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**The Centenary of Korean-British Diplomatic Relations: Aspects of British Interest and Involvement in Korea 1600-1983\***

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INTRODUCTION

At the end of October 1883, Sir Harry Smith Parkes, long the doyen of British diplomats in East Asia, arrived in Seoul to complete the negotiations for a treaty which was to replace that negotiated in 1882. That had aroused widespread opposition and had finally been abandoned. The negotiations in Seoul were successful, and a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was signed in the Kyongbok Palace on 26 November 1883. Parkes left Seoul the next day, before the Han River froze for the winter, but he was to return the following April to exchange ratifications.

Thus began formal relations between Korea and Britain. To mark the anniversary, numerous events were planned. The first ever official visit by a member of the British Royal Family took place in May, when His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester came at the same time as the Royal Ballet. There was a second Royal visit in October, when the Duke of Kent led a British Overseas Trade Board mission to Korea. Other British visitors to Korea included the novelist Iris Murdoch, the playwright Arnold Wesker and the economist Professor Frank Hahn. From both countries, there were ministerial and other official exchanges. If the Royal Ballet is the major British cultural manifestation to mark the centenary, the exhibition of Korean art in London from February 1984 is a fitting reminder of Korea’s cultural importance. In addition to these high-level contacts, there have been numerous others, covering the whole range of contacts between the two countries.

This paper traces the history of British interest in Korea from long before Parkes’s treaty to the present. It seems particularly appropriate that such a paper should be given to a Royal Asiatic Society audience, for the British in Korea were very much in the forefront of the move to found the

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[page 2] RAS, and were certainly in the forefront of its activities until the Pacific War. Since then, the changes in Britain’s position in East Asia have been reflected in the RAS, no less than in other fields.

The paper does not claim to be a piece of original research. Others have covered the ground, sometimes indeed in front of RAS audiences1. But it does include some new material, and attempts to bring the story up to the present, which has not been done before.

KOREAN-BRITISH RELATIONS BEFORE THE TREATY

British interest in Korea dates from the beginning of the seventeenth century. News of Korea, and its reputed wealth, reached Europe through the Portuguese, and appears to have first been made known to the English in Richard Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation,* published between 1598-1600. It may have been this compilation which aroused the interest of Sir Edward Michelborne, a founder member of the East India Company established in 1600,and which led him to seek a charter from King James I to enable him to trade with various eastern countries, including Korea. Michelborne set out for the east, but he got no further than the Malay peninsula.2

As the East India Company itself became established in East Asia, it was natural that its members should take an interest in Korea. The setting up of a factory at Hirado in Japan in 1613 not only brought members of the Company close to Korea, but also raised the possibility of actual contact with Korean envoys in Japan. In spite of high hopes, and even knowledge of Korean products such as ginseng, however, nothing came of these early attempts, which ended with the withdrawal of the English from Hirado in 1623.3 The East India Company turned its attention to China, though there was a brief flurry of interest in Korea again in 1702. But that too quickly died.4

It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that British interest was again awakened. The growth of the China trade led to an increase in British (and other western) shipping in East Asian waters, which in turn led to the need for survey work. It was this need which lay behind Captain William Broughton’s voyage around the North Pacific and the Asian region in HMS *Providence*, from 1794 to 1798, and which brought him to Korea’s northeastern coast in 1797.5 Broughton’s account of his voyage, published in 1804, sparked off further interest in Korea, and in 1816, HMS *Alceste* and HMS *Lyra* engaged in survey work off the west coast of Korea. Attempts to land were discouraged. The Korean officials encountered made it [page 3] clear that they would be in great trouble if the foreigners persisted. Two ac-counts of this voyage were published.6

During the next forty years, the number of British and other foreign ships in Korean waters increased year by year. In 1832 the East India Company, whose control over Britain’s China trade was rapidly slipping away, sent a ship along the northern shores of China in search of new trade. Not only did this ship, the Lord Amherst, visit Korea, but it had on board the Rev. Charles (or Karl) Gutzlaff, who hoped to explore the possibilities for Christian missionary work, as well as the prospects for trade. Gutzlaff succeeded in distributing some Bibles, but the visit to Korea was not generally successful, the Koreans displaying the same sort of hostility they had shown in 18167.7

No further attempts at trade took place, but the survey work went on. Increased China trade after the Opium War of 1839-1842, and the opening of Japan to the west in the 1850’s, also added to the shipping in or near Korea. By the early 1970’s, British naval vessels were regularly visiting Port Hamilton (Komun-do) off the south of Korea, and there were those who advocated its permanent occupation by Britain.8 The British government declined to do so in 1875,however, since “...it was not desirable to set to other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain had no title...”.9

The British were disappointed in trade and not inclined to annexation; instead, missionary interest, never followed up after Gutzlaff’s 1832 visit, began to revive in the 1860’s.10 A Welsh missionary in China, the Rev. R. J. Thomas, beset by personal worries, found his way to Chefoo in the autumn of 1865. There he met Koreans, and began to study the language. He also visited Korea, and distributed Bibles. His Korean contacts promised to take him to meet senior officials if he returned the following year, and thus it was that he took passage on the ill-fated American ship, the *General Sherman*, in September 1866. The ship was under charter to the British company, Meadows and Co., of Tientsin, and there are those who suggest that Thomas’s involvement, like that of Gutzlaff some thirty years before, was not entirely concerned with spreading the gospel. Whatever his motives, Thomas, like all on the *General Sherman*, was killed when the ship tried to force the barriers on the Taedong river below Pyongyang in September 1866. Although this was to be a contributory factor to America’s “little war” with Korea in 1871, the British government took no action.11

The next major British missionary involvement with Korea came via Scots missionaries in Manchuria. The Rev. John Ross and his brother-in-law, Rev. John Mclntyre, made the acquaintance of Koreans across the Yalu [page 4] border in the early 1870’s. Ross in particular seems to have felt that it was essential to learn Korean in order to talk with the Koreans whom he met, and in order to produce Bible translations.

His efforts were successful. By 1879, the Gospel of St. Luke had been translated, and work was underway on the rest of the Bible. Ross’s translation was later deemed to be too full of provincialisms and Sino-Korean words, but it was widely used after 1879,and opinions today are less harsh than they once were. Ross continued to work with Koreans in Manchuria until his retirement in 1910. He died in Edinburgh in 1915.12

By this stage, the opening of Korea to the outside world was well ad-vanced. There had been the French expedition of 1866, the American of 1871,and finally the Japanese success with the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876. The British authorities had watched these developments with interest, but did not seem inclined to take any initiative themselves. There were exceptions, as we have seen, but, as far as Korea was concerned, the British were very reluctant imperialists.

However, the British were busy gathering information about Korea. Sir Harry Parkes, British Minister in Tokyo from 1865,had long had an interest in Korea, and his had been one of the most prominent voices advocating the occupation of Port Hamilton. It may well have been his interest which prompted a number of his consular officers in Japan to begin Korean studies. Certainly, even before 1883,some of these had begun to acquire the language, and to publish works on Korea.13 The Minister in China, Sir Thomas Wade, also had a history of interest in Korea.

The first British diplomat to visit Korea was Joseph Longford, then Consul at Nagasaki, in 1875. Longford met the same hostility as had earlier visitors.14 The most comprehensive account of Korea before 1882 came from W. D. Spence, of the British Consulate in Shanghai, who was allowed to accompany the Duke of Genoa in July 1880. Before he went, Spence, having rejected books by Ross and others as worthless, received what he regarded as more useful works from W. G. Aston, Consul at Kobe, who was by then well advanced in the study of Korea and the Korean language.15 Parkes and his government were also learning about Korean politics from Koreans in Japan, including Kim Ok-kyun.16

TREATY MAKING 1882-1883

While the British were content to let the Japanese “open” Korea, they were more concerned by Russian and American moves in the same direction. Anglo-Russian rivalry was a major factor in international affairs, and [page 5] the British feared that the Russians, by establishing themselves in Korea, would pose a threat to British imperial interests.17 In the American case, the British concern was largely over what were believed to be mistaken ideas about trade and tariffs, most recently shown in Japan.18 Thus when the British learnt that the Americans intended sending Commodore Shufeldt to Korea to negotiate a treaty, they deemed it prudent to send Vice-Admiral Willis, Commander-in-Chief of the China station, to Korean waters, to monitor American moves. Willis was also given discretion to negotiate a treaty, if he thought it necessary. Given previous British experience of the diplomatic negotiations of naval officers in East Asia, this was a surprising move.19

Following Shufeldt’s successful completion of negotiations at Inch’on in May 1882,Willis concluded a treaty at the same place a few days later. Although Willis was accompanied by Aston, his treaty owed nothing to Aston’s experience or knowledge. Instead, he took over Shufeldt’s treaty. The only addition was a letter from King Kojong to Queen Victoria, which cast doubts on the Korean ability to make treaties independently of China and was not regarded as useful.20

Willis’s treaty aroused a storm of opposition. It was well known by 1882 that British goods were available within Korea, and British merchants in the East argued that the proposed treaty, which contained the same high tariffs as the American one, would do nothing to help the growth of trade. The Secretary of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce, for example, wrote that “...little or no commerce could be conducted by British merchants under this treaty...”.21 Parkes, though he had been in favour of sending Willis to Korea, also expressed his disapproval of the treaty. Willis’s own protective attitude to his treaty, and the steady souring of his relations with Parkes, added an extra dimension to the debate.22

As Parkes and Willis exchanged barely polite letters, a steady stream of diplomatic officers visited Korea. At first they sought ways to modify Willis’s treaty, but gradually it became clear that a completely new treaty would be necessary to meet the British objectives and to take account of the objections. The German government, whose representative had concluded a treaty similar to Shufeldt’s, was also persuaded to abandon it and to reopen negotiations.23

