her life lay in front of her.

In January of 1894, Isabella left Britain bound for the Far East and was not to return home until 1897 the longest continuous period which she had been abroad. Rather than going via the Red Sea, Isabella journeyed first to Canada, then across the North American continent by rail, and embarked at Vancouver to cross the Pacific to go to Japan. She spent little time in Japan this time but pressed quickly on to Korea about which country she had devised a program of research. In the preface to her book, *Korea and Her Neighbours* she says:

My four visits to Korea... formed part of a plan of study of the leading characteristics of the Mongolian races. My first journey produced the impression that Korea is the most uninteresting country I ever traveled in, but during and since the war its political perturbations, rapid changes, and possible destinies, have given me an intense interest in it; while Korean character and industry, as I saw both under Russian rule in Siberia, have enlightened me as to the better possiblities which may await the nation in the future. Korea takes a similarly strong grip on all who reside in it sufficiently long to overcome the feeling of distaste which at first it undoubtedly inspires.6

Her trips to Korea were the first time that Isabella set out to prove a point scientifically, so to speak, by observing the same people living under different social curcumstances. Her trips to Korea over a three year period convinced her that Korea rather than being the most underdeveloped and hopeless nation in the Far East bade fair to become an important country economically through the industry of its people. Certainly, she would feel fully confirmed by the events of the past two decades. In her journeys to Korea, a concern for medical missions was combined with an interest in the prospects for the economic development of the people. This concern in turn resulted in an affection for the Korean people which was stronger than any which she had felt for other peoples amongst whom she sojourned [page 48] on previous travels. She says on leaving Korea:

It is with great regret that I take leave of Korea, with Russia and Japan facing each other across her destinies. The distaste I felt for the country at first passed into an interest which is almost affection, and on no previous journey have I made dearer and kinder friends, or those from whom I parted more regretfully.7

Her record of her journey here, *Korea and Her Neighbours*, formed by that sympathetic attitude is no less an important resource for a Westerner’s view of the East than any of her other books.

In *Korea and Her Neighbours*, Isabella records the type of equipment which she carried with her on her journeys, rather spartan, especially when one remembers that she was 63 at the time she began this three year adventure. She says that:

I took a saddle, a trestle-bed with bedding and mosquito net, muslin curtains, a folding chair, two changes of clothing, Korean string shoes, and a “regulation” waterproof cloak: Besides, I took green tea, curry powder, and 20 lbs. of flour. I discarded all superfluities, such as flasks, collapsing cups, hand mirrors, teapots, sandwich tins, lamps, and tinned soups, meats, bouillon, and fruits. The kitchen equipment consisted of a Japanese brazier for charcoal, a shallow Japanese pan and frying-pan, and a small kettle, with charcoal tongs, the whole costing under two dollars!...Tables, trays, tablecloths, and sheets were from thenceforth unknown luxuries. I mention my outfit, because I know it to be a sufficient one, and that every pound of superfluous weight adds to the difficulty of getting transport in Korea and in many other countries.8

Her three years in the Orient were not confined to Korea alone, for Isabella made extensive journeys in China as well. In 1895, she visited China, Japan and revisited Korea. During her stay in Japan, she founded the John Bishop Memorial Orphanage in Tokyo. In 1896, she pressed on to China, first going to Shanghai and then travelling up the Yangtze River. She left the Yangtze at Ch’engtu in Szechuan Province proceeding overland toward Tibet. It had been her intention to explore part of that mountainous country, but she had to turn back because of tribal warfare amongst some of the non-Chinese tribes en route. She went back to Ch’engtu and [page 49] returned via water to Shanghai, making a total journey by boat of some 2,000 miles. At the end of the year she returned to Korea and made some final observations about Christian mission work here. Judging from Isabella’s remarks about some early women missionaries in Pusan, she strongly felt that mission work should not be conducted from a compound but by living as had these ladies amongst the people.

By January of 1897, as Isabella contemplated going home to Britain, she could look back over a journey of 8,000 miles, 2,000 of which had been by inland water, and which had taken her to Japan, Korea, Siberia, Manchuria, and Central China. It was not only her most extensive journey, but her most comparative one as well, for she could compare at first hand the livelihood and social conditions of three peoples under various circumstances. Isabella had also caught the fever of living in the Far East and was reluctant to return home to Britain. In a letter dated January 23, 1897, addressed to John Murray, her publisher, she writes:

I feel very loth to leave (Korea). Indeed I am returning to England with a very bad grace. I am far more at home in Tokyo and Seoul than any place in Britain except Tobermory, and I very much prefer life in the East to life at home.

1898 was a busy year for Isabella. *Korea and Her Neighbours* was published and it proved to be an immediate success. Two thousand copies were sold in the first year, from which Isabella made a profit of £550. She lectured again before the British Association for the Advancement of Science on the topic of “The Valley of the Yangtze.” In the following year, her record of travel in China was published under the title Yangtze Valley and Beyond followed in 1900 by the publication of two volumes of photographs which she had taken in the Far East. The first one, *Chinese Pictures*, was published in Britain, but the second book *Views in the Far East*, was published in Tokyo, her only book to be published in the Orient.

As she and her sister had for many years, Isabella took up residence in the remote Scottish village of Tobermory on the island of Mull off the west coast of Scotland. During 1899 and 1900 she waged a war against the intemperance of the local villagers, but to no avail. This was perhaps the only battle which Isabella had ever lost. In January of 1901, she left on a journey to Morocco, in the course of which travel she rode over a thousand miles by horse and camel. She was seventy years of age. Her vigor so impressed the youthful Sultan of Morocco that when Isabella wished His Highness long life, he expressed the hope that he might be as active at her age. Although she spent some six months in this North African kingdom, [page 50] it did not sufficiently interest her, and she never wrote up her impressions in book form. It also proved to be her final earthly journey.

In August of 1902, Isabella began packing her bags for another trip to China, but fell ill and was never able to make the journey. She initially spent some time in a nursing home, but her indominatable spirit refused to be confined by medical or nursing routine. She wrote to a friend:

I am not going to be a cipher any longer.

and moved out immediately. She finally took up residence at 18 Melville Street in the elegant Georgian New Town of Edinburgh where she died on October 7,1904. It is a fitting memorial to this great lady traveller that her final earthly home is presently the Scottish headquarters for the Automobile Association.

In this lecture, I hope that I have indicated to the listener that Mrs. Isabella Bird Bishop was not only a great adventuress possessed of great powers of observation and courage, but that she was a women devoted to the cause of the betterment of humanity through what she saw as the advancement of Christianity. She was a principled lady of causes who took seriously the implications of her faith. I hope that it is also clear, as it has become clear to me in reading her books, that she not only led an exciting life, but that she would have been an interesting friend as well.

**NOTES**

1. As most of the information in this lecture is taken from the standard biographies of the life of Mrs. Bishop, only that material which is actually quoted from the writings of Mrs. Bishop is footnoted here. Letters quoted here from the manuscript collection of the National Library of Scotland are not footnoted.

2. Unbeaten Tracks in Japan, p. xxiii.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid, p. xxiv.

5. The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither, p. 271.

6. Korea and Her Neighbours, p.5.

7. Ibid, p. 459.

8. Ibid, p. 67.

[page 51]

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**Shared Failure: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1888-1896**

**by Donald M. Bishop**

Poor Korean people, whose fate at last appears to be sealed, your soldiery, if they had but drilled. . . years ago in far greater numbers, might have prevented all the tragedies of the last decade.

—Bertram L. Simpson1, 1905

From 1888 to 1896 a small group of American military officers worked in the Kingdom of Korea as military advisors under contract to the court of King Kojong. Although their arrival had been a consistent objective of Korean foreign policy for half a decade, and although their story has a significant place in Korea’s troubled passage through the late nineteenth century, the advisors, work in Seoul has drawn scant attention from historians.2 The delay in the progress of Korean historical studies caused by the unfortunate events on the peninsula since the beginning of this century has meant that no Delbruck or Craig has yet portrayed the military dimension to Korean history, and the American military mission has suffered from a corollary lack of examination. Korean studies for the period between 1864 and 1910, however, have now sufficiently advanced and enough documents are now available to describe the mission, to place it in its historical context, to estimate its effects, and to judge its significance in the history of Korean modernization.

**THE KOREAN REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE**

In the late 1800’s, isolated Korea was ruled by the kings of the Yi dynasty, then in its fifth century of power. The state of the Korean armed forces in the declining dynasty offers one more illustration of the military historian’s concept that military establishments reflect the larger society of which they are a part. Though Korea possessed proud naval and military traditions, by the late nineteenth century her military institutions were weak. Korea’s long period of self-imposed isolation had left her armed forces outmoded in technology. Korean military leadership had been weakened by the same clan rivalry, factionalism, and excessive turnover that [page 54] hampered all branches of the government. Corruption and “squeeze” were as prevalent in military and naval administration as in civil governance. In sum, the Korean armed forces were increasingly unable to perform their fundamental social task—to defend the nation against foreign or domestic enemies.3

After 1876, when a Japanese military demonstration precipitated the end of Korea’s celebrated resistance to foreign relations, however, the young king and a number of members of the scholarly class, stimulated by new ideas entering Korea from abroad, became interested in reform. Drawing on both China and Japan as models, the government ordered changes in Korean military organization. Korean students were sent abroad for training—seventy to Tianjin and fourteen to Toyama in Japan. And eighty Korean soldiers were organized into a “Special Skill Force,” the *pyolgigun*, to be trained by a Japanese officer.4

In July 1882,however, a clash took place over military reform. The new military policies led troops of the other, traditional military units in Seoul to fear dismissal. Angered by an incident revealing corruption in the administration of their pay, they rose in protest. They attacked government offices, the palace, and the barracks of the Special Skill Force. The Korean troops killed the Japanese advisor and attacked the Japanese Legation. In the tumult, the ex-regent, the Taewon’gun, seized power. China, as Korea’s traditional suzerain, and Japan, to avenge the murders of its nationals, deployed troops to Seoul. The Chinese removed the Taewon’gun after a rule of thirty-three days and restored the king. The Japanese imposed a harsh treaty.5

The Soldiers’ Revolt of 1882 forced King Kojong to become cautious in, his approach to reform, and it gave him reason to regard the loyalty of his troops with some apprehension. In the wake of the revolt the king authorized China to assume a new program of military training.6 As he regarded the failure of the initial reform program, the doubtful effectiveness of his armed forces in the era of transition, and the tense diplomatic situation between Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo, he came to perceive that the new diplomatic relationship then being forged with the United States might offer possibilities for fresh initiatives.

In order to counterbalance the growing Japanese influence in Korea and to widen the kingdom’s options in the difficult period after 1876,the Korean court sought to sign treaties with other nations. China had recommended the United States as a power free of territorial ambitions in Asia. The Koreans’ willingness corresponded with Commodore Robert Shufeldt’s ambition to open Korea to the West. With Chinese assistance Korea signed [page 55] a treaty with the United States in May, 1882.7

The Korean court came increasingly to favor its new relation with the United States. In order to cement the new friendship and win American advice, assistance, and support for a reform program, the king granted several concessions to American firms and requested an American foreign affairs advisor, teachers for a royal school, farm advisors, and medical assistants.8 And at a special audience on October 16,1883,the king requested the “services of an American Military Officer, to instruct and drill my troops. If such a one can be recommended to me, I will confer upon him the Second Military rank in my Kingdom.” American Minister Lucius H. Foote eagerly conveyed the request to the Secretary of State.9

At the same time that the king was discussing military advisors with the American minister in Seoul, the first Korean embassy to the United States was in Washington.10 Minister Min Yong-ik raised the question of military assistance in conversations at the Department of State. At that time the idea that Shufeldt, soon to retire from the Navy, should go to Korea as foreign affairs advisor, was mooted. Shufeldt’s experience and the possibility that he could provide advice on foreign affairs as well as military improvements appealed to the Korean diplomats. Both Shufeldt and Secretary of State Frelinghuysen apparently assured the Koreans that an advisor—probably the Admiral―would be sent.11

Expecting a positive response to the request for military assistance, the Korean government made preparations. Minister Foote was asked to arrange the purchase of arms from an American firm.12 In January 1884, incidents between Chinese troops and Korean civilians gave the monarch a pretext to dismiss the Chinese military instructors.13 In June, 1884, four thousand Remington breech-loading rifles arrived in Seoul. Two naval officers at the American legation supervised the storage of the weapons while the king awaited the arrival of American instructors.14 The king also asked the Legation’s naval attache, Ensign George C. Foulk, to inspect Pukhan fortress to “advise as to the creation of modern batteries along its approaches.”15

The king and Minister Foote patiently awaited a formal reply from the State Department to the royal request for military advisors. On September 3, 1884, almost a year after the king’s original request, the minister wrote the Secretary of State to say he was “embarrassed and mystified” by the delay. When the State Department reply reached Seoul some months later, Foote was astounded to read that his original dispatch had been mislaid, and no action had been taken.16

In the period of delay, another crisis brewed. Conservative officials op- [page 56] posed to rapid modernization and military reform gained ascendancy in the government and began to assert control of the military units in Seoul. This state of affairs was anathema to a younger group of radical reformers, which included a number of the Koreans who had received military training in Japan. The cadets sent to Toyama in 1884 had been refused posts in the army by conservatives. Shortly afterward, it became known in Seoul that Admiral Shufeldt had decided against working in Korea.17 The radical group, with the tacit support of the king and the Japanese minister, thus decided to seize the government while they still had some control. The celebrated “post office coup” began on December 4, 1884. Several officials and military commanders were killed, and the radicals held control of the government for three days. The army units, associating the emeute with foreign innovations, reacted by attacking symbols of foreign influence, including the Japanese legation. It was not the Korean army, but rather the Chinese garrison in Seoul, that expelled the radicals and restored the government. The conspirators fled to Japan and exile. Once again, change in Korea had been stalled, at least partly by traditional armed forces.18