These negotiations came to fruition in November 1883. Parkes, now Minister to China, arrived in Seoul with Aston from Japan, and Walter Hillier and C. T. Maude, both from the China consular service. They were joined in Korea by Herr Zappe, German Consul-General at Yokohama, who had been appointed German plenipotentiary, and who was an old [page 6] friend of Parkes’s, from Japan days. The negotiations were tough, but came to a successful conclusion, from a British and German point of view, with the signing of the new treaty on 26 November. Parkes had found his companions congenial, and had found both Seoul and its people congenial.24 There are many analyses of this treaty, and there is no need to go over its terms here. Parkes’s efforts were highly praised by London, and widely welcomed by the foreign communities in East Asia. Sir Philip Currie, the Under-Secretary concerned in the Foreign Office, wrote that: “Your treaty has given entire satisfaction, and we are very grateful for the admirable way in which you have managed the business...”25 In many ways, as Parkes himself admitted, the treaty had less to do with Korea than with other British interests in China and Japan. Certainly Parkes took the opportunity offered by the negotiations to avoid problems which had arisen in those countries because of careless or unclear drafting.26 Although Shufeldt’s treaty holds a symbolic importance, as Korea’s first with a western country, it was Parkes’s treaty which formed the basis on which American and other foreigners lived in Korea until 1910.27

IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY 1884-1890

Parkes returned in April 1884, to exchange ratifications of the treaty. On that occasion, he was accompanied by his eldest daughter—his wife had died while he was Minister in Japan—and she, together with the wife of the United States’ representative, was received by the Queen and the ladies of the court. This was to be Parkes’s last visit, for he died in 1885.28

Meanwhile, steps were in hand to implement the treaty. Even before November 1883,there were a number of British citizens in Korea. Some were employed by the Korean government, while others were engaged in various commercial activities. Jardine Matheson, for example, the most famous British trading company in China and Japan, had interests in both mining and shipping before the treaty.29 Problems were also beginning to arise which required the involvement of British consular officers. The British already had the most comprehensive legal system of any western power in East Asia, and this was extended to Korea by the Order in Council of 26 June 1884,which was to come into force in October 1884.30

There was also the question of how this system was to be administered and the form of British representation in Korea. The treaty allowed the appointment of diplomatic and consular representatives, and the British authorities were anxious that this should be done. But there was the question of cost, coupled with uncertainty about how trade would develop and [page 7] what size British community might establish itself in Korea and where. In these circumstances, Parkes argued that “...it would be unnecessary, at the outset at least of our intercourse with Corea, to incur the expense of appointing to that country a special Legation.” Instead he proposed that he should be accredited as British Minister to Korea, while continuing to reside in Peking, and that a number of temporary appointments should be made to consular posts in Korea. The Koreans and the Chinese would both be willing to accept such an arrangement.31

It was a proposal which fell on fruitful ground in London, where the Treasury was already making it clear that it was most reluctant to make any new money available for the setting up of diplomatic or consular establishments in Korea.32 It is also a proposal which has caused much confusion in assessments of British views of Korea’s relations with China ever since. It is frequently asserted that this arrangement, which was to last until almost the turn of the century, was made in order to take account of Chinese claims to suzerainty over Korea. Parkes and his colleagues who negotiated the 1883 treaty were of course well aware of the Chinese and Korean positions on this matter, but one reason for the rejection of Admiral Willis’s treaty was precisely because Willis had, whether knowingly or not, conceded the Chinese position. Though the British position may have been obscured by later actions—for example, during the Port Hamilton affair of 1885-87— the original position taken by Parkes is clear. Sir Robert Hart, Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, who was in favour of supporting the Chinese claim over the status of Korea, noted in March 1885, just after Parkes’s death: “...he had insisted on the King of Corea describing himself (which he did not want to do) as independent (which he is not)...”33

There were more immediate concerns, however. Parkes, no doubt anticipating the acceptance of his proposal in London, set in motion the search for suitable premises from which the British would operate. W. G. Aston, who was Parkes’s proposed candidate for the post of acting Consul-General, began the search even before the exchange of ratifications. In May 1884, soon after King Kojong had allowed foreigners to settle on land inside the Seoul city walls, Aston concluded an agreement to buy a tract of land in Chong-dong, in the area of a decayed former royal palace. The land, bought for Mexican $1200—then worth some £225—is the land on which the British Embassy still stands today. In addition, during 1883 Aston had obtained first refusal on a number of other sites at the places now opened to foreign trade.34

There was some reluctance on the part of the Treasury to spend any money on Korea, but they were eventually persuaded that Aston had a [page 8] bargain. So offices and living quarters were set up in the 10 or 12 Korean-style houses on the site, and the British Legation began to function. At Chemulp’o also a consular post was functioning soon after the exchange of ratifications, under an acting vice-consul. The first of these vice-consuls was W. R. Carles, from the China consular service, who was to spend much time in Korea, and who published a book about the country. Chemulp’o had scarcely existed before 1882,and it was impossible to find anything suitable for either consular offices or a residence. Parkes suggested the construction of a special building in Shanghai but in fact the first premises used seem to have been an old public house or saloon, the “Royal Oak,” which was purchased in Nagasaki and brought over on the Jardines, steamship, the Nanzing, in September 1884. Great efforts were also made to ensure that there was a consular jail, another sign of the British determination to provide for the good government of their community.35

The British were the prime movers behind efforts to have the new foreign settlements in Korea established on a proper footing. Here, as in treaty making, Parkes, Aston and the others brought with them years of experience in China and Japan, and a determination to learn from mistakes which they thought had occured in the setting up of foreign settlements. This approach was one which did not always find favour with their colleagues. Indeed, one American official claimed that the British insistence on proper regulations for land holding at Chemulp’o was “...an attempt to freeze out other foreigners by the investment of the more abundant English capital in the far east.”36

If that was the object, it was unsuccessful. Parkes had been under no illusions when he had set about renegotiating the 1882 treaty that Korea would prove to be a great source of new trade. Korea’s long seclusion, he noted in June 1883, and the “consequent stagnation of industry which this has occasioned...” meant that the economy was largely self-contained.37 He did not add, though he might have done, that the existing trade in British goods was already well taken care of by Chinese and Japanese merchants. Jardines, whose expectations were quickly disappointed, pulled out early on, and none of the other major British trading companies attempted the Korean market. Such British trade as there was was small-scale. As a consequence, numbers of Britons, too, remained small, though the British residents were the main group of westerners well into the twentieth century.38

For the diplomats, there were plenty of other things to keep them occupied during the turbulent years of the ‘80’s. During the Post Office coup in December 1884, Aston, his colleagues and family all took refuge in the [page 9] American Legation.39 Dashing about the streets in the depths of the winter had a serious effect on Aston’s already poor health, and he was unable to work for some six months.40 Even without such excitements, there were problems to be sorted out for British employees of the Korean government, for British merchants and for the occasional traveller who met with hostility. After the signing of the Italian treaty in June 1884, the British also looked after Italian interests.

There was also the immense amount of work created by the British oc-cupation of Port Hamilton. By 1885, Lord Derby’s view of the propriety of Britain occupying bits of Korea had given way to a decision to occupy Port Hamilton, in a move which, it was claimed, would prevent the Russians taking a port on Korea’s northeastern coast. Whether or not the Russians ever intended to act as others said they would is open to question. What is not open to question is that the British Navy, on the instructions of the Cabinet, sent three ships to Port Hamilton in April 1885, although at first the British flag was not hoisted over the islands. This move took place without any consultation with Korea. Neither were the Chinese or Japanese governments informed, though, as quickly became apparent, both considered that this was a matter which directly concerned their interests.41

The story of the diplomatic manoeuvres which followed this action have been well told elsewhere, though, surprisingly, there is as yet no full-length study of the subject.42 What matters in this paper is that for nearly two years, British sailors and marines lived at Port Hamilton. The islands then had few Korean inhabitants, but those who were there seem generally to have been friendly. They were willing to make land available for buildings and, occasionally, to work. The British erected barracks, a hospital and some other buildings, as well as several jetties. Attempts to close off some of the harbour entrances by booms and other devices were unsuccessful. A cable was laid to Hong Kong, but there were great difficulties in keeping it in operation.43

For those stationed on the islands, life cannot have been very exciting. They had occasional visitors from Seoul and elsewhere, and from time to time the regular garrison was reinforced by visiting ships. But life in general must have been dull, and dangerous in the autumn and winter gales. An enterprising Japanese, no doubt well aware of the habits of sailors the world over, brought in five Japanese women in May 1886. Strong—and probably illegal—measures were taken to get him and his ladies off the islands, especially after one marine died when a boat turned over as a party of marines returned after visiting the makeshift brothel.44

By then there were already growing doubts in British official circles [page 10] about the wisdom of the continued occupation of the islands. The commander of British naval forces on the China station, Vice-Admiral Vesey Hamilton, who visited the islands at the end of May 1886,sent back a report in which he said that he could not see “...a single point in [the occupation’s] favour, and very many objections against it.” Rather than strengthening the British naval presence in East Asian waters, it weakened it, for it tied up too many men, ships and stores. The anchorage was not good, and there seemed to be no commercial advantage.45

For these practical reasons, and because of the continued diplomatic complications caused by the occupation, plus a reduction in Anglo-Russian tension, the decision was taken late in 1886 to end the occupation. A Chinese undertaking that they would allow no foreign occupation of any Korean port was a further major consideration. The decision was announced in Parliament on 2 and 3 February, and on 28 February 1887 the Admiralty received a cable from Vice-Admiral Hamilton: “Flag hauled down Port Hamilton 27th. Cable under charge of Chief.”46 A suggestion that a Korean official should be taken to the islands to witness the British withdrawal, which came from the British Minister in Peking, was turned down by the Admiral “...as from their not very cleanly habits these officials were far from acceptable guests on board a man-of-war...”47 The British left Port Hamilton, as they had come, with no official Korean involvement.

All that now remains of the occupation is a grave dating from 1886. Another grave dates from 1903, for British and other foreign ships continued to visit the islands regularly after 1887. The local inhabitants say that other graves were destroyed during the Japanese colonial period. It is also said that the remains of one of the British jetties lies at the base of an existing jetty. But, the grave apart, nothing can be seen which dates from 1885-1887. In the 1970’s, the British government agreed to lease the land on which the graves stand, and to mark the centenary of Korean-British diplomatic relations, a commemorative plaque was erected in 1983, paid for partly by the British government, and by various Korean and British societies.48

Thus, by the end of the 1880’s, British interest in Korea, and belief in its strategic importance, had led to actual occupation. Further signs of British interest in the country were also available. The consular establishment in Korea had remained on a temporary basis, with staff drawn from either the Japan or China consular services, receiving only additional allowances for serving in Korea. By the late 1880’s, this arrangement was no longer satisfactory. The needs for new buildings in Seoul to replace the existing buildings—which Aston had described in 1884 as all being “...of [page 11] wood, old and in an indifferent state of repair”49―had been recognised for some years, but the Treasury had refused to sanction the erection of new buildings as long as the temporary arrangements of 1884 continued. Now, in 1888,the Minister in Peking, still of course side-accredited to Seoul, put forward a proposal whereby Seoul and Chemulp’o would become substantive posts. This in turn led to the Treasury’s approval for the erection of new buildings in Seoul, to serve both as the Legation and the Consulate- General. It also led to a decision to provide more satisfactory accommodation at Chemulp’o.50

In 1890-91, therefore, the majority of the old buildings on the Seoul site were torn down, and work began on a set of standard nineteenth-century British official buildings, to provide residential and office accommodation. There were conflicting views about the merits of the buildings, but they were seen by contemporaries as a sure sign of continued British interest in Korea.51 At Chemulp’o, where a site was purchased in 1887, work went on more slowly, and it was not until 1897 that the buildings there were completed.52

THE BRITISH CONSOLIDATE 1890-1900

Further evidence of this British interest, both official and private, was forthcoming in the 1890’s. Additional consular sites were selected at Chin-namp’o, Mokp’o, Pusan and Masanp’o, as these ports were opened. Although in some cases buildings were leased with the sites, there were never permanent establishments at these places. Consular officers visited from time to time, however, and the sites were kept well into the twentieth century.53

The turbulent years of the 1890’s saw British marines brought up to Seoul from time to time, in order to protect the legation. The officers and men were often a welcome addition to the small foreign community.54 Other visitors were also important. Chemulp’o was a regular port of call for the British naval detachments in East Asian waters, and not infrequently, senior naval officers went up to Seoul. Many British sailors are buried in the Inch’on Foreign Cemetery, including eighteen of those lost when one of the boats from HMS *Edgar* capsized in November 1895.55

There were of course happier occasions. In May 1893, the British Minister at Peking, Nicholas O’Conor, sailed up the Han river to Seoul, to present his credentials as British Minister to Korea, the first Minister to do so since Sir Harry Parkes in 1884. He stayed a week and as well as his formal audience at the Palace, he gave a grand dinner to mark the Queen’s [page 12] birthday.56 In 1897, his successor, Sir Claude McDonald, also presented his credentials in Seoul.57 Two other important visitors during the 1890’s were the celebrated lady traveller Mrs. Bishop and the future Lord Curzon. Both wrote valuable books about Korea, with Mrs. Bishop in particular arguing for a much stronger British presence in a “...country rich in underdeveloped resources and valuable harbours, and whose possession by a hostile power would be a serious threat to [British] interests in the Far East...”58

One of Mrs. Bishop’s biggest complaints was the lack of British commercial activity in Korea. Sir Harry Parkes’s predictions had on the whole proved accurate. It was not that British goods did not reach Korea. They did and in reasonable quantities, but the trade remained as it had been in 1882, in the hands of Chinese, and especially after 1894-1895, Japanese merchants. The British merchants established in China and Japan showed no inclination to develop the Korean market. Not that they were alone in this, for the total number of foreign firms established in Korea by the mid-1890’s was pitifully small. However, in 1896, the British firm of Holme, Ringer and Company, set up originally at Nagasaki in the 1860’s, established a branch at Chemulp’o, the first British firm of any standing to test the Korean market since Jardines in 1883-4.59 Before long they were acting as agents for other British companies including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and, somewhat later, the Glasgow-based Singer Sewing Machine Company.60

There was another area of British commercial interest—gold mining. This scarcely got under way before the turn of the century, but the British were as keen as other foreigners to obtain concessions from the Korean government, though it was not always British companies which exploited the concessions obtained.61

It was also the 1890’s which saw the establishment of a British missionary presence in Korea. Given the interest in Korea aroused through contact in Manchuria, it is not surprising that a number of missionary societies sought to have special clauses inserted in the 1883 treaty to facilitate missionary work. In fact, no special arrangements were made, Parkes and others believing that the treaty system would allow a certain amount of missionary work and that any attempt to seek a special status for missionaries would only meet with Korean objections. But although the Anglican church in Japan and China took an early interest in the possibility of establishing a mission in Korea, nothing happened for some years. There were a number of Britons working with American and other groups, but no formal British missionary presence in Korea until 1890. It was then, following the recommendation in 1887 of the Anglican Bishops of North China [page 13] and Tokyo, that an Anglican missionary bishop, Charles J. Corfe, arrived in Korea. He purchased various pieces of land, including one just in front of the British Legation, and set about organising his mission.62

It had been difficult to get this project under way. There were some doubts in Anglican circles about the stretching of resources which Corfe’s mission would represent, and also about appearing to compete for converts in a country where there was already a well-established Roman Catholic mission. Corfe had also found great problems recruiting others to work in Korea. Nevertheless, Corfe persisted, and by 1900, the Anglican mission was a well-established and highly-regarded one. Corfe set high standards. He insisted on the need to learn the vernacular, and did not attempt the conversion of Koreans until he and his colleagues were able to operate in the Korean language. Instead, the mission concentrated on its three small hospitals, two in Seoul and one at Chemulp’o and on other activities such as its printing press, which did secular printing as well as work for the mission. In addition Corfe began a programme which was unique among missions in Korea, of missionary work among the Japanese.63

The 1890’s also saw a marked increase in the number of Britons employed in one section or another of the Korean govenment. Probably the earliest such employee was W. Du Flon Hutchinson, who acted as Secretary to P. G. von Mollendorff from 1883-1885. Hutchinson then left Korea to run an English school on Taiwan, but returned in 1892 as a teacher in the naval school established on Kanghwa island. He later transferred to Seoul.64 Other teachers included Messrs. Hallifax and Frampton. For a short time, in the late 1880’s, a British engineer was in charge of the electric lighting in the Royal Palace. In 1896, Mr. Stripling, formerly of the Shanghai police force, became adviser to the Korean government’s newly formed police department.65

The most famous of these British advisers were those in the Korean customs service. The Korean customs service was in a somewhat anomalous position until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, for it was to all intents and purposes part of the Chinese customs sevice. Not only were all its personnel appointed by the British head of the Chinese service, Sir Robert Hart, but they and the ports at which they served appeared in the Chinese customs’ published lists. After 1895, there was a change. Although in practice, all appointments were made in Peking, matters relating to Korea no longer appeared in the Chinese customs’ publications.66

There were British members of the Korean customs from its inception, but the most famous of them was J. McLeavy Brown, an Ulsterman like Hart, who was Chief Commissioner of Customs in Korea, with one short [page 14] break, from 1893 to 1905, and who also acted as chief financial adviser to the King of Korea from 1896. Not only was he responsible for helping to put Korea’s finances on a reasonably sound footing, but he was widely credited with responsibility for much of the improvements which took place in Seoul around the turn of the century. It was McLeavy Brown who designed Pagoda Park and who set in hand the work on the Stone Palace in the Toksu Palace.67

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE JAPANESE TAKEOVER OF KOREA

By the end of the nineteenth century, British interest in Korea seemed strong. The British government had thought Korea important enough in 1885-1887 to occupy Port Hamilton as a preventive measure. It was jealous of the rights of British traders and of British employees of the Korean government. Although its position on Chinese claims over Korea was perhaps ambiguous, its original treaty position had been designed to assert Korea’s independence. Publicly, the British position was to encourage Korean independence, and there were those who argued firmly that Britain should increase its commitment to Korea by increasing its diplomatic and consular coverage.68 The growing signs of Korea’s willingness to take its place in the world, e.g. by the despatch of diplomatic envoys, were wel-comed.69

In 1898, the British position seemed to be reinforced, for a decision was made to break the link between British representation in Peking and that in Seoul. The then Consul-General, John Jordan, was at first appointed charge d’affaires, and then in 1901,Minister Resident.70 Yet this post was to last only until 1905. In spite of all appearances to the contrary, by 1900, and even more so by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Britain had come to believe that its interests in Korea were so slight that they were not worth a struggle. Britain’s continued preoccupation with Russia had led to a search for new allies, and in 1902 to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The logic of that Alliance was that it was better to have Japan in Korea than Russia, a position further emphasised when the Alliance was renewed in 1905. Although the British position was no different, in effect, from that adopted by other countries, including the United States, the sanction given to the Japanese takeover by the two Anglo-Japanese Alliances, has caused much bitterness to Koreans ever since.71

There were few changes for the British community after 1905, when Japan established a protectorate over Korea. The British Legation formally [page 15] closed but it re-opened immediately as a Consulate-General, whose exact status was to remain somewhat anomalous for a few years longer.72 Japanese pressure was brought to bear to oust McLeavy Brown from the customs service,73 but at least one other Briton continued to work for the customs for several more years. Indeed, by 1910, the British community, excluding known Canadians and Australians, who were then and indeed until the Pacific War listed as British, still numbered well over a hundred. As well as the customs, other Korean government departments employed Britons at least up to 1910. There were still teachers in government establishments, and others were employed in areas such as the waterworks. In trade and industry, too, the years 1905-1910 saw a modest increase rather than a decrease in the number of British companies operating or represented in Korea. The British-American Tobacco Company set up a factory under British management at Chemulp’o. Other Britons were employed in more humble capacities, such as governess and hotel keeper. Even the constable at the United States, Consulate-General in 1910 was British.74

The years immediately after 1905 saw an expansion of British missionary activity. The Anglican mission continued to grow at a slow pace. Corfe left in 1904, the burden of trying to learn Korean, and the lack of funds and interest in Britain for his mission, proving too much for him to bear any longer. His place was taken by the second Anglican bishop, Arthur Turner, whose approach and interests were different.75

The Anglicans were joined in 1908 by quite a different brand of missionary, the Salvation Army. The Salvation Army’s message first reached Korea through Koreans in Japan, and when the first representatives arrived in Korea, they were amazed and delighted by the reception they received. When it was realised that some of this Korean pleasure was the result of a mistaken interpretation of the form which “salvation” would take, the delight faded. Criticism from other missionary groups at what was seen as the naivety of the Salvation Army also led to some early soul-searching. But the newcomers persisted and survived.76

Not all Britons accepted the Japanese takeover, although in general, most foreigners accepted the change after 1905. But one or two did not. Most prominent of these was a British journalist, Ernest Bethell.