In 1885,Ensign Foulk, then serving as American charge d’affaires described the Korean army’s status to the Department of State. The troops were armed with modern weapons, Remington and Peabody-Martini rifles. Six Gatling guns and ammunition reloading equipment had been ordered. The army was, however, commanded by Korean officials of traditional bent. The troops of the four capital battalions

...have been well exercized in the use of modern rifles by long continued target practice; are uniformed, well garrisoned, and subordinate but are sadly deficient in training as to the manual of arms, company or platoon drill, or fighting tactics. The officers are Koreans of the old civilization without any knowledge of troops to be trained after Western methods.19

Foulk urged expeditious action on the king’s previous request for American advisors. In this desire both China and Japan, having twice sent troops to Seoul and risked the opening of an Asian war, agreed. In April 1885, the two governments signed the Convention of Tientsin to govern the withdrawal of their troops from Korea, and in the same convention they agreed that military instructors for Korea should come from a third power. Both nations communicated a desire to the Department of State, through their ambassadors in Washington, that the instructors be American.20

Everyone was willing that Americans should instruct the Korean army, it seems, except Washington, where was a definite lack of enthusiasm for the [page 57] project. The Commanding General of the Army, Philip Sheridan, could not “favor a proposition which embraces the idea of permitting an officer of our army to be detailed to duty in some foreign country which does not inure to the benefit of our military service.”21 Receiving an inquiry from the president, Secretary of War Robert Lincoln more tactfully opined that Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution (“no person holding an Office of Profit or Trust under them the United States shall, without Consent of Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State”) would prohibit releasing officers for such duty. Only Congress could grant such authority. The secretary of state and the president corresponded perfunctorily on the matter, and on January 30, 1885. Lame-duck President Chester A. Arthur wrote Congress to recommend that officers of the army be granted permission to accept temproray service under the government of Korea. The proposed measure came before the Senate and was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, was designated a Senate Resolution, and twice read by title. But no action was taken.22

News of Congress’s initial refusal to authorize military instructors reached Korea in May, 1885, in the midst of still another crisis. The king had just refused to name a German as foreign advisor and troop commander, and shortly afterwards he would refuse to discuss the same subject with the Russians; the monarch was resolute in his desire for Americans.23 Secretary of State Bayard, on his part, agreed to bring the matter before Congress again when it reconvened at the end of 1885, but he also tried to dampen concern in Seoul. To Charge Foulk he wrote:

...let it be distinctly understood that your government in no wise originated or is now disposed to press the proposal to obtain United States Military officers as instructors in Corea. The desire of Corea that such officers should be sent is most friendly and flattering. It cannot, however, be acceded to without the consent of Congress. The urgency of Corea upon the immediate dispatch of the officers is almost embarrassing in view of this fact.24

The matter of the army instructors received no more attention in Washington until December. In his annual message to the Congress, President Grover Cleveland mentioned the request and recommended its approval. The following month, Senator Samuel Sewall of New Jersey introduced the proposal, and the Committee on Military Affairs reported it to the whole Senate with a favorable recommendation. After debate and [page 58] minor changes it was passed by the Senate on February 24, 1886. The bill was considered by the House Committee on Military Affairs, which received a favorable recommendation from the War Department and from the commanding general of the army, but no action was taken and the bill died.25 From Seoul, the American charge informed Washington that “almost daily inquiries” about the advisors were coming from the king, and that “from the time it is definitely established in Korea that the United States cannot supply the officers applied for, we may expect our influence to wane here.” He also predicted “a very probable increase of the already grave difficulties besetting the little kingdom we were chiefly instrumental in bringing to the notice of the world of nations.”26

Foulk was correct. In 1885 China had begun to assert a forceful, and ultimately controlling. influence on Korean affairs. The severe stresses in Chinese politics in the 1880’s convinced Li Hung-chang that the Middle Kingdom must curb the assertion of Korean independence, force the Korean court to accept China’s suzerain lead as an “elder brother” state, and strangle any fundamental changes in the Korean social and political order.27 Implementing this policy was China’s “Resident” in Korea, young Yuan Shih-k’ai. In 1886 Yuan officially deplored several Korean projects that had been earlier launched with American advice—the royal hospital under Presbyterian medical missionary Horace N. Allen, the Western model farm that had been established with seeds provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the purchase of coastal steamers from the American Trading Company. In the same memorial he urged a halt to army reorganization.28 The next year, working through pliable officials in the Korean Foreign Office, Yuan succeeded in having Ensign Geroge C. Foulk relieved of duty at the American legation.29 The same year he opposed the Korean court’s decision to send permanent diplomatic missions abroad. One mission was ultimately sent to the United States in 1888, but only after the king abjectly petitioned the Chinese emperor for permission to do so. The king’s memorial clearly marked Korean impotence in resisting the assertion of Chinese control over her domestic policies.30

As China increased its influence and Washington failed to provide advisors, the king gave up on securing advisors through channels. He began to appeal to trusted Americans for help. Admiral Shufeldt returned to Korea in a private capacity in November 1886, and remained some months as a guest of the king. In conversations with the monarch, Shufeldt refused another invitation to become foreign advisor, but he recommended that Ensign George C. Foulk be appointed as commanding general of the Korean army. Foulk, however, refused to accept a position without governmental [page 59] instruction.31 In September 1887, the king offered the position to Navy Lieutenant Theodore M. B. Mason, the brilliant officer who had been the Navy’s first chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence. With Foulk he had been assigned as escort to the Korean embassy in 1883; in 1887 he was in Seoul temporarily as aide to the Asiatic Squadron commander. Mason asked a yearly salary of $10,000 guaranteed by a pledge of the customs revenue and rank as major general and commander-in-chief. Mrs. Mason, however, vetoed the idea before the king made a decision.32 In 1888 the king also offered the position to the secretary of the American Legation, Charles Chaille-Long. This unusual individual was a Civil War veteran who had formerly served the khedive of Egypt. Chaille-Long refused.33 Responding to the king’s frantic concern, the new American minister, Hugh A. Dinsmore, wrote the American consul in Osaka to ask if he could recommend any member of the American community there for a position in the Korean military service.34 And medical missionary Allen prepared a letter for the Korean Foreign Office to the Presbyterian Mission Board in New York requesting the religious body to recommend military instructors!35

It was W. W. Rockhill, however, who successfully arranged for an American military advisory team to come to Korea. Acting as charge d’affaires in Seoul for a brief period at the beginning of 1887, he realized that the constitutional scruple causing the delay in Washington applied only to officers on active duty in the armed forces. To the Korean Foreign Office he noted that there were many other qualified Americans with military experience who could accept Korean service, perhaps “resigned officers or... men who, having graduated at the military Academy, had not received commissions in the army.”36

The king immediately agreed to the revised proposal, but the War Department then concerned itself with the adequacy of the Korean terms. The king agreed to pay $5,000 (Mexican) to a chief instructor and $3,000 to each of two subordinates, to provide housing, and to pay a travel allowance.37 Another year passed in the course of these negotiations, and thus it was not until 1888 that a mission was named to serve in Korea.

**THE DYE MILITARY MISSION**

The constitution hurdled and the terms settled, Commanding General of the Army Philip Sheridan was entrusted with making the actual selection of advisors for Korea. In doing so, the War Department followed the precedent established in 1873 when it had chosen former officers to serve the [page 60] khedive of Egypt.38

Sheridan selected as chief of the Korean mission a West Point classmate with military experience on both Civil War battlefields and the Nile— William McEntyre Dye. Born in 1831, Dye had been graduated from West Point in 1853. Assignments on the frontier followed graduation, and Dye was on duty in Texas as the secession dispute raged between North and South. He was on leave in Mexico when the Texas garrisons were surrendered to the Confederacy in 1861. He could not return to the United States via Texas or New Mexico, so he and another American took a small boat to Cuba, arriving there starved after a journey of twenty days. From the Caribbean Dye returned to New York. In 1862 he became colonel of the 20th Iowa Volunteers and served with great distinction during the war. By war’s end he held brevets as Colonel in the regular army and as Brigadier General of Volunteers.

After the war, however, Dye reverted to the grade of major. Peacetime service at a low grade failed to satisfy him, and he resigned from the army in 1870. Having married the daughter of a Chicago judge and invested his money there, the great fire of 1871 placed him in financial distress. Shortly thereafter he was one of the American veterans to be recruited for service under the khedive of Egypt. He entered the Egyptian army in 1873 and served on its staff until he was wounded in a campaign in Ethiopia. He returned to New York in 1878. Between 1883 and 1886 he served as superintendent of police for the District of Columbia, invigorating the department and sup-pressing lotteries within the District. At the time of his selection for the Korean mission by Sheridan, he held a position in the Bureau of Pensions.39

On paper, Dye’s credentials seemed impressive. He had certain traits of character, however, that augured ill for a successful mission to Korea. In Egypt he had developed little sympathy for the people of a different culture. In addition, he was a man who easily bore grudges for insults real or imagined; he was argumentative and criticized others easily.40 In the closed foreign community of Seoul, where even missionaries engaged in violent quarrels, Dye’s personality was to have an important effect.

General Sheridan allowed Dye to choose his own subordinates.41 At best, they must be judged unfortunate. His first assistant was Edmund H. Cummins, a former Confederate major who had seen active service in the Departments of the Mississippi and the Gulf in various staff positions, spe-cializing in signals. Cummins had fallen on hard times after the war, eventually joining the District of Columbia police force as a patrolman in 1883. General Dye came to know him and agreed to allow him to join the Korean mission to alleviate his financial distress. He was in 1888 sixty years old.42 [page 61]

Dye’s second choice can only be judged mystifying. Dr. John Grigg Lee of Philadelphia, age 30, the son of a naval officer, educated in France, had no military experience beyond membership in a Pennsylvania militia unit. A physician by profession, he evidently found work at the Philadelphia coroner’s office unsatisfying and sought excitement abroad. In 1885 he had been appointed Secretary of the American Legation in Constantinople, but Minister Samuel Sullivan Cox had quashed the appointment when he learned that Lee had concealed his political affiliation (Republican) from him. Three years later, the prospect of service in Korea must have appealed to Lee on two counts: it was romantically far away and satisfied what one contemporary called Lee’s “infatuation with the tinsel and glitter of military life.” Perhaps Lee’s willingness, his urbane personality and fluency in languages, or his “special studies” of tactics appealed to Dye; the influence of Lee’s second cousins, George McClellan and Fitzhugh Lee, may also have helped.43

The three officers at long last arrived in Seoul in April 1888. There they met a fourth individual who was to enter Korean military service. The prolonged delay in the arrival of advisors had prompted Minister Dinsmore to look for instructors in Japan. When his request reached the American consulate in Osaka, the vice consul, marshal, and translator, Missourian Ferdinand John Henry Nienstead, age 35, resigned his low-paying position to go to Korea. His military experience had been a term of service as a Navy pay clerk.44

On arriving in Korea, the instructors were introduced to the king and the crown prince by Minister Dinsmore. The king “expressed great satisfaction at their arrival and a hope for good results.” The relations between the four instructors and the Korean government got off to a bad start, however, as they negotiated their contracts. Nienstead was regarded as supernumerary now that the other three officers had arrived; he received no official contract as instructor, but remained anyway. The three other officers were surprised and disappointed to find that the Korean government felt no urgency about arranging to pay them. On May 9 they signed contracts providing for the agreed salaries.45 Dye was given the rank of general; Cummins and Lee became colonel and major respectively. (Nienstead later became a captain.) Minister Dinsmore saw that clauses were added to guarantee monthly payments of the salary in advance, and the Korean government made internal arrangements to pay the instructors from the customs revenue of various ports.46 By the end of June, however, no money had been paid. The officers correctly foresaw that the early delinquency in payment would become cumulative. During their entire term of service they [page 62] never received their salaries on time.47

The officers were not given the task of training the Korean army as they had been led to expect. Shortly before the arrival of the mission, Korean reformer Pak Yong-hyo had memorialized the king to initiate military reform by training military cadets in a modern academy.48 The American advisors were assigned to establish a small military academy, the *Yonmu Kongwon*, with some forty officer cadets. The king decreed that each province provide a quota of young men between the ages of sixteen and twenty-seven as students, and he appointed a number of reform-minded officials as trustees of the new institution.49

The military academy had hardly begun operation when the advisors were given another task一to train a number of army noncommissioned officers. The king desired that his palace guard become more reliable, and so 160 NCO’s were selected to undergo a program of drill and training under the Americans. Besides strengthening the palace unit, the NCO’s could be distributed throughout the army to improve the qualities of all units.50

General Dye began the difficult work with determination. He believed that the healthy physique and willing attitude of Koreans made them excel-lent military material. Dye formulated a program of studies for the cadets, and for both cadets and NCO’ he sought to establish standards of military bearing and an attitude of uncomplaining performance of duty. He used his influence to reduce the use of corporal punishment in the model unit. From Dye’s experience with troops, he knew that the foundation of military efficiency was unit “cohesion”; drill would develop it. The initial work, then, was to teach close-order drill and small unit maneuvers. Dye decided to use English as the language of command, and he modified and combined features of various infantry drill systems to fit the Korean situation.51 Dye’s methods were described by a visiting officer:

The tactics in use by General Dye are not based on any one particular system, but are extracts from Hardee, Casey, and Upton, modified and harmonized with General Dye’s own tactical ideas as to what combinations are essential for use with much of the tactics of the past. The General has given particular attention to a simplification of the phrases of com-mand, reducing the number of words as far as practicable, that the Korean recruit may have less English to learn.... In the tactics of the column the principal novel feature was that of ‘squads’ of 16 men. While in line changing front to the rear [page 63] there was no wheeling of groups, but each individual faced directly about.52

Dye spent most of his time in this small unit work. He regarded it as the preliminary to the development of a coordinated land-sea defense system and a Western defense organization for the country. He outlined the initial work necessary to the Korean government, urged coastal surveys, and re-commended the appointment of a single commander-in-chief for the army.53 Dye confronted several problems, however. First was the language barrier. Dye and his assistants spoke no Korean, and the students knew little English. Another was that Korean arms purchases had never been standardized : the mission had to cope with the use of different weapons and different types of ammunition.54

Other difficulties were more profound. The Korean cadets and soldiers were not acculturated to Western ideas of discipline and physical activity. An American teaching English at the royal school, George Gilmore, noted that the “soldiers had hardly any idea of military discipline. Precision and punctuality were lacking. Soldiers served for their rice, and had no *esprit de corps*.”55 The young *yangban* (nobles) who formed the corps of cadets were not used to hard work and physical activity. For them, the appeal of Dye’s rigorous training program was also cooled by the government’s failure to provide for the new academy’s graduates to enter the army without passing the traditional Korean official examination. The cadets were obviously aware that physical training and drill would not improve their command of the Confucian classics.56

The latter failure of government policy paralleled a daily lack of support for the mission’s efforts. Dye lacked explicit command authority. His work depended, therefore, on cooperation with Korean officials. A Russian military observer, General Staff Lieutenant Colonel Vebel, noted that:

...training was supposed to begin at five or six in the morning. The American instructors would come out on the parade ground and find no Koreans were present. They would try to assemble the soldiers, dealing through Korean officials. Two hours would pass in useless arguments. Then, when everyone had finally fallen in, the Koreans would announce that it was too hot.... everyone would go back to the barracks.57

Gilmore was diplomatic: “While the instructors were treated with all courtesy and consideration, effective use of their acquirements was not made because of the sloth, indifference, and distrust of the officials.”58 The [page 64] Russian was more blunt: “The Korean government, or more properly the mandarins of the ministry, jealously followed them [the Americans] about in order to obstruct any influence they might exert and made success impossible.”59

While it was conservative Korean officials who visibly frustrated the work of the mission, the effect of China’s policy was also evident. An early public dispute with Yuan Shih-k’ai compounded the mission’s problems by adding the force of Yuan’s personal emnity to the restraint of Chinese policy on Korean initiatives for change.60 Dye would later remark that Yuan “opposed my efforts to place the Korean soldiers under educated, experienced, disciplined officers up to the day he left Korea...”61

Adding to these difficulties was the conduct of Dye’s own subordinates. The general, an older, more mature individual with previous experience in Egypt and the high ideals of West Point to uphold, took the various setbacks in stride. From the beginning, however, he had to deal with discontent and disloyalty among his juniors.

It began with the disillusion—now well known as a variety of culture shock—resulting from the unrealistic expectations Westerners on training missions often bring with them abroad. Gilmore recalled:

The youngest two of these men came out full of pluck and energy, and amused those who had more experience with oriental life, and especially with Korean inertia, with accounts of the reforms they were going to institute and the transformations they would effect in the appearance and effectiveness of the army. But months wore on, and even a start was hardly made....62

The military skills Nienstead had learned as a navy pay clerk were modest, but by most accounts he performed his duties with zeal. By learning just ahead of the cadets he became a competent drillmaster. Nienstead was nonetheless scorned by the other two “official” instructors, Lee and Cummins, who begrudged him his position.63

Colonel Cummins took an immediate dislike to Korea and the military academy. Within a few weeks he asked to be discharged, but Dye persuaded him to stay on. Cummins was subsequently overcome with lethargy, malaise, and hostility to Koreans. He resented being a “schoolteacher,” and doing “a corporal’s work.” He was disappointed not to find himself leading large bodies of troops. His expertise in staff positions during the Civil War had given him little experience in drill. Soon he absented himself from the academy for long periods, started drinking heavily, and even [page 65] refused to salute cadets.64

Major Lee was also fomenting disrespect. He, too, drank heavily in Korea. Though his own military service was limited to a state militia, he apparently regarded himself as an expert drillmaster and tactician. He regarded Dye’s adaptaions to suit the Korean troops as a personal affront and complained that Dye was out of touch with modern tactical developments.65 Minister Dinsmore discovered that Lee had a “disposition... which he apparently cannot control, to make everything which concerns him, and many which do not, the subject of newspaper correspondence.”66 Newspapers in Philadelphia, San Francisco, Hong Kong, and Shanghai printed articles in which Lee freely expressed his unflattering opinions of Korea, Dinsmore, Dye, Dr. Allen, the Chinese Resident, the king’s foreign advisor, and the Russian minister. To provide background for his articles, Lee rifled the files of the legation; he also purloined private correspondence. Even Charles Chaille-Long, the petulant American legation secretary, judged Lee as a man queerly subject to “bad humors.”67

Dye could not soothe the discontent of his less mature subordinates, and he became characteristically impatient with their conduct. Cummins and Lee argued that Dye failed to support them in their salary disputes with the government; the general was in turn displeased by his subordinates’ lack of loyalty. In September, 1889, Dye finally urged General Han, the Korean commander, to dismiss Cummins and Lee from Korean service.68 Han did so, but a long and bitter contract dispute followed. The two officers protested that no valid cause had been given for their dismissals, and they demanded full payment of their contracts with interest for arrearages. Secretary of State James G. Blaine sustained the two officers in their demands, making the dispute a formal diplomatic issue between the United States and Korea.69 On his part, Major Lee sought to sustain his conduct with a torrent of articles. In the *Shanghai Mercury* he labelled Korea as a country of:

Meddlesome foreign representatives, incompetent and venal officials, a people without spirit or honor, mismanaged finances, corruption, and misrule everywhere. Unpaid officials, unpaid contractors, unpaid troops, unjustly treated and un-paid foreign employees, famines, dissatisfaction, riots, and even partial revolts, to say nothing of palace intrigues and harem conspiracies, with their attempted assassinations and nameless horrors .70 [page 66]

Writing in the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Lee called the Chinese Resident, young Yuan Shih-k’ai, “the Ching-chong Chinaman representative” and said of his policies, “What do’st think o’that? Daring, is it not? It is hoped he will try it on! What a jolly war we should have—Russians, Japs, Chinese, Koreans, and Britons all mixed up together. Hi-Yah!”71

The two disgruntled officers remained in Korea to extract every cent due them, and did not leave Korea until March, 1891, a year and a half after their dismissal. Their duty performance and offensive behavior had gone far to embitter the Korean Ministry of War against Americans.72

With Lee and Cummins frustrating the purpose of the mission, it is surprising that General Dye and Captain Nienstead accomplished anything. Nonetheless, they soon had the troops assigned to them in good condition. In October, 1889, Rear Admiral George Belknap observed a drill demonstration by the 155-man NCO training unit. Nienstead commanded the company in rifle, sword, and bayonet exercises, company-size maneuvers in column and line, and skirmish drill by bugle command. All spoken com-mands were in English, and the Koreans conducted portions of the exercise. He wrote that the Korean troops performed “with a precision and excellence that would do credit to veteran soldiers.” The visiting admiral was impressed with how the soldiers readily grasped the English orders and how the commands in a foreign language were accurately delivered by the Korean officers. The men followed bugle commands as efficiently. The admiral warmly approved Dye’s plans to “distribute this company as drill sergeants throughout the Korean army” as a “leaven for the whole force.”73

Dye’s plans, however, were never implemented. Records of the mission after 1890 become unfortunately sparse, but it is evident that the plan to use the academy cadets and the training company as the beginning of a wider reform of the Korean army was never carried out. In the early 1890’s the number of academy cadets gradually decreased; the secretary to the British consul general reported in 1894 that “favoritism and interest killed competition amongst the cadets, and now but a remnant remain.”74 Dye and Nienstead continued to drill individual Korean units on a part-time basis and had the opportunity to train them to use Gatling guns.75 The two Americans remained in the Korean army until 1896, but they never received more authority, troops, or control than they had at the turn of the decade.76

After 1891 the reports of American ministers in Seoul and the accounts of foreign visitors noted frequent disorders in the Korean army. Though the small units under Dye’s tutelage still impressed visiting dignitaries, it was apparent that the greater portion of the army was traditionally inefficient [page 67] and corrupt.77 In this regard, the army’s military inefficiency was displayed when the government confronted social unrest in 1893 and 1894. The Gatling gun unit was deployed to guard the approaches to Seoul against rebellious peasants in 1893, and a small number of troops from Dye’s unit were deployed to Kunsan and Cholla province in 1894 to defeat the Tonghak rebels.78 There are no reports that the small group of Western-drilled troops had any effect on the sorry performance of the body of the Korean army during the campaign. Indeed, the poor showing of the army prompted the Korean court to once again request military aid from China, thus opening the events leading to the Sino-Japanese War.

In the course of the war with China, Japanese forces seized the royal palace and took control in Seoul. Under Japanese auspices, returned Korean reformers undertook to reorganize the Korean military. The Korean army was disarmed and then reorganized with Japanese instructors. Japanese power in Seoul was maintained by two new battalions of eight hundred men known as the *Kurentai* (Korean: *hullyondae*).79 As part of the takeover of the army by the Japanese, General Dye was removed from his post at the military academy. Since his contract as advisor, however, had only been recently renewed for two years, he remained in Seoul.80

After the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April, 1895, the Japanese felt free to ease their policy of direct control in Korean affairs. During the summer General Dye and a few assistants began to form and drill a loyal Korean palace battalion, at first without arms, later with various old weapons. The rifles included some that Dye recovered from a lake where they had been discarded at the time of the Japanese takeover.81

In October, 1895, a group of Korean leaders in the queen’s clan, the Mins, resolved to frustrate the Japanese hegemony; the necessary first step was to disband the Kurentai troops. When the Japanese minister learned of the Korean plan, he determined to reassert Japanese control by once again seizing the palace, deposing the king, eliminating the Min leadership, and placing pro-Japanese officials in the government.82 The week before he implemented his plan, he saw that Dye’s guard was reduced and that useful weapons and ammunition were spirited from the palace.83

Early in the morning of October 8, 1895, the Japanese legation guard, the Kurentai battalions, and several Japanese ruffians (*soshi*) surrounded the palace. General Dye and one Mr. Sabatin, a Russian watchman, watched them form ranks beyond the palace walls. While the two were discussing a response, the assault began. The Japanese forced the main gate. The resistance of Dye’s loyal Korean guard, led by three former cadets, was ineffective; the general was swept aside by the Japanese. Treacherously, the Jap- [page 68] anese killed the Korean commander of the Kurentai troops, General Hong Kye-hun; having saved the queen’s life in 1882, Hong might impede the night’s plans. Royal counselor Yi Kyong-sik had his hands cut off as he offered resistance; he bled to death in front of the king’s quarters. Colonel Hyon In-tak, the loyal guard commander who had saved the queen’s life in 1884, was severely wounded. The *soshi* entered the chambers of Queen Min. They killed chambermaids while demanding that they identify the queen; finding her, they attacked with knives. After her assassination, they dragged the warm body outside for burning. When the kerosene flames died, only a few bones remained of Queen Min. With the palace battalion expelled from the grounds, the king was a virtual prisoner of the Japanese.84

General Dye and the Russian watchman informed the diplomatic corps of the night’s outrages. John Cockerill of the *New York Herald* was present in Seoul at the time; he interviewed Dye, wrote of the Japanese action, and smuggled the story past Japanese censors at the telegraph office. The Herald broke Dye’s story to the world.85

With the king completely defenseless and surrounded by enemies, Horace Underwood an American missionary, and Dr. Allen, now the American charge d’affaires, made frequent and ostentatious visits to the palace to insure that the monarch was unharmed. Mrs. Underwood prepared the king’s meals so that he would not be posioned. General Dye no longer had any troops under his command, but he took an apartment adjacent to the king’s and acted as his bodyguard.86

Dye’s presence in the palace antagonized the Japanese, and through the pliable new Minister of War they demanded that he be dismissed. Dye refused to be relieved unless the king himself demanded his withdrawal in the presence of the American charge. The king was forced to summon Allen to the palace. At the audience the king managed to whisper a few words to the American representative before the formal interview, begging Allen to refuse the request he was forced by the Japanese to make.

The doctor was glad to oblige. The king “demanded” Dye’s relief and Allen stated that since Dye’s service had been arranged by a previous minister he could not act without instructions from Washington. When the minister of war demanded that he telegraph immediately, Allen indicated that a written dispatch would suffice. Perhaps an answer could be expected in four months.87

Dye was still in the palace at the end of 1895, and the American minister’s wife wrote in December that “rumors are again rife, no foreigner at all is allowed inside the palace ground. The Taewon’gun is very anxious to have General Dye sent out, but the brave old gentleman insists that he will [page 69] stay, and in spite of them all, he does, although all the others have gone.”88 On February 11, 1896, the king escaped to the Russian legation and safety. Dye’s last dramatic duty came to an end.