Bethell originally arrived in Korea in 1904 to cover the Russo-Japanese War for a British newspaper. He decided to stay on, and began his own local newspaper, which appeared at first as a bilingual publication. The English name was the *Korean Daily News*, and in Korean it was *Daehan Maeil Shin-bo*. Not knowing Korean himself, Bethell relied on his Korean colleagues to produce the Korean-language version of the newspaper.  [page 16]

Bethell early on took an anti-Japanese stance, which was perhaps stronger in Korean than in English, for he had, in effect, no control over what appeared in the Korean-language edition of his paper. The Japanese authorities, stung by Bethell’s constant attacks, sought redress through the British consular courts still operating in Korea. Bethell was convicted, and eventually spent a spell in jail in Shanghai. On release, he returned to Korea, where he died in 1909. He is buried in the Seoul Foreigners’ Cemetery, and his grave, defaced during the Japanese colonial period, has become a place of pilgrimage.77

THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD 1910-1941

In 1963, Mr. Whitwell gave it as his opinion that after 1910, the subject of British involvement in Korea “...seems to shrink and become less interesting.”78 That is a view which I do not share.

There were of course changes after 1910. As Whitwell pointed out, the Japanese, having made Korea a colony, were not keen to share it with others. But the British community did not fade away. Inevitably, with Korea no longer an independent country, but an appendage of Japan, the focus shifted, but there is much of interest about the British in the colonial period, and probably much more to be discovered by research in a variety of archives.

Among the first changes after 1910 was abolition of extraterritoriality and the other privileges which foreigners, including Britons, had enjoyed in Korea since the 1880’s. Although some were concerned at this change, for most it made as little difference as had the similar changes in Japan in 1899. The Japanese courts and Japanese officials were, on the whole, careful of foreigners.79

These changes led the British government to look carefully at its representation in Korea. The somewhat unusual position in which the Seoul Consul-General had been left after 1905 was rectified in 1910-1912. Thereafter, Seoul was part of the British consular service in Japan, staffed by Japanese-speaking officers and certainly in the late 1930’s, and probably before, with Japanese locally-employed clerks.80

The transfer to the Japan service also led to a close look at Chemulp’o and at the other places where there was consular property. Chemulp’o had been made a substantive vice-consulate in 1904 and a consulate in 1908. But even then, there were doubts about its continued usefulness. Although it was true that such British trade as there was generally came through Chemulp’o, this had proved to be never very much. Major trade rivals such as [page 17] the United States and Germany had not felt a need to maintain consular posts there. There was some hesitancy about abandoning the post altogether, however, and in 1914, it was decided to leave it vacant for the moment. In the event, Chemulp’o was never reopened as a British consular post, and the site and buildings were sold in the 1920’s. The building survived the Pacific War, doing duty as a community arts centre in the late 1940’s. During the Inch’on landing in September 1950, “British Consulate Hill” was a major objective, and the old building was destroyed. Today the Olympus Hotel stands on the site.81 During the 1920’s, the other sites which had been leased or purchased for possible use, were all disposed of. For a time, it looked as though Pusan might be retained, because of the potential of that port, but in the end, that too went.82 The official British presence after 1914 was confined to a Consul-General, plus two or three assistants in Seoul and, occasionally, an unpaid honorary appointment elsewhere.83

Britain’s official presence may have been reduced after 1910, but Britain’s official interest in Korea was not. The British government, having accepted the Japanese moves to assert control over Korea after 1905, had not taken a very serious view of allegations of Japanese atrocities during the period when the Japanese were consolidating their position. But some twelve years later, at the time of the March First Movement in 1919, the British authorities were far less tolerant of Japan’s behaviour in Korea.84 Later, in the 1930’s, as tension grew between Japan and the western powers, the British watched with concern the growing Japanese rigidity and xenophobia which hit Koreans, and often the poorest Koreans, even more than they affected the foreigners at whom they were supposedly aimed.85

British trade and traders did not disappear from Korea after 1910, but some found it difficult to operate. The British American Tobacco Company withdrew in 1914 after the introduction of the tobacco tax.86 Holme Ringer and Company closed its Chemulp’o branch but there were at least two other British general trading companies up until the Pacific War. One was W. G. Bennett and Company, which held a number of important agencies, including that for Lloyds. The other belonged to H. W. Davidson, last British employee of the Korean customs after the Japanese takeover and supervisor of the building of the Stone Palace in the Toksu Palace. Others ran small businesses at a variety of places throughout Korea.87

In mining, too, British interest remained strong right up to 1940. The Chosen Mining Corporation was registered in London, and at least one of the other major mining enterprises, the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company, although nominally American, was in fact partly dependent on British capital, and also imported its equipment from Britain. Only at the [page 18] end of the 1930’s, with growing Japanese pressure, did these companies abandon the operations they had been conducting since at least the turn of the century.88

Missionary activity also showed no signs of a decline during the colonial period. No new groups joined those already established, and some of the small British missionary organisations withdrew from Korea.89 The British and Foreign Bible Society, whose interest in Korea went back to the beginnings of missionary activity, became the sole publications agency for several Bible societies in 1919. It operated in Korea until, like other missionary organisations, its foreign staff were forced to withdraw in 1940.90 The two major British missionary groups, the Anglicans and the Salvation Army, not only remained active but expanded their respective activities until they too, were compelled to withdraw.

The second Anglican Bishop, Bishop Turner, died in 1910. He was succeeded by Mark Trollope, who had been the first priest to follow Corfe in 1890. Trollope was a scholarly man of considerable dynamism. (Not the least of his achievements was the resurrection of the RAS, which after an initial spurt of activity, had fallen on evil days. Trollope did much to reactivate it, and was its president for many years.)91 He set about building up the church in his charge with great energy. He continued the work among the Japanese, encouraged expansion into areas not previously covered, ordained the first Korean Anglican clergy, established a theological college, and laid the foundations for an Anglican religious sisterhood. All this was achieved against the same lack of resources which had beset his predecessors.92

In addition, Trollope, having decided that the Anglican church needed a cathedral, sought and obtained the required funds. The foundation stone was laid in 1922 and the cathedral consecrated in 1926. It was fitting that when Trollope died in 1930, permission was sought and obtained for his remains to be placed in the crypt of the cathedral he had built.93 In addition to these rather grand scale activities, the Anglicans continued to build attractive Korean-style churches, and ran small country hospitals in places where few other missionaries operated. Trollope’s successor, Bishop Cooper, continued his work. The wholly Korean order of Anglican nuns, the Society of the Holy Cross, received its first fully-professed member at the beginning of 1932, and several others were added in the next few years.94 Bishop Cooper also took various measures to ensure better financial arrangements for the church.95 By 1935, there were some 7,000 baptised members, 27 priests and 54 catechists.96

The Salvation Army had a similar story of activity. From its some- [page 19] what hesitant beginnings, it grew rapidly. Although there were officers from many countries, the British continued to be the main foreign group. As well as evangelisation, it quickly took on the sort of social work for which it had already become famous. It began winter relief work in 1918 among destitute boys in Seoul, and this led to the establishment of a “Beggar Boys Industrial School.” In 1926,it established, with the Federal Council of Missions, an institution “...for the rescue of fallen women... euphemistically called ‘The Women’s Industrial Home.’ “97

Both these missionary bodies took the decision after 1910 not to oppose the Japanese takeover of Korea. In this their approach differed from that of many other missionaries. This does not mean that they were indifferent to developments in Korea, but rather that they did not think that overt political activity formed any part of their function. This did not stop them expressing their opposition to Japanese policies, either in reports back to Britain to their headquarters or sometimes to the British government. How effective these unpublicised efforts were in influencing policy makers in either Britain or Japan it is hard to say, but the fact that the attempts were made should not be forgotten.98

THE COMING OF THE WAR 1940-41

By 1940,the war clouds were gathering in Korea as elsewhere. There were Japanese-inspired anti-British demonstrations in Seoul. In the countryside, the Anglican mission hospitals found it more and more difficult to operate. The “shrine question,” and the whole problem of the relationship between Christianity and Japanese demands affected the British missionaries and their flocks, just as they did all other Christians. Japanese suspicions of the military flavour of the Salvation Army, always there but dormant during most of the colonial period, now flourished again.99

As tension grew, the British missionaries, like most others, decided that it was best for expatriates to leave, a move which was encouraged by the British Consul-General. The Anglicans left behind one of their number, Arthur Chadwell, who had been imprisoned by the Japanese in retaliation for the imprisonment of a Japanese in Shanghai.100 When war came in December 1941, there were offically 58 British subjects in Korea.101 Exactly how this figure was arrived at is impossible to say, but it would have included Canadians, Australians and other empire and commonwealth citizens, and may also have included Irish missionaries. There were also two British consular officials, their wives and a typist.  [page 20] This latter group was detained on the compound in Seoul, while the others were usually held, in varying degrees of discomfort, in the areas where they had initially been detained In summer 1942, all were repatriated via Portuguese Africa.102