Dye’s military contract expired in May, 1896. He remained in Korea three more years as unofficial manager of the government farm.89 The Russians aggressively assumed the task of instructing the Korean army; a mission of sixty Russian officers and NCO’s resumed the tasks that Dye and Nienstead had done alone.90 Their efforts, and those of a French military mission that followed, were equally ineffective.

Dye left Korea, an invalid, in 1899. He died in Muskegon, Michigan, a few months after his return.

**THE FAILURE OF MILITARY REFORM UNDER AMERICAN AUSPICES**

Future assessments of the decline of the Yi dynasty, it seems evident, must come to include a hard look at the weakness of Korean military institutions at the end of the nineteenth century. It is clear in retrospect that Korea’s loss of independence in 1910 was virtually foreordained by her total lack of effective military power. In this regard, it is not only the effectiveness of the army and navy against foreign enemies or domestic rebels that is significant. Korea’s military impotence was far more fundamental.

Students of politics and military theorists alike argue that a “monopoly of violence: is a fundamental attribute of a state. Military and police power form a protective framework that establishes the integrity of the social order. In this regard, then, the inability of the Yi dynasty to protect the Korean social order from the destructive effect of the coups, emeutes, and violent factional struggles demonstrates how marginal was its control of Korea’s destiny.

For a military advisory mission to have reversed this trend, Korea required a national commitment to a general program of reform and a parallel willingness to undertake specific military reform initiatives, leaders who possessed sufficient judgment in the realm of military affairs to advise the government and guide the reform efforts, and the technical assistance of a training mission which possessed enough people and resources to have an impact. This last, given the realities of the last century, required a commit-ment on the part of the sending government to support its efforts.

None of these requirements were met. In a decade when the energies of the United States were fully engaged in westward expansion and the nation’s foreign policies were founded on a principle of noninvolvement,  [page 70] the American government proved to be a most reluctant partner. Lucius Foote’s genuinely modest proposals—rendered in 1883, when their presence might have had a good effect—were never implemented. Administrative incompetence and delay in Washington played a role, but the failure to send the mission stemmed primarily from Washington’s firm policy of noninvolvement in Korea.91 This offcial reluctance meant that the American mili-tary advisors would be sent nearly four years after the moment for their favorable reception had passed. The advisors were not regular officers; they served Korea only in private capacities. And they were too few to have any real effect on the Korean military system.

The mission, moreover, was ill-suited to the task. General Dye’s military expertise was not matched by good judgement in selecting subordinates. The advisors lacked language ability, specific military skills adapted to Korean needs, and the proper temperaments to work in Korea.

Nevertheless, these American shortcomings, however grave, cannot be allowed to obscure the effect of other deficiencies on the Korean side. Korea’s lack of knowledge of the outside world compounded the late Yi dynasty’s cultural and political disposition to belittle military affairs; Korean officials of the 1880’s thus lacked sufficient military judgement to understand the need for weapons standardization, for military education based on such factors as technical expertise and physical fitness, and for unambiguous command arrangements. These deficiencies in turn highlight the lack of a basic commitment to a program of reform—at least after December, 1884. The difficulties experienced in daily training, the lack of proper management of the salary issue, and the failure to provide places in the army for Academy graduates all demonstrate the government’s inability to establish a program of reform and sustain it against internal critics and foreign resistance. The relief of Ensign George C. Foulk―the most energetic, effective, and sympathetic advisor the king had—from his position as attache at the American Legation and, two years later, the obstacles faced by General Dye both resulted from this same internal weakness. Despite his earlier eagerness for American military advisors, King Kojong was in 1888 unwilling and—due to the strength of conservative circles in the government—unable to give the mission the support it needed. Americans could not do for Korea what the Koreans could not resolve to do for them-selves.

Facile judgements about the past century of Korean-American relations abound, and partisans carelessly blame one side or the other for the missed opportunities, unwise decisions, and narrow self-interest of the other. The example of the American military advisors belies such easy [page 71] analysis. It must be judged a shared failure that revealed the weakness of both nations in the decades that set the stage for the tragic events of our own century.

**NOTES**

1. Pseud. B. L. Putnam Weale, The Re-Shaping of the Far East (New York, 1905), p. 514.

2. The only specific studies of the mission were written by military historians who described it as a predecessor to the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG). See KMAG’s Heritage: The Story of Brigadier General William McEntyre Dye, Eighth Army Pamphlet 870-2, 1966, by Herman Katz; and Richard P. Weinert, “The Original KMAG,” Military Review, June 1965, pp. 93-99. Korean historian Lee Kwang-rin also gave the mission some attention in his Han’guk Kaehwasa Yon’gu (Seoul, 1969); his work was summarized in English as “The Role of Foreign Military Instructors in the Later Period of the Yi Dynasty,” in International Conference on the Problems of Modernization in Asia, Report (Seoul, 1965), pp. 241-248.

3.See Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley, 1963), pp. 8-9.

4. This bald summary does some violence, through brevity, to Korea’s exceedingly complex politics after 1876. The reforms are covered in most works on the period. The latest comprehensive study is Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875-1885 (Seattle, 1977), esp. pp. 99-101, 103-104.

5. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen, pp. 130-138.

6. C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876-1910 (Berkeley, 1967), 40-41; H.A.C. Bonar, “Notes on the Capital of Korea,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan 11 (1882-3), p. 255.

7. The most effective summaries of the Korean-American treaty, based on multilingual research, are Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen, pp. 114-122, and Frederick Foo Chien, The Opening of Korea: A Study of Chinese Diplomacy 1876-1885 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1967), ch. IV. The best recent commentary on the treaty is Vipan Chandra’s “The Korean Enlightenment: A Re-Examination,” Korean Culture (July 1982) pp. 20-25.

8. The primary sources are effectively summarized in Young I. Lew, “American Advisors in Korea, 1885-1894: Anatomy of Failure,” in The United States and Korea, Andrew C. Nahm, ed. (Kalamazoo, 1979), pp. 64-90.

9. Lucius Foote to the Secretary of State, no. 32, 19 Oct. 1883, in Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, 2 vols., vol. 1 ed. by George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, vol. 2 ed. by Spencer J. Palmer (Berkeley, California: 1951-63), I. p. 53. (These volumes are hereafter cited as KAR.)

10. The best summary of the Embassy’s activity is Gary D. Walter, “The Korean Special Mission to the United States,” Journal of Korean Studies 1 (1969), pp. 89-142.

11. No official record of the conversations seems to exist. They were discussed retro-spectively by the Embassy’s escort officer, Navy Ensign George C. Foulk; see Foulk to Robert W. Shufeldt, 4 Oct 1886, Robert W. Shufeldt Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collections, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as “Shufeldt Papers”), and Foulk to the Secretary of State, no. 257, 1 Dec 1885, in KAR: I pp. 61-62. See also Walter, “Korean Special Mission,” p. 106.

12. Foote to the Secretary of State, no. 47, 18 Dec 1883, Despatches from United States [page 72] Ministers to Korea 1883-1905, Record Group 59 (General Records of the Department of State), National Archives (hereafter cited as “Diplomatic Despatches, Korea”).

13. Kim and Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, p. 45. Foulk, “Report of Information relative to the revolutionary attempt in Seoul, Corea,” enclosure to Foote to the Secretary of State, no. 128, 17 Dec 1884, KAR, I, 101-113. (This report is hereafter cited as “Foulk, ‘The revolutionary attempt’.”)

14. Foote to the Secretary of State, no. 82, 9 Jun 1883, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea; Foulk to family, 22 Jul 1884, Foulk Papers, Naval Historical Foundations Collections, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as “Foulk Papers, Library of Congress”).

15. Foulk, “The revolutionary attempt,” p. 110.

16. Foote to the Secretary of State, no. 105, 3 Sep 1884, KAR, I, 54-55; Secretary of State to Foote, no. 14, 6 Nov 1884, KAR: I, p. 57.

17. Shufeldt’s indecision may be traced through the despatches and his papers; see Perceval Lowell to Shufeldt, 24 Jan. 1884, and Foulk to Shufeldt, 4 Oct 1886, Shufeldt Papers; Foote to the Secretary of State, no. 105, 3 Sep. 1884, KAR: I, pp. 54-5, 56-7; Foulk, “The revolutionary attempt,” pp. 107, 108.

18. The coup is discussed in a great body of literature. For our purposes the document which best presents the coup from the American point of view is Foulk’s “The revolutionary attempt.”

19. Foulk to the Secretary of State, no. 224, 2 Sep 1885, KAR: I, pp. 130-131.

20. Secretary of State to Foulk, no. 63, 19 Aug 1885, KAR: I, 65; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ed., Korea: Treaties and Agreements (Washington, 1921), p. 7.

21. Cited by Weinert, “Original KMAG,” p. 95.

22. Secretary of State to the President, 29 Jan 1885, in Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, 1721; 48th Congress, 2nd Session, 1106, 1142, 2175; Secretary of State to Foulk, no. 184, 18 Jun 1885, KAR: I, p. 59.

23. Foulk to the Secretary of State, no. 166, 28 Apr 1885, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea; Foulk to John A. Bingham, 23 Jun 1885, Miscellaneous Record Books, Post Re-cords—Diplomatic—Korea, in Record Group 84 (Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State), National Archives (hereafter cited as “Legation Miscellaneous Record Books”).

24. Secretary of State to Foulk, no. 63, 19 Aug 1885, KAR: I, p. 65.

25. Annual Message of the Pressident to the Congress, 8 Dec 1885, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1885 (hereafter cited as “Foreign Relations, [year]”), IX; Secretary of War to the House Committee on Military Affairs, no. 2953/B, 9 Jul 1886, records of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, National Archives; Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 604-5, 1080, 1721, 1783.

26. Foulk to the Secretary of State, no. 9, 3 Oct 1886, KAR: I p. 63.

27. Lew, “American Advisors” pp. 80-82.

28. Foreign Relations, 1887, pp. 256-8.

29. Donald M. Bishop, “Policy and Personality in Early Korean-American Relations: The Case of George Clayton Foulk,” in The United States and Korea, Andrew C. Nahm, ed. (Kalamazoo, 1979), pp. 51-53.

30. Charles Denby to the Secretary of State, no. 521, KAR: II, pp. 110-112.

31. Foulk of the Secretary of State, no, 15, 1 Nov 1886, no. 23, 23 Nov 1886, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea; Shufeldt to “The Chronicle,” Aug 1887, clipping in the Shufeldt Papers, Box 30, Folder 3.  [page 73]

32. Hugh Dinsmore to Foulk, 18 Sep, 1887, Foulk Papers, New York Public Library; D. P. Mannix to Shufeldt, 24 Sep 1887, Shufeldt Papers.

33. Charles Chaille-Long to the Secretary of State, no. 159, 31 Dec 1888, KAR: 11, 169; Chaille-Long, My Life on Four Continents, 2 vols. (London, 1912), II, 383; Chaille-Long, “From Corea to Quelpaert Island,” American Geographic Society of New York Bulletin 12 (1890), p. 266.

34. Dinsmore to Thomas R. Jernigan, 27 Aug 1887, Legation Miscellaneous Record Books.

35. Fred H. Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr, Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations (Madison, Wisconsin, 1944), p. 220.

36. W. W. Rockhill to the Secretary of State, no. 63, 13 February 1887, KAR: II, p. 141.

37. Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 67, 24 Oct 1887, KAR: II, pp. 143-144.

38. The best work on this eariler American overseas advisory effort is William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, The Blue and the Gray on the Nile (Chicago 1961).

39. Dye has not yet been the object of separate study. I have summarized his life from the Dictionary of A mericanBiography, s.v. “Dye, William McEntyre,” article by Harold J. Noble; Katz, KMAG’S Heritage; his military file in the National archives; J. Russell Young and Jas. L. Feeney, The Metropolitan Police Department Official Illustrated History (Washington, 1908), 62; news clipping files held by the Chicago Historical Society and the Capital Historical Society; and “General Dye Passed Away at his Home in this City Today,” Muskegon Daily Chronicle, 13 Nov 1899.

40. Hesseltine and Wolf, Blue and Gray, p. 238.

41. William McE. Dye to General Han Kiu Sul, n.d., enclosure to Dinsmore to the Secre-tary of State, no. 233, 15 April 1890, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

42. List of Staff Officers of the Confederate States Army, 1861-65 (Washington, 1891), p. 39; Cummins’ application for the Police Department in the police personnel folders, records of the Government of the District of Columbia, Record Group 351, National Archives. Cummins was the author of “The Signal Corps in the Confederate States Army,” Southern Historical Society Papers 16 (1882), pp. 91-107.

43. Edmund J. Lee, Lee of Virginia 1642-1892 (Philadelphia, 1895), 467, pp. 412-56. Ac-cording to Lee’s military record, held by the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, he served in the Pennsylvania National Guard as an officer in the 3rd Infantry and as aide on the 1st Division staff. His highest grade was major. See also the passport application for John G. Lee, 28 Jun. 1881,Record Group 59,National Archives; Army and Navy Journal 25 (1887-1888), p. 590; S.S. Cox to Thomas F. Bayard, 11 Dec. 1885, Lee to Bayard, 24 Dec 1885,Bayard Papers, Library of Congress; Lee’s file in the “Applications and Recommendations for Public Offices,” RG-59, National Archives; and Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 364. Lee was the author of Homicide and Suicide in the City and County of Philadelphia (Philadelphia,/1882/) and Handbook for Coroners (Philadelphia, 1881). See also ‘‘Colonel Lee’s Sudden Death,” New York Times (10 Sep 1891), p. 1.