THE BRITISH RETURN 1945-1950

Korea did not play a great part in British planning during the second world war. Though until 1941 Britain was still the most important western power in East Asia, this was no longer the case by 1945. The British forces fighting in Burma were joined at one time by a Korean unit from Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, but otherwise there was little or no contact between Britons and Koreans.103

Korea did of course begin to feature in the Great Power discussions which began in 1943, as the focus of the war shifted from Europe to Asia. None of the participants in those discussions seem to have given much thought to Korea or indeed to other parts of the Japanese Empire until then. Britain’s role vis-a-vis Korea seems to have been limited to opposition to the idea of a long period of trusteeship before independence. It was thus at British insistence that the reference to Korea becoming free and independent “in due course,” became part of the allies’ stand on Japan’s colonies. This had more to do with Britain’s own colonial empire than with concern for Korea.104

British forces played only a small part in the occupation of Japan and none at all in Korea. Nor did Britain play any part in administering Korea below the 38th parallel. But Britain was anxious to reestablish its representation in Korea, and this was encouraged by the Americans. An official visited from Tokyo in December 1945. This led to the appointment of a British naval officer for liaison duties and to look after British official property. Consular work proper, which was then effectively limited to looking after the property of British subjects, remained with the Swiss representative, as it had during the war.105 Although the original plan was for the naval officer, Lt. Lury, R.N.V.R., to take up his post in December 1945, it was not in fact until mid-February 1946 that he arrived in Seoul. Lury had been charged to set in hand repairs to the residence and the offices, which had deteriorated badly during the war, but he did not have time to do much before he was replaced in May 1946,by D.W. Kermode, a consular officer. Kermode was “British liaison officer.” rather than a consular officer, until the Americans agreed to recognise consular officers in the autumn of 1946.106 [page 21]

He must have seemed a good choice for a rather difficult task, for he had originally joined the Japan consular service in 1922. But he clearly found the conditions under which he had to work very trying. He asked for a considerable number of staff to help him, but raised frequent objections to those offered. Faced with a constant barrage of complaints from Seoul—which were even raised in the House of Commons in London, following a visit by Fitzroy Maclean, M.P.―one of Kermode’s colleagues in London noted that “… Mr. Kermode liked to have a grievance to nursed.”107

Even as Mr. Kermode’s complaints were being aired in Parliament, things began to improve. As well as occasional visitors, a more permanent British community began to reestablish itself. The expatriate Anglican missionaries had been anxious to return to Korea as soon as the war ended, but it was not until autumn 1946 that first Bishop Cooper and then Fr. Charles Hunt reached Seoul. They found the Anglican church still functioning well, in spite of the war. The cathedral was in good condition, as were many of the country churches, though that in Kanghwa town had lost one of its bells, taken by the Japanese for scrap, since it had been cast in England.108 The Salvation Army sent an officer from Japan about the same time, but it was not until 1947 that Commissioner Lord’s arrival marked the permanent return of foreign Salvationists. Like the Anglicans, Lord found his Korean colleagues in good shape.109 For both, of course, there was the sadness of the country’s division and the loss of contact with those in the north.

The years 1946-50 thus saw a gradual reestablishment of the Britons in Korea. The Consulate-General was repaired and functioned normally. Following the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, it again became a Legation, with Capt. Vyvyan Holt appointed the first Minister in March 1949. (A Korean Legation was opened in London about the same time.) By 1949, there was once again a British commercial presence, with both Jardines and Swires represented.110

The Britons, like most foreigners outside the American net, lived a somewhat hand-to-mouth existence, especially in the early days. Everything was run down after the years of war. Repairs were costly, and difficult to finance. Indeed, financing was to prove a great complication in many instances. Thus some of the Anglican church’s funding in 1948 came from money collected in Korea to finance the Korean team for the London Olympics, the team’s expenses in London being met by the Church of England. All concerned were happy and no exchange control regulations were broken.111

[page 22]

THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

A member of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office said in 1945 that “Korea... is not worth the bones of a single British grenadier.”112 But when war came to Korea in June 1950, the British response was altogether different. The British government at once condemned the North Korean action. The Prime Minister took account of criticisms which had been levelled at President Syngman Rhee’s government, but said that this was beside the point: “I am not concerned to defend the [Korean] Government, or to estimate if it is a good or bad Government, but I never knew that an occasion for assaulting someone peacefully pursuing his way was that his character was not very good...”113

In spite of military commitments elsewhere, the British quickly provided forces for the United Nations Command. British ships were in action off the north in July, and the first British ground forces landed at Pusan on 29 August 1950. British ships took part in the Inch’on landing in September 1950, and the British 27th Infantry Brigade entered Pyongyang in October 1950. By the end of that same month, British troops were at T’aech’on, some forty-five miles from the Yalu River, and the furthest point north they reached during the war. The British land forces operated independently, as did other British Commonwealth forces, until the summer of 1951. Then all the Commonwealth land forces joined to form the First Commonwealth Division.114

During the course of the Korean conflict, and immediately afterwards, over 1,000 British servicemen lost their lives. Many more were wounded or captured. There were, of course, many engagements involving British forces, but the most famous was the stand of the First Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment during the battle of the Imjin river in April 1951. In that engagement, which lasted from 22 to 25 April, this battalion, supported by C Troop 170th Independent Mortar Brigade, Royal Artillery, held off some 30,000 men of the Chinese 63rd Army. The action left the “Glosters” with some 59 dead and 526 prisoners. It held up the Chinese advance for a sufficient length of time to allow the main UN forces to regroup for the defence of Seoul. Only 67 officers and men escaped capture, and 34 died as prisoners of war. The Chinese 63rd Army was withdrawn from the battle and did not fight again in Korea.115

The British had been quick to respond to the invasion of the Republic of Korea, but as the war progressed, doubts arose about the way in which the UN Commander, General MacArthur, was conducting it. In particular, the British government, which had extended diplomatic recog- [page 23] nition to the People’s Republic of China in January 1950, was concerned at the drive to the Yalu and at the airing of the possibility of using nuclear weapons. At the same time, the unanimity which had appeared immediately after 25 June 1950 in British political circles, began to break down as the war continued. MacArthur’s dismissal helped to restore Anglo-American agreement to some extent, but as the war dragged on, voices of dissent grew louder in Britain.116 At the outbreak of the war in June 1950, the British Minister was still Vyvyan Holt, appointed in 1949. He did not leave the city, believing that it was his duty to remain and that his diplomatic position would protect him. Two other members of his staff also stayed.117 Others who remained in Seoul included the Anglicans, Bishop Cooper, Fr. Hunt, Sister Mary Clare (the only one of the Sisters of St. Peter to return to Korea after the Pacific War), and Commissioner Lord of the. Salvation Army. In July 1950, they were all detained by the North Koreans and were taken on the notorious death march. Fr. Hunt and Sister Mary Clare died during this ordeal. Another expatriate Anglican, Fr. William Lee, disappeared without trace from Inch’on in 1950, as did many Korean Anglicans and Salvationists. It was not until early 1953 that it was confirmed that Holt and the others had survived. These survivors were released just before the 1953 armistice.118 Two other casualties of the war should also be mentioned. These were the war correspondents, Ian Morrison of *The Times* and Christopher Buckley of the *Daily Telegraph,* who were killed, together with an Indian officer, on 12 August 1950.119

Following Holt’s capture, the British Legation moved first to Taegu and then to Pusan, where it remained until the end of the war. It was headed at first by a charge d’affaires, but from 1952 a new Minister was appointed.120

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 1953-1957

Though the war went on, Britain and the Republic of Korea continued to do normal business, though it had to be conducted in the crowded conditions of Pusan. One sign of normality was the visit of the Korean Prime Minister, Mr. Too Chin Paik, to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in June 1953, even before the end of the war.121.

It was not only the diplomats who functioned at Pusan. The Anglican mission, deprived of its Bishop, did so also, under an assistant Bishop, Arthur Chadwell. To their other works, the Anglicans, like all other missionary bodies, now added urgent relief work. The needs of the [page 24] refugees also brought new British organisations to Korea, such as the Save The Children Fund.122

The prospect of the end of the war allowed both the missionaries and the Legation to return to Seoul. The Anglican headquarters moved back there from Pusan in March 1953. The cathedral had survived, but both it and the buildings nearby, including the convent of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, were in urgent need of repairs.123 Again, as in 1946, finance was a major problem. Bishop Cooper, somewhat restored after his detention in North Korea, returned to his diocese in November 1953. The strains he had undergone, however, proved too much for him, and a year later he resigned as Bishop.124

The Legation buildings, too, survived the war, though damaged. There was some reluctance on the part of the Office of Works to begin repairs for fear that a renewal of the fighting might take place, but eventually, following the move of the Korean government back to Seoul, the work was set in hand.125 By autumn 1953 the main buildings were usable, and the Legation formally reopened in Seoul on 27 January 1954. The first social function to be held after the return was an informal reception, attended. by the Foreign Minister, among others, on 12 February. That year, the Queen’s Birthday Party was again held in Seoul.126

As reconstruction got under way, so life returned to something like normal. British relief organisations were still active in Korea, and British government aid was also forthcoming. A provisional Air Services Agreement was signed between Korea and Britain in 1954, which provided for flights between Korea and Hong Kong. 1954 also saw the resumption of normal commercial activity, though on a very small scale at first. It also saw the establishment of the Korean-British Society, to further friendship between the two countries.127

THE PRESENT 1957-1983

Perhaps a twenty-year span is a long time to count as the present, yet in some ways it makes sense. The raising of the two countries, diplomatic missions to Embassies in 1957 can be seen as the symbolic opening of new relations. All the elements which had been present in Korean-British relations since the 1880’s remained, but recent years have seen some changes. Perhaps least changed is the diplomatic side. In both Britain and Korea, the size of diplomatic missions had increased, but there have been no fundamental changes except that, in the British case, a new dimension was added in 1973 with the opening of a British Council office in [page 25] Korea.128 During the period 1969-1980 there was an additional form of British official presence in Korea—technical assistance teams. These included advisers at the Ulsan Institute of Technology, which was established in 1969 partly with British financial and equipment assistance, and others engaged in a variety of rural development projects, a geological survey and a medical research project. All have now come to an end, though there is still a residual British involvement with Ulsan Institute of Technology.