44. See Nienstead’s file in “Applications and Recommendations for Public Office, 1893-97,” Record Group 59, National Archives; F. J. H. Nienstead to James D. Porter,14 Oct 1887, Consular Records, Osaka and Hiogo, Record Group 84, National Archives; “List of American Residents in Korea,” 31 Dec 1892, Consular Records, Seoul.

45. Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 113, 11 Jun 1885, KAR: II, pp. 144-5.

46. Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 67, 24 Oct 1887, KAR: II, p. 144. For the customs arrangements, see Ch’oe T’ae-ho, “Custom-House Organization and Customs Duty [page 74] Revenues at the Time of Port Opening,” Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, no. 44 (Dec 1976), p. 65.

47. Horace N. Allen to the Secretary of State, 8 Aug 1898, enclosure 3, Legation Miscel-laneous Record Books.

48. Young I. Lew, “The Reform Efforts and Ideas of Pak Yong-hyo, 1894-1895,” Korean Studies I (1977), p. 42.

49. Lee, Han’guk Kaehwasa, pp. 161-163.

50. [John G. Lee], “The Chosen Military Mission,” clipping from the Shanghai Mercury, 5 Mar 1890, enclosure from Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no- 227, 24 Mar 1890, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea, Dinsmore noted that the “Soul correspondent. . . is unquestionably Mr. Lee though the articles are not signed in his name.” See also General Staff Lieutenant Colonel V. M. Vebel, “Comments Made in 1889 on the First MAG Mission to Korea,” tr. Edward Hurewitz, enclosure Hurewitz to Street, 18 Aug 1975,in the files of the Historian, U.S. Forces Korea, Yongsan Garrison, Seoul (hereafter cited as “Vebel, ‘Mission to Korea’ “).

51. The elements of Dye’s philosophy of training can be gleaned from his comments in “To the Editor: In Defense of the Palace Guard on October 8, 1895,” Korean Repository 3 (1896), pp. 228-230; Dye, “Dangers to an Agricultural People,” Korean Repository 4 (1897), pp. 267-270; Dye, “To the Editor: Comment on Korea and Her Neighbors,” Korean Repository 5 (1898), pp. 439-442. It is worth noting that the U.S. Army has recently embarked on a morale program to restore “cohesion” as an element of its post-Vietnam reform. For Dye’s training program we must rely on the comments of observers (Belknap, Gilmore, Vebel); “The Army of Korea,” Army and Navy Journal (16 Sep 1893) p. 61; and Major Lee’s contentious “The Chosen Military Mission.”

52. Rear Admiral George Belknap to the Secretary of the Navy, 21 Oct 1889, copy in Cor-respondence with Naval Officers, Post Records—Diplomatic—Korea, Record Group 84, Na-tional Archives.

53. Dye to General Han, 16 Aug 1889; “The Army of Korea,” Army and Navy Journal (16 Sep 1893), p. 61. See also Dye, “Dangers to an Agricultural People,” p. 270. The Korean government’s interest in a defense system may have been stimulated by Chaille-Long’s remarks to the King following his return from Cheju; see Chaille-Long to the Secretary of State, no. 159, 31 Dec 1888, KAR: I, pp. 169-170.

54. Lee, Han’guk Kaehwasa, pp. 170, 174; A. Henry Savage-Landor, “A Visit to Korea,” Fortnightly Review 56 (1894), pp. 184-190; Harry H. Fox, “The Corean Army,” Report of the Sxith Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, January 1895, p. 517.

55. George W. Gilmore, Korea from its Capital (Philadelphia, 1892), pp. 41-2.

56. Lee, Han’guk Kaehwasa, p. 167.

57. Vebel, “Mission to Korea,” pp. 2-3.

58. Gilmore, Korea from its Capital, pp. 41-2.

59. Vebel, “Mission to Korea,” p. 2.

60. [John G. Lee], “The Chosen Military Mission.”

61. Dye, “To the Editor,” Korean Repository 3 (1896), p. 218.

62. Gilmore, Korea from its Capital p. 41.

63. “The Army of Korea,” Army and Navy Journal (16 Sep 1893), p. 61; [Lee], ‘‘The Chosen Military Mission.”

64. Dye to Han, n.d., enclosure to Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 233, 15 Apr [page 75] 1890, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

65. Ibid.; Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 220, 27 Jan 1890, KAR: II, p. 149; [Lee], “The Chosen Military Mission.”

66. Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 233, 15 Apr 1890, KAR: II, p. 154.

67. Chaille-Long to the Secretary of State, 19 Feb 1889, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea; Augustine Heard to Dye, /?/ Sep 1890, Legation Miscellaneous Record Books; Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 364. See also the interesting comment that Lee would “destroy friends from behind when smiling in front.” G. Vossiou to Chaille-Long, 13 Sep 1891, Chaille-Long Papers, Library of Congress.

68. Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 220 and enclosure, 27 Jan 1890, Dye to Han, n.d., enclosure to Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 233, 15 Apr 1890, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

69. The relevant correspondence is reprinted in KAR: II, pp. 145-166.

70. Clipping, 8 Feb 1890, enclosure to Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 227, 24 Mar 1890, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

71. Clipping, n.d., enclosure to Heard to the Secretary of State, no. 68,6 Oct 1890, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

72. Heard to Edmund H. Cummins, Heard to Lee, 26 Sep 1890,Legation Miscellaneous Record Books; Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, no. 227, 24 Mar 1890, KAR, II, p. 151. Lee died soon after nis return to New York. Cummins, subsequent life is unknown.

73. Belknap to the Secretary of the Navy, 21 Oct 1889, copy in Legation Correspondence with Naval Officers. In his short biography of Dye, Harold J. Noble noted that Dye had published a drill manual in Korean. No copy of this manual, however, has come to light.

74. Fox, “The Corean Army,” p. 518. The difficulties of inclucating Western concepts of military service and discipline among the Korean cadets and NCO’s may have been the reason behind the Korean government’s request—presumably prompted by Dye—in 1893 to send Korean cadets to West Point and Annapolis. Washington ignored the request. See Ye Sung Soo to the Secretary of State, 10 Nov 1893, Korean Legation Notes; Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, 16 Oct 1893, 20 Nov 1893.

75. Korean Repository 1 (1892), 100; Dye, review of Korea and her Neighbors by Isabella Bird Bishop in Korean Repository 5 (1898), p. 441.

76. Dye, “To the Editor,” Korean Repository 3 (1896), 217-218; Savage-Landor, “A Visit to Korea,” p. 190.

77. For favorable views, see Fleet Engineer John D. Ford, An American Cruiser in the East (New York, 1898), pp. 255-6, and Army and Navy Journal 30 (1892-3), p. 468; for less favorable descriptions see Yi Kyu-tae, Modern Transformation of Korea (Seoul, 1970), p. 243, and Chaille-Long, La Coree ou Chosen (Paris, 1894), pp. 8-10; and Heard to the Secretary of State, no. 220, 3 Dec 1891, KAR, II, p. 299.

78. Lee Ki-baek, Han’guksa Sillon (Seoul, 1973), pp. 317-19. The basic work on the Tonghak movement in English is Benjamin B. Weems, Reform, Rebellion and the Heavenly Way (Tucson, 1964); see esp. pp. 38-39.

79. These were part of the celebrated Kabo reforms. The standard work is Wilkinson, The Corean Government: Constitutional Changes, July 1894 to October 1895, with an appendix on subsequent enactments to 30th June 1896 (Shanghai, 1897).

80. Horace N. Allen to the Secretary of State, 8 Aug 1898, Legation Miscellaneous Record Books.

81. Kim and Kim, Korea and Imperialism, 84; Allen to the Secretary of State, no. 158, [page 76] 13 Oct 1895, KAR: II, 363; Dye, “To the Editor,” Korean Repository 3 (1896), pp. 218-219.

82. The events leading to the murder and the complicity of the Japanese minister were established in a trial of the major conspirators in 1896. The findings of the court are published in Henry Chung, The Case of Korea (New York, 1921), pp. 322-327.

83. Dye, “To the Editor,” Korean Repository 3 (1896), pp. 218-219.

84. Dye, review of Korea and her Neighbors by Isabella Bird Bishop, in Korean Repository 5 (1898), pp. 439-442; Allen to the Secretary of State, no. 156, 10 Oct 1895, KAR: II, p. 358; Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors, pp. 271-274; Allen to Commander Folger, 8 Oct 1895, Legation Miscellaneous Record Books.

85. John A. Cockerill, “How the Queen was Murdered,” “Queen Killed by Japanese,” New York Herald, 14 Oct 1895, p. 7, 15 Oct 1895, p. 7.

86. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors, p. 279; John M. B. Sill to Arthur Cram, 1 Nov 1895, Sill Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. Korean Repository 2 (1895), p. 437.

87. Allen to the Secretary of State, no. 158,KAR: II, pp. 363-4.

88. Sally Sill diary letter, 6 Dec 1895, Sill Papers.

89. Allen to the Secretary of State, 8 Aug 1898, Legation Miscellaneous Record Books.

90. Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy (Berkeley, 1958), p. 388; Dye, Review, of Korea and Her Neighbors by Isabella Bird Bishop, Korean Repository 5 (1898), p. 441; Allen to the Secretary of State, no. 270, 10 May 1897, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

91. I find the analysis of John Chay particularly persuasive in this regard; see his “The First Three Decades of American-Korean Relations 1882-1910” in United States-Korean Relations 1882-1982, Tae-Hwan Kwak, et. ah., eds. (Seoul: 1982), pp. 24ff.

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**The Ming Connection: Notes on Korea’s Experience In the Chinese Tributary System**

**by Donald N. Clark**

**INTRODUCTION**

The position of Korea vis-a-vis more powerful neighbors has colored many aspects of her history. The unfortunate effects of modern rivalry among Korea’s neighbors are well known. Most people also are aware that prior to Korea’s modern century (i.e., the century since the treaties with Japan and the Western powers), Korean leaders had to deal constantly with the threat of foreign interference. It seems ironic, in view of the recent militarization of the Korean peninsula, that for centuries prior to 1900 the Korean government maintained autonomy and independence without resort to arms, or at least a large standing army. There were several reasons for this: perhaps the most important was the Yi dynasty’s Confucian disdain for military men. But another reason is that the very existence of a major standing army would have invited various kinds of trouble, including Chinese attempts to disarm Korea, perhaps even by conquest.

Much is made of Korea’s lack of military preparedness in the Hideyoshi invasions of the 1590’s. At that time the king was obliged to beg the Ming court for military support and direct intervention. One may argue that the capacity for self-defense, had it been present, would have discouraged Hideyoshi. At least a capable effort at self-defense would have been better than what happened: a major war between China and Japan on Korean soil, with the Korean people as chief victims. Many of the same questions might be raised concerning the Manchu invasions of the 1630’s. Why wasn’t Korea better prepared to ward off the enemy? The answer lies in the nature of Korean relations with China, and in the elements of what we call the Chinese tributary system, of which Korea was an integral part.1

**THE CHINESE TRIBUTARY SYSTEM**

The Chinese tributary system has been described many times as a system of vassalage and personal loyalty between the emperor of China, whoever it happened to be, and the kings and princes of neighboring states and tribes. The [page 78] primary purpose of the tributary system was Chinese security; the primary tools of the tribute system were rewards and punishments. The rewards took the form of Chinese support for local rulers such as the Korean king. Punishments took the form of revocation of the support, public humiliation, interruption of the tribute trade (about which more below), and outright intervention. It behooved local rulers, therefore, to keep on the good side of the Chinese regime. As long as they did so, they were safe and largely autonomous. If they failed to do so, trouble of many kinds was sure to follow. It might even be argued, in fact, that if the Koreans had been militarily strong enough to resist Hideyoshi alone, the Chinese empire would have intervened first. It was the purpose of the tributary system to keep China’s neighbors in humble compliance, and hopefully, though not always, at peace with each other.2

The Chinese tributary system was not merely a strategic structure. It was based on an assumption of Chinese superiority, in terms both of power and of cultural—even moral—influence. The relationship between the Chinese emperor and the Korean king, for example, can be stated in Confucian terms as an older brother/younger brother relationship, involving obligations of loyalty and obedience on the part of Korea, and obligations of magnanimity and protection on the part of China. Reciprocity was everything in the tributary system, and it was symbolized by the willing payment of tribute by Korea in exchange for gifts and symbolic acts and declarations of support by China. The tribute trade symbolized Korea’s loyalty and obedience to the Chinese emperor and the reciprocal magnanimity of the Chinese emperor toward his junior, the Korean king. The mutual profit which came as a by-product of the tribute trade confirmed the rightness of the system: it was the kind of blessing to be expected when people interact with propriety.

Many peoples participated in the tributary system—what has been called “The Chinese World Order.” The court at Peking regularly received tribute delegations form Champa and Annam (Vietnam), Tibet, the Ryukyus, and many neighboring tribal states along the borders. Korea, however, is probably the best case study since it was closest and adhered to the system most regularly and over the longest period of time. Korea’s tributary relations with China were not well understood at the end of the nineteenth century. The Korean habit of thinking in terms of the tributary pattern also had a lot to do with its failure to perceive the changing nature of power relationships in East Asia between 1860 and 1910, when Korea succumbed to Japanese imperialism. One central fact was hard for Koreans to grasp at that time, however easy it may be to see in retrospect: the tribute system assumed that China was the preeminent world power. When that [page 79] ceased to be the case, China’s inability to offer elder-brotherly protection after 1895 left Korea on her own with no significant military experience or leadership, and subjugation to another power occured before Korea could develop an autonomous defense. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of the tributary system in Korean thinking up until that time, and equally hard to exaggerate the consequences when it broke down.

**SINO-KOREAN TRIBUTARY RELATIONS IN THE EARLY MING, 1368-1400**

It is a fact that the Korean tributary relationship with China was acceptable, even desirable, to the Koreans. One might expect that the Koreans would have resented having to load up valuable commodities for transmission and presentation to the Chinese emperor every year, but such was not the case. Despite Korea’s poverty through much of the Yi dynasty, the benefits of the tributary system in symbolic, if not in material, terms outweighed the costs. To understand why this was so, we must take a closer look at how the tributary system operated. The late fourteenth century―the period of the fall of Koryo and the founding of the Yi dynasty—provides much material for understanding how the system worked.3

In the late fourteenth century, the Sino-Korean strategic situation was as follows: The Mongols ruled in China and held sway over Korea. Invasions in 1227 and 1235 had subjugated Korea even before the Khans descended on China and overthrew the Southern Sung. Mongol power over Korea was maintained consistently from that time forward by various means in addition to the threat of force. Koryo princes were raised in China under Yuan (Mongol) tutelage and intermarried with the Yuan imperial family. Mongol advisory officers resided in Korea to supervise the Koryo administration. The Mongols divided the royal Koryo lineage and maintained a collateral line of potential Koryo kings under their direct control in the Manchurian city of Shenyang. And the Mongols exacted heavy tribute from the Koreans as a constant inducement to compliant behavior. Each time the Korean throne changed hands, the Mongols produced the new ruler and in-vested him as their agent in Korea, compelling his dependence upon them for authority and, indeed, survival. The Mongols succeeded in this pattern of control because of the widespread awe of their military power, and as long as their rule appeared inviolable they maintained control over Korea.

In the mid 1300’s, however, Mongol control over China began to unravel. Rebellions gathered force in South China. Some rebel leaders avowed [page 80] the aim of restoring the former Sung dynasty; all shared the aim of expelling the Mongols. By 1350,the power of the Mongols, while still awesome, was in a steep decline.

King Kongmin, a Koryo prince who had been tutored in Peking succeeded to the Korean throne in 1352. The Mongols no doubt expected him to continue the pattern of acting like a Yuan viceroy in the capital of Kaegyong. In 1354,for example, he dutifully answered a Yuan levy for troops to aid in the defense of the Kao-yu fortress against Chinese rebels. This defense failed, proving to the Koreans that the Mongols could be beaten after all, and suggesting to some in Kaegyong that the Yuan regime was nearing its end. Kongmin began his reign as a reformer, employing Confucian officials to revitalize his state. With the defeat of the Yuan forces at Kao-yu, this reformist mentality soon took on an anti-Mongol cast. Once the Koreans thought they could get away with it, they began to shake off the more oppressive aspects of Yuan overlordship. Kongmin began a purge of Mongol favorites in his capital, even going so far as to attack the powerful relatives of the Yuan Empress Ch’i (Korean: Ki) who was a native Korean. He decreed an end to the wearing of Yuan court costumes and hair styles, ended use of the Yuan calendar, and began laying plans to recapture Korean territory in the northeast which the Mongols had allowed to fall into the hands of the Manchurian peoples known as the Jurchen. As calculated, the Mongols were unable to arrest this movement toward Korean independence.

The early years of Kongmin’s reign showed hopeful signs of improvement in conditions in Korea and the establishment of a new degree of autonomy on the peninsula. Unfortunately, during the remainder of his time on the throne, until his death in 1374, Korea was plagued by an unending state of crisis. Japanese pirates wasted Korea’s coastal villages year after year; repeated droughts parched Korea’s farmland; many of the king’s officials, being beneficiaries of Mongol favor, opposed his reforms and there was considerable infighting; and in 1359 and 1360, as the rebellions in China spread northward, bands of Chinese called Red Turbans invaded Korea, seized the capital, and forced Kongmin into a costly war to recover his own realm. By 1365, his kingdom was in serious fiscal and administrative frouble. In that year, Kongmin’s queen died, leaving him without an heir. It appears then that he suffered a collapse of will, and his reform program lost its momentum. While he mourned and looked for diversions, the business of government passed into the hands of his officials, who quarreled over many points. The Koryo kingdom, therefore, was in a sorry state in 1368, the year the Chinese rebellions finally succeeded in ousting the Mongols [page 81] from China and Chu Yuan-chang founded the Ming dynasty.

The rise of a new dynasty in China required nimble adjustments in Korea. The Ming victory was decisive as far as China proper was concerned, and the restoration of Chinese rule should have elicited from Korea a timely expression of submission to the new regime. Koryo officials communicated their willingness to shift tributary allegiance to the Ming, but they were in an awkward position. The Mongols, in fleeing China, had repositioned themselves in southern Manchuria, whence they were capable of inflicting heavy damage on Koryo. The survival of the Korean kingdom required the maintenance of friendly relations with both the Ming and the leftover Mongols, at least until the Ming armies could assert control over Manchuria. This, however, the Ming government would not tolerate. When it became known at the Ming court that Korea was keeping up contact with the Mongols in Manchuria, the honeymoon ended and the Ming emperor T’ai Tsu upped the cost of Korean tribute by demanding impossible numbers of key items, such as horses, and he embarrassed Kongmin by sending letters accusing him of bad faith and unfitness to rule. Since Chinese approval―which took the form of a document “investing,” or “appointing” Kongmin to rule in Korea—was essential to the Korean monarchy, the Ming emperor’s constant criticism was a blow to Kongmin’s legitimacy as king. In 1374,Kongmin was murdered by a court eunuch. Almost simultaneously a Ming ambassador was assassinated enroute home by a Korean official. These two events plunged Ming-Korean relations into conflict. T’ai Tsu refused to invest the new ruler of Koryo, King U, putting him at the mercy of his own court factions. King U, meanwhile, tried to balance the need for Ming investiture against the need for protection against the nearby Mongols. This, of course, was impracticable. Korean peace delegations to China were turned back at the border at times; at other times the ambassadors were arrested. For ten years King U drifted in a state of uninvested limbo until finally, in 1385,the Ming emperor allowed a tentative restoration of contact through the payment of a decade’s overdue tribute. But there was little forgiveness in the settlement; it was rather an arrangement designed to gain Korean support for the final push to eliminate the Mongol remnants in Manchuria, something which was accomplished in 1387 with the surrender of the Mongol chieftain Naghachu.

Throughout the period 1375-1385,while the Koreans struggled to recover Chinese friendship, they chafed under the abuse heaped upon King U by the Ming government. They resented the overbearing attitude of the emperor and his officials and saw no justice in it. Certain officials at Kae- gyong came to believe that Chinese support could never be regained, and [page 82] they urged an aggressive military posture. Where Kongmin had begun the recovery of lost northern territory and had actually sent forces to reclaim parts of Liaotung, beyond the Yalu, in 1370, these officials urged that further campaigns be launched to take some of the territory being vacated by the retreating Mongols. This, of course, was in direct conflict with Ming policy, which sought to establish Chinese border commanderies in the same territory. In 1388, when the Ming government notified Korea of its claim to Manchuria as far as T’ieh-ling, the Korean court responded with a military campaign to preempt the Ming claim in Liaotung. In a direct challenge to the Ming, King U ordered his army across the Yalu to the northwest. In the midst of the advance, as the Korean army reached the Yalu, the commanding general, Yi Song-gye, revolted, returned to the capital, and overthrew the king and his court. Four years later, after appropriate hesitations, Yi Song-gye usurped the throne himself and founded the Yi dynasty.

One might expect that the abolition of the faithless Koryo royal lineage would have pleased the Ming and led to a relaxation of Sino-Korean tensions. Indeed, fealty to the Ming was a cardinal point of Yi Song-gye’s political program and he sent an embassy to Nanking immediately to make this point and to request investiture and approval of the new government. The Ming emperor, however, was not so easily swayed. He had his reasons. Who could guarantee that Korea would remain loyal for long? What about the troublesome Korean claims to Manchurian territory? Who was this new Korean king, and what was the significance of the fact that he had many Manchurian (Jurchen) friends and a background of experience on the border? Wouldn’t it be better to withhold approval for the time being and make General Yi struggle for the all-important Chinese charter? Besides, would not investiture signify the emperor’s approval of the act of usurpation? Being a usurper himself T’ai Tsu well understood the danger of being overthrown from within, and his thirty-year reign was characterized by unceasing vigilance against rebellion, bordering on paranoia. Thus there were many good reasons for holding Yi Song-gye (Yi T’aejo) at arms, length, whether or not the emperor believed in his good intentions. Accordingly the emperor lost no opportunity to criticize and humiliate King T’aejo— whether over his ancestry, his policies, the quality of the tribute he offered up, the literary quality of his petitions, or the honesty of his ambassadors. T’aejo’s six-year reign witnessed a continuous struggle to obtain Chinese investiture, to no avail, and when he abdicated in 1398 he was still very much on the defensive, spurned by his Ming suzerain, guilty of the crime of usurpation and the failure to secure Korea’s place within the world order of Chinese civilization.  [page 83]

The year 1398 brought Ming T’ai Tsu’s death as well as Yi T’aejo’s ab-dication, and there was a marked shift in Ming-Korean relations. Where T’ai Tsu had gotten along perfectly well without Korea, feeling free to use and abuse the Koreans however he pleased, his successors were locked in power struggles which required support from every available source. Thus Chu Yun-wen, who succeeded T’ai Tsu, readily patched things up with Korea, and both of T’aejo’s successors, Chongjong (r. 1398-1400) and T’ae- jong (r. 1400-1418), received investiture from the Ming emperors who followed T’ai Tsu. Cultural and political links to the Ming were very important in the years which followed, as T’aejong and Sejong (r. 1418-1450) constructed a model Confucian state based on the value of Korean tradition within the broader scheme of the Chinese cultural sphere. No better piece of evidence for this exists than the epic Yongbi Och’on Ga (Songs of Flying Dragons), which legitimized the Korean ruling house in Chinese literary terms, using the Sino-Korean literary language to construct comparisons of Chinese culture heroes and the ancestors of the Yi roval house.4

**SINO-KOREAN EMBASSIES**

Several scholarly works in English offer detailed accounts of what it was like to participate in the tribute system as an ambassador.5 It is no surprise that throughout the Yi dynasty there were many more embassies to China than from China to Korea. The reason is simple: Korea had to send tribute embassies three times a year, on the occasion of the New Year, the emperor’s birthday, and the birthday of the heir apparent, while the Chinese only sent embassies to Korea to make investigations, to give special reports on major events in China, and to present investiture documents to new Korean kings. Koreans also went to China on special missions, to offer thanks (for example, following a Ming investiture embassy), condolences, and special communications or petitions.

Korean embassies typically consisted of around 40 people, including the envoy, his deputy, secretary, translator, physician, calligrapher, brush- keeper, grooms, valets, porters, and slaves. Their pack animals carried tribute cargoes specified in the Ming administrative code: gold, silver, mats, furs, silk, linen, hemp, paper, brushes, and ginseng, among other things.6 Along the way the travelers engaged in a lively private trade as well, bartering for items to sell at a profit when they got back home. Indeed, so lucrative were the trade opportunities on the tribute road that officials struggled to be named to the delegations despite the rigors of travel. Neither [page 84] did the trading stop in the Chinese capital. The Peking market had specialists in the Korea trade who descended on arriving Korean envoys to buy up their extra commodities. There were even times when the Chinese government complained that members of the Korean entourages were dipping, into the stocks of tribute designated for presentation to the emperor, which was a serious offense. This charge was a favorite of the first Ming emperor, T’ai Tsu, when he was looking for excuses to criticize Korea.

When the Koreans returned from China they brought back the treasures conferred upon them by the emperor at the audience which was the main object of their trip. The visiting Koreans got gifts themselves, but far more elaborate were the items sent back with them to the Korean king. Returning embassies brought back court costumes, musical instruments, jewelry, jade, silks, drugs, and, of course, books, which were the source of continuing vitality in the intellectual life of the Korean upper class. Korean embassies always carried home new editions of the classic, with commentaries, along with treatises, histories, and literature of all kinds which could be reprinted and disseminated in Korea.

The tribute route could be by land or sea. The land route went from Seoul via Pyongyang to Uiju,crossed the Yalu, proceeded to Shenyang, and then to Peking through Shanhaikuan, taking about thirty days. The sea route left the Korean coast at Ch’olsan, near the Yalu, crossed the Yellow Sea to Tengchou, and then overland to Peking. At Peking the envoys stayed at a special hostelry, the Yu Ho Kuan (Jade River Hall), in the southeastern part of the city. All their expenses were borne by their Chinese hosts while they were in China, and both sides provided interpreters to compensate for the fact that the ambassadors themselves could write, but not necessarily speak, Chinese.

The atmosphere of Ming embassies to Korea was somewhat unlike that of Korean embassies to China. Exciting opportunities and experiences awaited Korean envoys in the Chinese capital, and prestige and wealth awaited them on their return. Ming envoys to Korea, on the other hand, were not the cream of Chinese officialdom and they often displayed such arrogance and disdain for their Korean hosts and their comparatively meager hospitality that the coming of Ming ambassadors to Korea was as often as not an occasion for dread. Chinese delegations at the Yalu sent word ahead to Pyongyang and Seoul, so there would be sufficient time to prepare an appropriate welcome. In the later Yi dynasty period there was a special portal outside West Gate (the pillars are still standing next to Independence Gate) called the Gate of Welcoming Grace (Yong’un-mun) [page 85] where Korean courtiers would meet incoming Chinese delegations before conveying them to their special residence, the T’ae P’yong Gwan, inside South Gate.