As well as this type of assistance, British finance and technology from the private sector played a major role in at least two important areas of Korea’s recent development—shipbuilding and the automobile industry.129 Reviving an old tradition, British banks have established themselves in Korea in large numbers and have recently begun to operate in Pusan as well as in Seoul. Recent years have seen the establishment of a number of joint venture companies, a trend which seems likely to grow. Two-way trade, minimal in the 1960’s, has expanded rapidly in the last ten years, with the balance heavily in Korea’s favour. A British Chamber of Commerce was established in Seoul in 1982.130

Britain has been a major supporter of the Republic of Korea in the international scene. The Commonwealth connection has enabled Britain to assist the Republic of Korea to establish links with a large number of former British colonies as they have reached independence. At the United Nations and in other international arenas, Britain has been a firm supporter of the Republic of Korea.

Cultural links between the two countries have been close. A number of Koreans studied in Britain even during the colonial period and since the end of the Korean War the number has increased considerably. As well as scholars of English literature, who understandably wish to go to Britain, many Korean engineers and scientists have attended British universities, especially to study subjects such as aeronautical and nuclear engineering. There have even been a few historians, though rather more political scientists.131

In Britain, the great promise of the early days was not kept up as far as Korean studies were concerned. Though many of the early diplomats and missionaries did good work in the field of language, history, botany and other areas, Korean studies did not take off in Britain. In recent years, however, that has begun to change. Partly as a spinoff from Chinese and Japanese studies, or from occasional visits to Korea by people with other interests, Korean studies are now beginning to take root in the British academic world. For the most part, they are confined to language, history and political science, but there are some more exotic developments, [page 26] such as the study of Korea music. A British Association for Korean Studies was established in 1982.132

More traditional links also continue. Both the Salvation Army and the Anglican church remain active in Korea, but there have been major changes in their links with Britain. The Salvation Army still has occasional British officers, but its expatriate officers are now more likely to come from elsewhere in the world and, in any case, it finds the majority of its officers from among Koreans.

The last British Anglican Bishop, Richard Rutt, left Korea in 1974 after twenty years. The Anglican church now has only two Britons working with it, plus two other expatriates. Its links with Canterbury remain strong. Two Archbishops of Canterbury have visited Korea since the Korean War, and many Korean Anglican clergymen have studied at the Church of England’s theological colleges in Britain. Interest in “the English Church Mission to Korea” is still kept alive in Britain, most notably through the quarterly *Morning Calm*, whose origins date back to the very first years of the mission.

Recent years have seen newcomers from Britain to the Korean missionary field. One of these is the Overseas Missionary Fellowship, successor to the China Inland Mission. Its links with Korea go back to 1951, and the establishment of the evangelical Far Eastern Broadcasting Corporation on Cheju-do, but its real work began in the 1960’s.133 Mention might also be made of the one non-Protestant religious worker—she did not claim to be a missionary―Miss Younger, who worked with Roman Catholic organisations in Korea during the 1960’s.134

One other group of people interested in Korea also deserve a mention, the Korean war veterans. They visit, and in some cases their interest in Korea has developed well beyond their own involvement in the war.135

CONCLUSION

This is inevitably only a sketch of a vast subject. As I have indicated, there is plenty of scope for more work to be done on a whole variety of issues in Korean-British relations. This is particularly true the closer one gets to the present, though it is then of course that the wealth of material available can become swamping. As the archives have opened on the Korean War years, there has been something of a boom in studies of that period in Britain, and no doubt the fruits of that work will soon begin to hit bookshops all around the world. But there are many other subjects of equal fascination which deserve attention. Some of these go back to the [page 27] very first days of Korean-British relations, such as the question of why the British decided to accredit their Minister in Peking to Seoul. What is needed is careful reinterpretation of the archives, not unsubstantiated assertions. There is also a need for proper studies of the British and other roles during the colonial period, again with dispassion and a desire to find as much of the truth as is possible, rather than to make a polemical case. Similarly, there is a need, and plenty of scope, for studies of the British and other contributions to Korea’s recent development.

Since the end of the Pacific War Koreans have, understandably, tended to focus on the relationship with the United States and with Japan, and have lumped everything else together. What is needed now is a look again at other countries’ contributions. In the British case, that is no small amount, as I hope I have shown in however an inadequate way.

**NOTES**

1. S. J. Whitwell, “Britons in Korea,” Transactions of the Korea Branch, Royal Asistic Society TKBRAS, vol. 41 (1964),1-56; A. W. Hamilton, ‘‘British Interest in Korea, 1866-1884,,,Korea Journal,vol. 22,no. 1,(Jan. 1982),24-41. A recent Korean account is: Kim Ki Yeol, ‘‘The Early Anglo-Korean Relations in the 19th Century,” Sahakchi, no. 17, (Nov 1983), 47-86. ; “ ‘

2. Michelborne’s charter was in breach of the East India Company’s monopoly. That, plus the fact that he had not paid his share to the Company, made him unpopular with his erstwhile fellow merchant-adventurers: Sir G. Birdwood, editor, (assisted by W. Foster), The Register of Letters etc. of the Gouvernor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies, 1600-1619,(London, 1873, reprinted London, 1965), p. 134, note 2. The text of the charter can be found in State Papers Docquets (SP38)/7.

3. J. H. Longford, The Story of Korea (London and Leipzig, 1911),pp. 196-98; G. N. Curzon. Problems of the Far East, (London, revised edition, 1896) p. 168,note 2.

4. Curzon, Problems of the Far East, p. 178, note.

5. Longford, Story of Korea, p. 225. See also Augus Hamilton, Korea, (New York, 1904), p. 169.

6. Basil Hall, Account of a Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Corea and the Great Loo-Choo Island, (London, 1818,reprinted Seoul 1975); J. M’Leod The Voyage of the Alceste to the Ryukyus and South East Asia, (London, 1817, reprinted Rutland, Vt., 1963). A Korean account of this visit can be found in G. Paik, “The Korean Record on Captain Basil Hall’s Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Korea,” TKBRAS, vol. xxiv, (1934), 15-19.

7. Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of Three Voyages Along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, and 1833; With Notices of Siam, Corea and the Loo Choo Islands (London, 1834, reprinted New York, 1968). See also Kim Key-huick, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (Berkeley, 1980), p. 40.

8. Komun-do may have been named Port Hamilton in 1845 after the then Secretary [page 28] of the British Admiralty, by Captain Belcher of HMS Sam a rang: Longford, Story of Korea, p. 266. For regular visits by the British Navy, see H. C. St. John, Notes and Sketches from the Wild Coasts of Nipon (Edinburgh, 1880), pp. 247-48. Both the Russian and the United States’ navies were interested in the islands: G. A. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884-1899, (Talahassee, 1982), 1, 8; R. E. Johnson, Far China Station: The US Navy in Asian Waters, (Annapolis, 1979),p. 131.

9. Park Il-keun, editor, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866-1886, (Seoul, 1982), p. 488, “Memorandum by Sir E. Herslett on the Importance of Port Hamilton (Corea)”, 5 Feb 1885.

10. J. E. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest in Korea before 1910”, International Studies, (Papers of the International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics) 1984/1,pp. 1-14.

11. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 1-2; M. W. Oh, “The Two Visits of the Rev. R. J. Thomas to Korea”, TKBRAS, vol. xii (1933), 95-124.

12. Korean Mission Field, vol. xi, no. 11 (Nov. 1915). A new book, by Dr. James Grayson, gives an account of Ross’s life and reproduces some of his writings. Kim Chong Hyon(J. Grayson), Han’guk ui ch’ot son’gyosa (Korea’s First Missionary), (Seoul, 1982).

13. The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (TASJ), for example, contain a number of such works, published in the 1870’s and early 1880’s: D. M. Kenrick, ‘‘A Century of Western Studies of Japan”, TASJ, 3rd series, vol. 14, (Dec. 1978),especially appendix 10.

14. Longford, Story of Korea, p. 226.

15. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 82 et seq., Sir T. Wade, (Peking) to Earl Granville, no. 5,confid., 18 February 1881,enclosing a memorandum by Mr. W. D. Spence, Sept. 1880.

16. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 70-72,J. G. Kennedy, (Tokyo) to Granville, no. 131,very con fid., 27 July 1880,forwarding a memorandum by E. M. Satow, 26 July 1880; see also Kim “Early Anglo-Korean Relations”, pp. 60-64.

17. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, I,17. See also, Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 64-65, Kennedy to Granville, no. 131, very con fid., 27 July 1880.

18. K. Morinosuke, Nichi-Bei gaikoshi, (“History of Japanese-American Diplomatic Relations”) (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 27-32; I. H. Nish, “The Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1883”, International Studies, 1984/1, p. 17.

19. It has been written of Admiral Stirling’s 1854 treaty with Japan that “...his results were disappointing to almost everybody except himself”: W. G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858, (London, 1951), p. 113.

20. Nish, “Anglo-Korean Treaty,” pp. 17-18. For a more favourable view of the Willis treaty, see A. R. Michell, “The Abortive Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1882”, Anglo-Korean Society Bulletin (Autumn/Winter 1982), pp. 15-20. A contemporary British voice in its favour, at least privately, was that of Sir Robert Hart, head of the Chinese customs service in Peking: J. K. Fairbank, K. F. Bruner and E. M. Matheson, The I G in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907,(Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1975), I, 455-57, Hart to J. D. Campbell, A/47, 24 March 1883.

21. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 141-43, J. Mollison to Granville, 9 Jan 1883. Similar letters were received from the Shanghai, Hong Kong, and London chambers.

22. Parkes told the Korean envoys in Japan in December 1882 that the Willis treaty [page 29] was ‘‘...of no value to my country...”, a view with which he said they had agreed. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 134-38, Parkes to Granville, no. 176,confid., 29 December 1882.

23. Nish, ‘‘Anglo-Korean Treaty”, pp. 18-24. See also Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Diplomacy of Korea, 1875-1885, (Seattle and London, 1975), pp. 162-63. The assertion is made from time to time―e.g. Han Woo-keun, History of Korea (Seoul, 1970), pp. 385-86; Dong A Ilbo 31 Jan 1983—that one British objection to the treaty was its failure to allow the import of opium. This is not the case, as Parkes himself made clear in discussions he had with the Chinese statesman most involved with Korean affairs, Li Hung- chang, when they met as Parkes was on his way to Seoul in October 1883: Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 375-78, Parkes to Granville, no. 37, confid., 3 Nov 1883.

24. Parkes’s official report on the final stages of the negotiations is in Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 388-97, Parkes to Granville, no. 42, 6 Dec 1883. He recorded more informal views and impressions in letters to his eldest daughter: S. Lane- Poole, Sir Harry Parkes in China, (London 1900, reprinted Taipei 1968), pp. 357-60.

25. Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, pp. 362-63, Currie to Parkes, 22 Feb 1884.

26. As well as in major areas such as tariffs, Parkes was extremely careful over apparently minor matters such as foreigners’ cemeteries: J. E. Hoare, “The British in Korea: Graves and Monuments”, Korea Journal, vol. 23, no. 3, (March 1983), 28-29.

27. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen, pp. 180-81. This was through the use of the “most-favoured-nation’’ clause, a device whereby the benefits gained by one treaty power were automatically extended to all others.

28. Longford, Story of Korea, pp. 316-19. Parkes’s official account is in Park, Anglo- American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 483-84, Parkes to Granville, “No. 1 Corean Mission”, 28 April 1884.

29. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen pp. 189-90.

30. The system is explained in F. T. Piggott, Extraterritoriality: The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and to Residence in Oriental Countries, (London, 1892), pp. 108-15. The system in Korea was taken over from that operating in China and Japan. I have examined its operation in Japan in J. E. Hoare, “Extraterritoriality in Japan, 1858-1899”, TASJ, 3rd series, vol. 18, (July 1983), pp. 76-79, 79-83.

31. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 410-12, Parkes to Granville, no. 54, confid., 16 Dec 1883.

32. The Treasury’s reluctance to spend any money on Korea became apparent from the very first: see Treasury Records (T/l)/14809, for the minutes on Parkes’s first letter on consular sites, 16 Oct 1882.

33. Fairbank, et. al., The I G in Peking, I, 590-91, Hart to Campbell, 2/212, 23 March 1885. There is a brief discussion of the point in A. W. Hamilton, “British Interest in Korea, 1866-1884, Korea Journal, vol. 22, no. 1, (Jan 1982), 27-28, but more research needs to be done on the subject.

34. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 230-35, Parkes to Granville, no. 66, 28 April 1883, enclosing W. G. Aston to Parkes, 24 April 1883. For the history of the area, see G. Henderson ‘‘A History of the Chong Dong Area and the American Embassy Residence Compound”, TKBRAS, vol. xxxv (1959), 1-31’ especially pp. 15-16. The Korean government’s agreement to the transaction was given on 10 May 1884: Asiatic Research Cen- [page 30] tre, Korea University, Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, English Version (Seoul 1968), I, 33-34.

35. Diary of Horace Allen, quoted in unpublished notes issued by KBRAS March 1971 on “Chemulp’o Revisited: a Tour of Inch’on City”. The saga of the jail can be followed in Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 470-72.

36. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, p. 968, George C. Foulk, U.S. Naval Attache, to Secretary of State, 10 Oct 1884.

37. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 277-78, Parkes to Granville, no. 97, 9 June 1883, Report on Trade for 1883.

38. In 1897, there were 33 British heads of household in Korea—this included some Canadians and Australians―compared to 22 Americans, 17 Germans and 8 French. There were then 10,711 Japanese and 477 Chinese: I. B. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbours, (London 1898, reprinted Seoul 1970), pp. 469-70, Appendix D.

39. Foreign Office China (F017)/996, Aston to Granville, no. 1, 3 Jan 1885. The American Minister’s account is in Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials p. 988, L. H. Foote to Secretary of State, no. 128, 17 Dec 1884.

40. F017/996, W. R. Carles to Granville, no. 1, 9 Jan 1885; F017/1084, N. O’Conor (Peking) to P. Currie, private, 22 Dec 1885.

41. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, p. 490, Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell to Admiralty, tel., 15 April 1885.

42. Kim Yung Chun, “Anglo-Russian Crisis and Port Hamilton, 1885-1887”, Journal of the Korean Cultural Research Institute, vol. 18 (1971), 243-71; A. W. Hamilton, “The Komundo Affair”, Korea Journal, vol. 22, no. 6 (June 1982), 20-30.

43. The Graphic, 12 Feb. 1887, has a brief illustrated account of the occupation.

44. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 682-84, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 21 July 1886, enclosing Vice-Admiral Hamilton to Admiralty, 31 May 1886.

45. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 680-82, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 17 July 1886, enclosing Hamilton to Admiralty, 1 June 1886.

46. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, p. 758, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 28 February 1887, enclosing Hamilton to Admiralty, tel., 28 Feb 1887.

47. Park, Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials, pp. 757-58, Sir J. Walsham, Peking, to Earl of Iddesleigh, no. 324, confid., 28 Dec 1886.

48. J. E. Hoare, “Komundo-Port Hamilton”, Bulletin of the Korean-British Society, no. 3 (1983), 48-53.

49. F017/1308, Aston to Parkes, accounts no. 1, 30 May 1884.

50. Works 10/389, Sir J. Walsham, Peking to F. J. Marshall, Office of Works, Shanghai, Public accounts no. 10, 27 August 1888. For Treasury approval, see Works 10/389, Treasury to Board of Works, no. 7504, 30 April 1889. Walter Hillier, who was appointed acting Consul-General in May 1889, last seems to have used the term “acting” in April 1890: Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, I, 694, Joint letter from the diplomatic and consular corps to Korean Foreign Ministry, 26 April 1890.

51. S. J. Palmer, edit., Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1963), II, 241-43, A. Heard to Secretary of State, no. 301, 12 Sept 1892.

52. Works 10/342, W. A. Robinson to Treasury, draft no. 6177, 18 August 1914, enclosure, “Consular property in Corea”. See also The Independent 6 July 1897.

53. Works 10/342, “Consular property in Corea”. [page 31]

54. In 1896, they provided drill masters for the government’s English school: The Independent, 5 May 1896.

55. Morning Calm, May 1896, Bishop’s letter, 13 Nov 1895.

56. J. E. Hoare, “The Centenary of Korean-British Relations: The British Diplomatic Presence in Korea 1883-1983”, Korea Observer, vol. xiv, no. 2, (summer 1983), 137-38.

57. The Independent, 25 and 27 March 1897.

58. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbours, p. 457.

59. Incheon [Inch’on] City, Inch’on kaehang 100-nyon sa, (“100-Year History Since the Opening of Inch’on Port”), (Incheon 1983), p. 173. For the origins of Holme, Ringer and Company, see G. Fox, Britain and Japan. (Oxford 1969), p. 330,note. 6.

60. Korea Review, Jan. 1901, pp. 14-15; Korea Daily News, 23 August 1904. A German firm, E. Meyer and Co., were the agents for another British bank, the Chartered: Korea Daily News, 4 Aug 1904. The American Townsend and Co. were agents for Nobel’s Explosive Co. of Glasgow: Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, II, 148-49, J. N. Jordan to the Korean Foreign Office, 7 Dec 1899.

61. Korean Repository, December 1898; Korea Review, Feb. 1901. See also E. W. Mills, “Gold Mining in Korea”, TKBRAS, vol. vii, pt. 1, (1916), especially pp. 23-29, and Lee Bae-yong, “A study on British Mining Concessions in the Late Choson Dynasty”, Korea Journal, vol. 24, no. 4 (April 1984), 23-38.

62. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 3-6.

63. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 6-7. The hard-pressed Korean mission also looked after Newchang in China for a number of years,

64. See the obituary in Korea Review, July 1901.

65. Korea Daily News, 19 Sept. 1904; Diplomatic Documents of Imperial Korea, I, 292 et seq., C. M. Ford, acting Consul-General, to the Korean Foreign Office, 26 Sept 1889, and subsequent correspondence; Bishop, Korea and her Neighbours, pp. 441-42.

66. Fairbank, et al., The I G in Peking, II, 1022, note 2. This, as Hart had foreseen in 1882, helped to maintain China’s claim to suzerainty over Korea; I, 429, Hart to Campbell, no. 2/94, 30 Oct 1882.

67. For contemporary accounts of McLeavy Brown, see Morning Calm, May 1899, and Bishop, Korea and her Neighbours, pp. 2, 381 and 453.

68. Interview with Sir C. McDonald, in The Independent, 1 April 1897 and a speech by Curzon quoted in The Independent, 11 September 1897. For a voice raised for an increased diplomatic presence, see Hamilton, Korea, p. 135.

69. After a number of abortive attempts, partly sabotaged by the Chinese, the Koreans finally sent a resident mission to London in 19이, with Min Yong Tong as Minister Resident, the same rank as that of the British representative in Korea. The post closed in 1905. From 1900 to 1906, W. P. Morgan, a former M. P. who was involved in gold mining in Korea, was Korean Consul-General in London. See Foreign Office List, 1900-1906.