The first Ming envoy to Korea was Hsieh Ssu,7 in 1369, who brought T’ai Tsu’s edict announcing his new dynasty and requesting Korea’s submission in return. Hsieh’s second mission, in 1370, was to invest Kongmin on behalf of the Ming emperor, presenting him with a golden seal, a writ of investiture, copies of the classics, the Ming calendar, ritual objects including musical instruments, and ceremonial costumes to be worn at court.8

The cordial atmosphere of Hsieh Ssu’s visits to Korea contrasts with the mood of many subsequent Ming embassies. Ming envoys were often not imperial officials at all but eunuchs, usually Korean eunuchs who had been part of the late Yuan/early Ming traffic in human beings. Their deportment in Korea often caused problems. At times they were overbearing and offensive to their hosts and they stayed longer than ordinary Chinese officials, incurring higher costs for entertainment. The visit of Sin Kwi-saeng in 1398 provides but one example of a Korean eunuch from the Ming who insulted his countrymen repeatedly, alternately demanding and refusing hospitality, refusing to speak Korean, humiliating senior officials, and at one point getting drunk and brandishing a knife at a dinner in the presence of the king.9 Such incidents were not uncommon, and they heightened the fears which surrounded Ming-Korean relations. Native Chinese eunuchs were not much better as ambassadors. Between 1403 and 1411 the Ming eunuch Huang Yen made no fewer than six visits to Korea, and he came to be thoroughly disliked.10 He made myriad demands in the name of the emperor, notably for Buddhist artifacts for which he traveled widely in Korea raiding temples and (in 1408-09) for virgins to be presented for acceptance in the imperial harem.

**The Problem of Human Tribute**

Without doubt, the problem of human tribute was the most demoralizing issue ever to arise in Sino-Korean relations. It began under the Yuan, but the Ming continued it on an irregular basis. The requisitions were for girls for the imperial harem, and also for boys, to be eunuchs. The number of persons thus requisitioned at any one time was usually small, but the trade itself is what mattered and Korean records attest to the bitterness with which the Koreans looked upon it. No other aspect of the tributary relationship so clearly demonstrated the contempt in which the Chinese held their loyal neighbor.

Some of the young people who went to China as human tribute even- [page 86] tually did well there. Eunuchs, for example, often were given important responsibilities, including diplomatic assignments which took them back to their homeland. The trouble was the way they lorded it over their hosts. And despite their power, because they were eunuchs, they were not welcomed back by their families, nor were they useful to them. Whereas a Korean official in the regular Chinese bureaucracy might well find positions for his relatives, such was not the case with eunuchs, whose role lay entirely within the palace, in the emperor’s personal keep, out of touch with the business of finding positions in either government.

Young women had a different future if they were chosen for the imperial harem. To begin with, their families were better treated back in Korea, and male relatives received privileges at Ming behest. Once in China, some of the young women became important as consorts: Toghon Temur, the last Yuan emperor, had a Korean concubine, Lady Ch’i, who bore him an heir and was herself promoted to Second Empress. Ming T’ai Tsu’s Korean concubine Lady Han bore him at least one daughter, and there has long been a controversy over whether Chu Ti, who became the Yung-lo emperor, was not the issue of another Korean concubine, Lady Kung.11 The occasional distinction of Korean women in Chinese court circles may have contributed indirectly,to closer relations between the two governments, but on the whole the Koreans were outraged by the idea of human tribute and con-sidered it a violation of the most basic Confucian principles, the more so because the women who were sent usually had to be selected from respectable families.

Requisitions for Korean tribute women were most frequent in the period 1408-1433,12 during the reign of the Yung-lo emperor. Prior to 1424 the Chinese sent for young girls exclusively, as harem candidates. After 1424, they diversified their demands to include entertainers, cooks, and servants. Selection of the women was an elaborate process. In 1408, for example, the Ming court dispatched a special embassy under the Chinese eunuch Huang Yen to Seoul to organize a country-wide search for suitable maidens between the ages of thirteen and fifteen. More than two hundred girls were gathered at the Kyongbok Palace for a first round of inspection. Of these, Huang Yen chose 44 for a second round. In the final round he chose five, all daughters of low-to-middle grade officials. In a special palace ceremony they were given Chinese costumes and court titles. Their male relatives received titles also. The Veritable Records of the Yi dynasty, recording the process in detail, recounts that when Huang Yen set off for China with the girls, their brothers were allowed along as tribute escorts. Lamentations were composed and the sound of their families, wailing is said to have [page 87] filled the streets of the city.13 Most of the tribute women never saw Korea again, and some were reported to have committed suicide when the Yung-lo emperor died, to follow him into the next life.14

Other requisitions for Korean women followed from time to time. Yun Pong, a Korean eunuch who frequently served as a Ming envoy to Korea, took away eleven women in 1426 and returned for 33 more in 1427. The women taken to China after that were exclusively entertainers and kitchen servants. The importation of Korean women was suspended in 1433. The Ming shih records Ying-tsung’s repatriation of 53 surviving Korean women in 1436 (Korean sources say 1435),15 and the practice appears thereafter to have stopped altogether.

**Tung Yueh’s Friendly Embassy**

One of the best-documented Ming embassies to Korea was that of Tung Yueh, chancellor of the Hanlin Academy, who went to Korea in 1488 to announce the ascension of Hsiao-tsung to the Ming throne. Tung Yueh recorded his observations of Korea in the reign of King Songjong in a fu, Ch’ao-hsien fu, a diary, Shih-tung jih-lu, and personal memoranda, Ch’ao- hsien tsa-chih. Tung Yueh reported that Korea was well governed and that her leaders were mindful of their duty and the niceties of diplomacy.16 Of course, Songjong’s reign (1467-1495) was a particularly harmonious period in Ming-Korean relations, and Tung Yueh’s writings suggested that in the absence of suspicion, when neither side wanted anything more than to maintain the basic suzerain relationship, Sino-Korean relations could be well-meant and cordial. But Songjong’s reign was the exception rather than the rule. Suspicion was rarely absent. Because of the constant tension arising from short-term conflicts, and also because of Korea’s need to conduct her internal affairs without interference by Chinese officials, the Yi government seems to have preferred to keep Ming embassies to a minimum, arranging instead to conduct most diplomatic business with China in Peking.

**CONCLUSION**

The foregoing demonstrates the intimate political and cultural relationship between Korea and China in traditional times and may help to explain the singleminded Korean foreign policy encountered by the early Westerners who tried to interest Korea in wider contacts. Many centuries of concentration on the benefits of Chinese contact, together with the pain and [page 88] struggle involved in maintaining that precious relationship, help explain the reluctance of Korea to be untrue to China by entering into treaties with others in the first place, and also the subsequent tendency that some scholars see in modern Korea to attach Korea to one or another great power in China’s place when it became clear that the Ch’ing government had lost its power.

Yi T’aejo, founder of the Yi dynasty, framed a foreign policy called sadae/kyorin. Sadae means “serve the great,” or, more precisely, “acknowledge the manifest superiority of China.” Kyorin means “friendly contact with neighbors (i.e., with Japan and Manchuria) on an equal basis within the Chinese tributary system.” The main emphasis was always on sadae, which is now interpreted by many Koreans as “flunkeyism” or “toadyism” and carries a pejorative connotation degrading to Korea which never was intended by its inventors. Indeed, while the Koreans did put up with abuse and maltreatment through the years in their position of subservience to China, they succeeded admirably in the main purpose of the tribute system as seen from the Korean side, namely the preservation of the kingdom’s autonomy. For as long as they practiced sadae they posed no threat to China and the Chinese left them alone. A feistier spirit of independence or denial of Chinese superiority might have succeeded in preparing Korea better for the dawn of modern times, but it could also have provoked a much more repressive Chinese response which would have been more destructive to Korean life and culture in the long run. However distasteful it may be to look back on the centuries of the sadae policy, the function of *sadae* as a preserver of Korean autonomy makes the pill a little easier to swallow. If there was an error, it was in the expectation that other Chinese neighbors would do as well, maintaining a similiar attitude toward Chinese supremacy in the region. The fatal weakness of the sadae stance was exposed whenever someone else got out of line, when Hideyoshi dreamed of eclipsing the Ming as the center of the world, when the Manchus swept down to overthrow the Ming in the seventeenth century, and when Japan and Russia eliminated China’s power over Korea at the end of the 1800’s. At such times Korea was a victim of its own faith in China’s good intentions and capa-bilities. The better course might have been to heed the example of the much-maligned King Kongmin, in the 1350’s, when he discerned the shifting balance, abandoned his faith in a decaying power, and tried to make adjustments to protect his country before it was too late.

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**NOTES**

1. A fundamental English-language study is Chun Hae-jong, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” in John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order (Cambridge: harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 90-111.

2. John K. Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” and Lien-sheng Yang, 1-19 and 20-33.

3. Much of what follows is based on the author’s “Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Tributary Politics: Sino-Korean Relations in the Fall of Koryo and the Founding of the Yi,” unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1978.

4.. English translations include James A. Hoyt, Songs of the Dragons Flying to Drugons (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

5. See John Meskill, Ch’oe Pu’s Diary: a Record of Drifting A cross the Seu (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965); Richard Rutt, “James Gale’s Translation of the Yonhaeng-nok: an Account of the Korean Embassy to Peking, 1712-1713, revised by Richard Rutt,” Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XLIX (1974), pp. 55-144; Gari K. Ledyard, “Korean Travelers in China over Four Hundred Years,” Occasional Papers on Korea, II (March 1974), pp. 1-42; and James S. Gale, “Hanyang,” Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, II (1902), pp. 35-43.

6. Ta Ming hui tien (Collected Statues of the Great Ming), chuan 105:4.

7. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang (eds.), Dictionary of Ming Biography (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 559-560.

8. Koryo-sa, kwon 29:5b.

9. Taejo sillok, kwon 14:156-16; 16b-17.

10.Goodrich and Fang (eds.), op. cit., pp. 1596-1597.

11. Li Chin-hua, “Ming Ch’eng-isu sheng-mu wen-t’i hui-cheng” (On the problem of the mother of the Ming emperor Ch’eng-tsu), A cade mi a Sinca Bulletin of History and Philology, VI, 1 (1936), pp. 55-77; and Fu Ssu-nien, “Pa ‘Ming Ch’ewng-tsu sheng-mu wen-t’i hui-cheng,” (Critique of the same article), Ibid., pp. 79-86.

12. Wang Ch’ung-wu, “Ming Ch’eng-tsu Ch’ao-hsien fei k’ao”(On Korean women in the court of the Ming emperor Ch’eng-tsu), Academia Sinica Bulletin of History and Philology, XVII (1948), pp. 165-176.

13. T’aejong sillok, kwon 16:38-39.

14. Sejong sillok, kwon 26:15b.

15. Ming shih, chuan 320-7b; Sejong sillok, kwon 68:8b-9b contains a full report of their life in Chinese service.

16. Gale, ‘‘Hanyang,” pp. 35-43.

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**IN MEMORY OF JAMES WADE**

The Korea Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, was saddened in 1983 by the death of its veteran Councillor, former President, Vice-President, Publications Committee Chairman, and Life Member, James Adam Wade. In recognition of his many contributions to the work of the Society over two decades, and in fond memory, the Council publishes this memorial by Councillor Helen Rose Tieszen:

Though James did not live out his allotted threescore years, he left an indelible impression on us and a valuable contribution in his musical and literary works.

He was an only child, the son of the J. E. Wades of Granite City, Illinois. James, in turn, was the father of Adam and John who are now 17 and 15 years of age. But James was not only their father; after Lee’s untimely death, he was both mother and father to the boys.

James’s roles of colleague and of friend were often intertwined. Many of us knew him as one of the mainstays of the RAS Publications Committee. He probably edited and/or proofread all of the books and Transactions published by the Society, at least since 1966, and probably earlier.

James was a friend of writers and musicians, he encouraged many in their fledgling artistic pursuits. In his own professional life, James was engaged in dual careers in the arts. He was a composer of music on the one hand and a free-lance journalist, writer, and editorial consultant on the other. His life work is impressive in both quality and quantity. He authored over 1,700 articles appearing in 125 publications, and his principal musical works include three operas in addition to eight compositions for chamber music, four for chorus, five for voice, eleven for orchestra, and seven arrangements.

James believed in the power of the pen; that one could really change things through writing. This sometimes made him a controversial figure, especially when he was outspoken. However, what might have seemed to be sarcasm was usually a misplaced sense of humor on his part with no malicious intent.

Be that as it may, James directed a good bit of his writing towards mutual cultural understanding. In his article “Culture Shock in Reverse,” he described a Korean friend’s culture shock upon first direct impact with the United States, pointing out many similarities between his Korean friend’s experience in the U.S. and an American’s in Korea. He summarized: “What bothers my friend in America seem to be many of the [page 92] same things that bother Americans newly arrived in Korea—and for the same reasons. Truly, culture shock is a two-way street.” (One man’s Korea, p. 32)

James was funny, too. He was a good conversationalist and entertaining host. This quality came out in some of his published poetry. On an Art Club tour to Ullung-do the group was practically marooned in the yogwan by rainy weather, but nearly every evening James entertained his friends with a new bit of verse. One of them was about Ullungdo’s most famous product, the squid:

Seafood lovers in devious ways

May show signs of a sinister phase,

For it’s not simply fiction

To speak of “addiction”...