70. Dictionary of National Biography, “Sir John Jordan”.

71. This is a theme discussed in I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907, (London 1966), pp. 233-34, 320-22, and 329- 30.

72. Discussed in Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, pp. 139-40.

73. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 352.

74. Embassy and Consular Archives, Japan (F0262)/1065, H. C. Bonar to Sir C. McDonald, no. 47, 20 July 1910. I am grateful to Dr. A. Michell, University of Hull, for [page 32] drawing my attention to this reference.

75. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, p. 7.

76. Hoare, “British Missionary Interest”, pp. 8-9. See also P. Rader “Seventy Years in Korea”, Salvation Army Yearbook. (London 1978), pp. 13-16.

77. For the most recent account of Bethell, see Chong Chin-sok, “E. T. Bethell and the Taehan Maeil Shinbo”, Korea Journal, vol. 24, no. 4 (April 1984), pp. 39-44. The Japanese authorities were able to use the precedent of a famous case involving a British newspaper publisher in Japan in the 1870’s: J. E. Hoare, “The Bankoku Shimbun Affair: Foreigners, the Japanese Press and Extraterritoriality in Early Meiji Japan”, Modern Asian Studies, 9 no. 3, (1975), 289-302. In the 1960’s, Korean journalists, (to whom Bethell is still very much a hero), tracked down some of his descendants living in Britain: Chung’ang Ilbo, 7 Sept 1969.

78. Whitwell, “Britons in Korea”, p. 49.

79. G. Herslett, edit., Herslett’s Commercial Treaties. (London 1913), vol. xxvi, 92- 95: Japanese proclamation, 29 Aug 1910, and British Order in Council, 23 Jan 1911.

80. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, pp. 139-40.

81. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, pp. 140-41. By 1912, Japanese was the language being used for much if not all official work: Records of the Consular Department (F0369)/484, Sir C. McDonald to Earl Grey no. 11 cons., 22 Jan 1912.

82. Works 10/24/1 contains papers from 1889 to 1925 on the acquisition and disposal of these other sites.

83. foreign Office List, various years.

84. The whole question is discussed in Ku Dae-yeol, “Korean Resistance to Japanese Colonialism: The March 1st Movement of 1919 and Britain’s Role in Its Outcome”, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1979.

85. See F0371/31845, G. H. Phibbs, Seoul, to Sir R. Craigie, Tokyo, no. 184, 29 Sept 1941.

86. Ku, “Korean Resistance”, p. 34.

87. Bennett was originally manager for Holme, Ringer and Co. Both he and Davidson engaged in general wholesale trade, and both served as British pro-Consuls at various times.

88. Mills, “Mining in Korea”, passim; G. C. Allen and Audrey Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan, (London 1954), p. 224, note

89. For example, the British Evangelistic Mission: Korean Mission Field, vol. xi, no. 7 (July 1916).

90. J. C. F. Robertson, The Bible in Korea, (London, no date [1954]), pp. 45-46.

91. R. Rutt, James Scarth Gale and His History of the Korean People, (Seoul 1972), p. 40.

92. C. Trollope, Mark Napier Trollope: Bishop in Corea, 1911-1930, (London 1930), is a biography by his sister.

93. There is a brief account of the Cathedral in B. F. L. Clarke, Anglican Cathedrals Outside the British Isles, (London 1958), p. 120. Trollope’s visions and struggles can be traced in his own papers, now in the archieves of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in London.

94. Anon., The Society of Holy Cross, (n.p, [Seoul] n.d.).

95. A. D. Clark, A History of the Church in Korea, (Seoul 1971), p. 331.

96. L. V. Beere and W. E. Lees, SPG Handbook: Corea, (Revised Edition London [page 33] 1935), p. 72.

97. Korean Mission Field, vols, xvii, no. 1, (Jan. 1921), xxii, no. 12, (Dec. 1926), and xxiv, no. 1, (Jan. 1928).

98. This point is discussed in Ku, “Korean Resistance”, pp. 290,294-95. For somewhat opposing view, see A. Hamish Ion, ‘‘British and Canadian Missionaries’ Attitudes to Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 1910-1925”: Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, Vol. I (1976) Part I: History and International Relations, pp. 60-77.

99. Something of the atmosphere can be found in the report of Dr. Anne Borrow, the doctor at the Anglican hospital at Yoju. The report, from the SPG archives, 1940,is marked: “It is inadvisable to print anything from this report”. (Copy of the report supplied by Miss A. J. Roberts, MBE, Taejon.)

100. S. Hall, With Stethescope in Asia, (McLean, Va. 1978), p. 582; Morning Calm, June 1947.

101. F0371/31736/F217/33/61, Minutes relating to the number of British subjects in Japanese territory and Japanese in British territory, Dec. 1941.

102. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, p. 142; F0371/31839/F7551/867/23, “Treatment of British Subjects in Japanese Controlled Territory”.

103. Han Woo-keun, History of Korea, p. 497.

104. W. R. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945, (Oxford 1977), pp. 235-36; B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberalism and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-47,(Princeton 1981), 104-06.

105. Records of the Chief Clerk’s Department (F0366)/1778/xS3K/23/19. D. M. McDermot, Tokyo, to Foreign Office, no. 76, confid., 29 Dec 1945.

106. F0366/1778/XS3K/23/19, Washington tel. no. 2233, 19 Sept 1946; Tokyo tel. no. 1271, 30 Oct. 1946. See also, Foreign Relations of the United States, (1946), vol. viii, pp. 685 and 735.

107. F0366/1778/XS3K/23/19, Minute by M. S. Henderson, 6 Sept. 1946, recording a conversation with Mr. A. De la Mare, Japan Department, FO. The saga of Mr. Kermode’s complaints can be followed in this file.

108. SPG Archives, D. Korea, 1945, Bishop Cooper to Bishop Roberts, 13 May 1945; D. Morrison, The English Church, 1890-1954, (London 1954), pp. 12-14. For the unfortunate bell, see Morning Calm, March 1948.

109. Rader, “Seventy Years in Korea”, p. 15; Clark, The Church in Korea, pp. 238-29.

110. The Trade Yearbook, (Seoul 1949).

111. H. P. Thompson, Into All Lands: The History of the Society for the Propogation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, 1701-1950, (London 1951), p. 209.

112. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, p. 488, note 65.

113. D. Rees. Korea: The Limited War, (New York 1964), pp. 33-34. Attlee’s position was supported on all sides. Even the left-wing Tribune said that the U.S. government was right to take action in Korea, and the British government right to support them: P. Lowe, Britain in the Far East: A Survey from 1819 to the Present (London and New York 1881), p. 205.

114. There is still no official British history of the war. The best account remains C. N. Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of the British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot 1954). The British role is also covered in Ministry of National Defence, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, (second edition Seoul 1981), vols, II, 585-730; VI, 405-446.  [page 34]

115. There is an account of the battle in Korea Times, 22 and 23 April 1983. See also the account by the Glosters’ adjutant of the fighting and his captivity: A. Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword (London 1955).

116. H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952, (London 1954), pp. 968 et seq. See also B. Porter, Britain and the Rise of Communist China, (London 1967), pp. 83-132 for a full discussion of strands in British attitudes to the Korean war. For the role of the press in this, see P. Knightley, The First Casualty, (London 1982) pp. 320-340.

117. H. J. Noble, Embassy at War, (Seattle and London 1975), pp. 259-61; P. Deane, I Was Captive in Korea (New York 1953), p. 79.

118. There are many accounts of the “death march.” As well as Deane’s, cited above, see P. Crosbie, March Till They Die, (Westminster, Md. 1956). This contains testimony to the heroism of Cooper and Lord, in particular. Bishop Cooper gave his own account in an interview on his return to Korea in November 1953: Korean Republic, 21 Nov. 1953.

119. Knightley, The First Casualty, p. 324.

120. Hoare, “British Diplomatic Presence”, p, 143.

121. Korean Republic, 14 March 1954.

122. R. Rutt, The Church Serves Korea, (London 1956), p. 29. For the Save the Children Fund, see Korean Republic, 13 May 1954. It began operations in Pusan in 1952.

123. SPG Archives, DS 1954 Korea, Report on 1953 by Bishop Chadwell, 20 Jan. 1954.

124. SPG Archives, DS 1954 Korea, Bishop Cooper to Bishop Roberts, 19 Nov. 1954.

125. See F0366/3024 for papers on this, especially XCOI/81/853, R. B. Marshall to R. H. G. Edmunds, 8 June 1953.

126. Korean Republic, 27 Jan., 13 Feb., and 1 June 1954.

127. Korean Republic, 14 Aug., 6 Oct. and 16 Dec. 1954. For the Korean-British Society, see J. E. Hoare, “The Korean-British Society: Some Past Events, 1954-1974”, Bulletin of the Korean-British Society, no. 2, (May 1982) pp. 7-10. There has been a London equivalent since 1957: Morning Calm, Dec. 1967.

128. “British Council Plays Active Role as Link for Cultural Exchange”, Korea Herald (Supplement), 26 Nov. 1983.

129. Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 Nov 1976. See also “ROK Trade with UK rises sharply”, Korea Herald (Supplement), 9 June 1983.

130. “British Chamber Contribute to Trade Boost with Korea”, Korea Times (Supplement), 26 Nov. 1983.

131. Early Korean graduates of British universities include former President Yun Po- sun (Edinburgh) and Dr. Kim Sang Man, KBE, (London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London).

132. “UK Interest in Korean Studies”, Korean Newsreviews, 18 Feb. 1984; A. R. Michell, ‘‘Korean Studies in the UK”, Korea Journal, vol. 24, no. 4 (April 1984) pp. 76-77.

133. Overseas Missionary Fellowship, One Small Flame, (Sevenoaks 1978), pp. 22-24; L. T. Lyall, A Passion for the Impossible, (London revised edition 1976), pp. 189, 200.

134. S. Younger, Never Ending Flower, (London 1967).

135. The British Korean War Veterans Association publishes its own journal, the Morning Calm.