“Squid Row” is where they end their days.

(Limmericks on an Island, X)

From among his serious poetry, James selected “Sonnet: 1949” as his best work:

All, as before, the ancient maze rewinding,

Search out again the altar and the fire

And tread again the measure of desire—

The footprints of a former visit finding—

In olden spells the soul and senses binding.

Is this the same deep-buried, rock-hewn fane?

Is this the ancient praise and ancient pain?

The same light, swirling, coruscating, blinding?

The centuries stream by and still you wait,

Patient yet ardent, in your cave of night;

While we still struggle to approach your light

And ritualize the blend of love and hate.

The ceremony ever stays the same:

Your blood the sacrifice, our praise the flame.

(Early Voyagers, p. 24)

The most fitting tribute to James’s genius is probably this line from his “Wotan Brooding Over the Ruins”: Creation alone can occupy eternity (Early Voyagers, p. 61).

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**Annual Report of the Korean Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1983**

The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, is one of several branches of its parent organization, the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Founded in London in 1823 under the royal patronage of King George IV, the purpose of the Society as a whole is to study the “progress of knowledge in Asia and the means of its extension.” Since its founding in Seoul in June 1900 by a small group of foreign residents, the Korea Branch has been devoted, as its Constitution requires, to stimulating interest in, promoting the study of, and disseminating knowledge about the arts, history, literature and customs of Korea and neighboring countries. To meet these requirements, the Korea Branch sponsors lecture meetings, tours, and publications. Among the requirements of the Branch’s Constitution is one that specifies an Annual Meeting at which a report of the year’s activities should be made to the membership and an election of the next year’s officers and Council held. The Annual Report follows. Membership: From its founding 17 members in 1900, the Korea Branch has grown to number over 1,600 members in 1983. This year membership increased from 1,591 in January to 1,640 as of the end of November, an increase of 49 during the year. This figure includes 60 life members, 478 overseas members, and 1,102 regular members residing in Korea. Membership includes not only those who are members of the Branch in Seoul but also those who have joined the Taegu, Kwangju, and Pusan Chapters. Meetings: During the year, 20 lecture meetings were held in Seoul, 9 in Taegu, 8 in Kwangju, and 8 in Pusan. The greatest number of people who attended a single meeting, some 250, witnessed a performance of the Puk- chong Lion Dance at the first fall meeting in Seoul on August 24. Other meetings covered such topics as Yi dynasty inheritance patterns, Korean Oriental medicine, late Koryo dynasty history, shamanism, and, in tribute to the centenary of British-Korean relations, a review of that 100-year-old partnership. In addition, some 250 members attended the annual Garden Party commemorating the Branch’s 83rd year, an event held at the residence of His Excellency J.N.T. Spreckley, the British Ambassador, who is also the Branch’s Honorary President.

Tours: During the spring and fall tour seasons, more than 1500 people went on RAS tours to such places as Puyo and Kongju, Chollipo, Andong, Buddhist temples in Seoul, the National Classical Music Institute. Some ate [page 94] pulgogi on the Han River and, on another occasion, kimch’i after having seen it made in front of their very eyes. Ten of the more than forty tours were two or three-day weekend trips.

Publications: The Korean Branch is justifiably proud of its accomplishments in producing and distributing works in English about Korea. Besides its annual Transactions―Volum 57 for 1982 which was distributed free, as usual, to members―the following titles were reprinted in 1983 to meet continuing demands:

Essays on Korean Traditional Music by Lee Hye-Ku

James Scarth Gale’s History of the Korean People by Richard Rutt

Virtues in Conflict, edited by Sandra Mattielli

Virtuous Women: Three Classic Korean Novels, translated by Richard

Rutt and Kim Chong-un

Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys by Martina Deuchler. The Publications Committee continues to review manuscripts for new additions to the catalogue.

Finances: Monthly statements from the Treasurer report that because of the continuing sale of its publications, the Korea Branch enjoys a state of financial health which allows it to continue to offer meetings, tours, and publications in order to meet its committment to contribute to the “progress of knowledge” about Korea and her neighbors.

Douglas Fund: The Douglas scholarship was awarded to Mr. Choi Sang- kun of the Sungkyunkwan University.

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**Seoul Programs**

Date Topic Attendance

January 12 The Kims of Puan: A Case Study in the 150

Disinheritance of Daughters

(Mr. Mark Peterson)

January 26 Foot-mask Drama 180

(Mr. Lee Dong-An)

February 9 The Life of the Foreign Community in the Treaty 80

Ports in Japan in the Nineteenth Century,

with a Look at Korea

(Dr. James E. Hoare)

February 23 New Intructional Media in Korean Studies 120

(Prof. Edward J. Shultz)

March 9 The Origins of Some Distortions in 90

Modern Korean History

(Dr. Kenneth C. Quinones)

March 23 A Photo journal of Favorite R.A.S. 200

Places in 1982

(Mr. Roger C. Mathus)

April 13 Metalcraft and Metal Art in Korea 60

(Ms. Komelia Okim and Mr. Jack Silva)

April 27 On the Abolition of Discrimination Between 70

Legitimate and Illegitimate Descendants

(Mr. Key P. Yang)

May 11 Tradition Versus Modernity in Korea Villages 150

(Prof. Jae-Poong Ryu)

May 25 Korean Oriental Medicine 120

(Dr. Kang Sung-gil)

June 8 The Extraordinary Life of Isabella Bird Bishop 50

(Rev. Dr. James Huntley Grayson)

June 22 I-Ching: The Book of Changes 150

(Prof. Han Tae-dong)

August 24 Pukch’ong Lion Dance 200

(Dr. Kim Ho-soon)

September 14 The Influence of Chinese Politics on the Fall 80

of Koryo and the Founding of the Yi Dynasty

(Dr. Donald Clark)

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September 28 Trip to Paektu Mountain, 1931 100

(Dr. Horace G. Underwood)

October 12 Women in Urban Poor Families (Prof. Cho Ok-rha) 80

October 26 The Dead Must Eat: Ancestor Worship in Korea 60

(Dr. Roger L. Janelli)

November 9 100 Years of the British in Korea (Dr. James E. Hoare) 30

November 23 Korean-American Cultural Ties through Shamanism 80

(Dr. Zozayong)

December 15 Kaya, the Legends and the Learning: 40

Excavations of the Kaya Tombs

(Ms. Maggie Dodds)

**1983 Tours**

Date Place Participants

March 19 Songmo-do in Kangwha 34

March 20 Sokchonje (Sacrifice to Confucius) 62

March 26 Chung Art Studio 14

March 27 Puyo and Kongju 66

April 2 Hoam Museum 19

April 9 Namhansansong 38

April 10 Shard Collecting Tour 19

April 16 Mountain Climbing—Samaksan 24

April 23-24 Magnolia Tour—Ch’ollip’o 23

April 30 Sudok-sa, Haemi & Hongsong 43

May 7 Inch’on to Suwon on the Narrow Gauge 77

May 14-15 Andong, Pusok-sa & Hahoe Village 35

May 20-21 Buddha’s Birthday at Songnisan 28

May 20 City Temples on Buddha’s Birthday 45

May 27-29 Ch’olla-do Tour 19

June 4-6 Cheju-do Tour 36

June 11 Onyang Museum & Hyonch’ung-sa 18

June 12 Pulgogi on the Han 26

June 18 Inch’on Harbor & Island Hopping 44

June 25 Garden party 250

July 2-4 Taech’on Beach Tour 38 [page 97]

August 28 Ch’ong P’yong Boat Tour 35

September 3-4 Ch’ollip’o Beach & Mr. Miller’s Arboretum 15

September 10 Silk Tour 80

September 11 Churches in Seoul 21

September 16-18 Hallyo Sudo & Songkwang-sa 42

September 24-25 Yangdong Village 28

October 1-2 Paekdam-sa & Inner Sorak 42

October 3 Kangwha-do Tour 26

October 7-9 Taegu Area Tour 12

October 9 Yoju and King Sejong’s Tomb 17

October 15 Kiln Tour 18

October 16 Kwangnung and Pongson-sa 33

October 22-23 Soyo-san & Hwaeam-sa 32

October 29 Tea Ceremony 22

October 30 Hiking Tour―Chuup-san 24

November 5 National Institute for Traditional Music 18

November 6 Pulgogi in the Samwon Garden 30

November 12 Gallery & Artist Studio Tour 27

November 19 Factory Tour 19

November 20 Kimjang Tour 25

**Taegu Chapter, Committee Officers**

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Maureen Taylor, President (2nd half year)

Julie Moyles, Secretary

Fr. Josef Platzer, Treasurer and Councillor

Sylvia Broderick, Membership Committee Chairman

Yoo Kwang-gil, Books Committee Chairman

Ahn Joon-sang, Member-at-Large

Whang Kee-suk, Member-at-Large

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Elizabeth Herakakis, Member-at-Large [page 98]

**Taegu Programs**

January 12 Koryo, the Forgotten Dynasty

(Dr. Edward J. Shultz)

February 9 The Confucianization of Korea in Perspective

(Prof. Kwon Yeong-oon)

March 9 Traditional Korean Folklore and Rituals

(Prof. Lee Nam-shik)

April 13 American Missionaries and 100 Years of Korean Protestantism

(Dr. David Kwang-sun Suh)

April 16 Walking Tour of Chinese Medicine Alley

(Mr. Ahn Joon-sang)

May 11 A Demonstration of Korean Martial Arts

(Col. Stan Henning)

June 8 Archabbot Weber’s 1925 Film of Korea

(Father Egon P. Berger)

September 14 Korea—Window to the Orient

(Ms. Maureen Taylor)

October 12 The 1976 Tree-Cutting Incident at the DMZ

(Capt. Wayne N. Kirkbride)

November 9 Traveling for Her Health—the Extraordinary Life

of Isabella Bird Bishop (Dr. James H. Grayson)

**Kwangju Chapter Committee Members**

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Mrs. David Shaffer, Secretary

Brother Larry Finn, Treasurer

Dr. Shin Sang-Soon, Program Chairman

Rev. John Underwood, Tours Chairman

Rev. Jefferson Ritchie, Books Chairman

Prof. Lee Jesu, Membership Chairman

Ms. Mary B. Carlin, Member-at-Large [page 99]

**Kwangju Programs**

January 28 The Cuvillier Collection of Lantern Slides

(Dr. Horace G. Underwood)

March 22 New Instructional Media in Korean Studies

(Dr. Edward J. Schultz)

April 23 Three Miruk and Puyo Tour

(Rev. John Underwood)

May 27 Metalcraft and Metal Art in Korea

(Professors Komelia Okim and Jack Silva)

September 23 So-Called Yangban in Korea―Past and Present

(Dr. Song Joon-Ho)

October 3 Tour of Chonju City Antiques, Kumsan-sa and Miruk-sa (Rev. John Underwood)

October 14 Travelling for Her Health―The Extraordinary Life of

Isabella Bird Bishop

(Dr. James Huntley Grayson)

**Pusan Programs**

January 11 The Kim of Pusan—Disinheritance of Daughters

(Mr. Mark Peterson)

February 8 Korean Thought Patterns

(Prof. Ahn Jung-hun)

March 8 The Southern Coastal Area of Korea (Mr. Don Miller)

April 12 Art Show: Work Completed in Korea (Mrs. Shirley Jeffery)

May 10 Acupuncture Discussion and Demonstration

(Dr. Lee)

June 14 Korean Traditional Dance, Film and Demonstration (Prof. Yang Hak-ryun)

October 11 Buddhism

(Dr. Lewis R. Lancaster)

December 13 Discussion and Demonstration of T’aekwondo

(Mr. Michael Hutton and Mr. Kim)

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Choi, Bang Won Dong, Duk-mo

Choi, Jin Dorow, Martha R. [page 102]

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Murphy, Carol A. Pettigrew, Mr. & Mrs. D. Eric

Murphy, Mr. & Mrs. D.F.C. Peyron, Maj Gen. and Mrs. Gustaf

Murphy, Clint J.A. Phillips, Charlotte E.

Musladin, James P. Pickard, Lynn E.

Myers, Charlotte E. Piotrowski, Kazimiera

Myers, Sheila K. Piatt, Mr. & Mrs. Alfred H.

Na, Kwang Bes Platzer, Josef

Nadeau, Kathleen M. Plavsic, Borivoj M.

Nahm, Yong Woo Plotteck, Mr. & Mrs. Dietrich M.

Naisby, Mr. & Mrs. Alan Poitras, Dr. & Mrs. Edward W.

Nelson, Charles Norman Quinn, Eileen Jane

Nelson, Mr. & Mrs. Dirk Rawn, Coral L.

Neukirchen, Mr. & Mrs. Matthias H. Raskine, Mr. & Mrs. Peter J.

Neveau, Beverly E. Ready, Maria

New, Janet T. Rector, Gary

Nicholas, Joseph Rhee, Sung Hon

Nicolay, Mr. & Mrs. Fons Richter, Dr. & Mrs. Ronald R.

Nieusma, Dr. & Mrs. D.H. Riemer, Hilbert W.

Noone, Mr. & Mrs. Richard F. Rhoads, Mr. & Mrs. Paul A.

Norman, Mr. & Mrs. J. P. Ritchie, Mr. & Mrs. Jefferson I.

Notley, Mr. & Mrs. Len F. Ritze, Dr. & Mrs. F. H.

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