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**United States Ministers to Korea, 1882-1905: The Loss of American Innocence\***

by Robert R. Swartout, Jr.

Regular diplomatic relations between the United States and Korea began in May 1882 with the signing of the so-called Shufeldt treaty, officially titled the “Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and Corea.”1 Diplomatic relations between the two nations would continue until 1905, when the Japanese established their protectorate over Korea and the United States withdrew its legation from Seoul. Official American representation in the peninsula would not return until after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the destruction of the Japanese overseas empire.

During the first twenty-three years of Korean-American relations—that is, between 1882 and 1905—a number of critical diplomatic issues arose. Perhaps the most important issue, certainly from the Korean perspective, was that of Korean independence. More specifically, just how far was America prepared to go to help protect the sovereign integrity of the Kingdom of Korea? Koreans often assumed, in part because of the “good offices” clause contained in the Shufeldt treaty,2 that the government of the United States was committed to maintaining Korean independence. American diplomats of course agreed that the United States, by signing the 1882 treaty, had officially recognized Korea as an independent nation. Yet those same diplomats often disagreed quite strongly over just how far the United States should go to help insure that same independence.

I think it is accurate to say that during this twenty-three-year period a very distinct division arose within the American diplomatic community over this issue. By and large, the United States ministers dispatched to Korea, as America’s highest-ranking diplomatic officials in that country, actively supported the continuance of Korean independence. Foreign policy makers back in Washington, on the other hand, proved increasingly reluctant to involve the United States in Korean affairs. Ultimately, the State Department’s position in Washington would prevail, thus leading to America’s willing acquiescence in the Japanese takeover of Korea in 1905.

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Let us now turn to a few specific examples of the rift that developed between the policy makers in Washington and the U.S. diplomats in the field. A little later we will get back to the issue of why the Washington view predominated, and what implications that may have for Korean-American relations, as well as for American diplomacy as a whole.

**I**

America’s first regular minister to Korea, Lucius H. Foote, arrived in Seoul in May 1883. Prior to serving in Korea, Foote had been an active member of the Republican party in California and had worked for the American consular service in Latin America.3 Upon reaching Korea, Foote began working almost immediately with Korean officials, and especially with King Kojong, to strengthen Korean independence. From Foote’s various actions and statements, the king inferred that the government of the United States was seriously committed to preserving Korean independence, a notion which was all too often reinforced by the attitudes of Footers successors in Korea over the next twenty-two years.

It was Foote who suggested to Kojong that Korea dispatch a goodwill embassy to the United States, a suggestion which the king quickly followed.4 This mission, which spent three months touring the United States during the fall of 1883, would serve to tie Korea and the United States more closely together, while giving to the rest of the world the impression that Korea was indeed a totally independent nation.5

Foote also recommended that the State Department make every effort to locate American citizens willing to serve as advisors to the Korean government, an idea close to King Kojong’s heart. In supporting the request for advisors, Foote declared that “the influence of Foreigners holding confidential positions in these Oriental countries, seems to add largely to the influence of their respective Governments.”6

In fact, it was exactly this influence which policy makers back in Washington were none too eager to assume. The United States was willing to sign a treaty with Korea, and recognize the peninsular kingdom as an in-dependent nation, in order to protect shipwrecked American sailors and ad-vance the cause of American commerce. But leaders in Washington were decidedly reluctant to accept the diplomatic, and perhaps even military, responsibilities needed to maintain Korean independence in the face of ever-growing foreign threats—particularly those from China, Japan, and Russia.

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The State Department’s position was clearly illustrated in July 1883 when Footers rank in Korea was reduced from minister plenipotentiary to minister resident and consul general. Foote protested against this change by deciding to resign from his post. In a despatch to Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, he declared that “it is impossible to explain the reasons for the change (to the Koreans), without leaving the most unfortunate impression, while the Minister degraded in their estimation by the loss of his rank, is no longer clothed with the same importance and influence,”7 This, of course, was one of Frelinghuysen’s main points: Seoul indeed was not as important as Tokyo, Peking or St. Petersburg.

When Lucius Foote finally departed from Korea in January 1885, he left the U.S. legation in the hands of Naval Attache George C. Foulk, who was to serve as charge d’affaires ad interim. While Foulk never officially became the U.S. minister to Korea, he did serve as America’s highest- ranking diplomatic representative in Seoul for almost two years. Because of his youth (he was twenty-nine when he took over the legation), his knowledge of the Korean culture and language, and his obvious sympathies toward Korean independence, Foulk has received more attention from historians than perhaps any other American representative in Korea.8

Ultimately, Foulk’s pro-Korean stance brought him into conflict with Chinese officials who, during the 1880s, were attempting to dominate Korea. By 1887 the Chinese government put pressure on the Korean Foreign Office and Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard to have Foulk recalled. This Bayard finally did in June 1887, claiming that he had no choice, since the Korean Foreign Office had declared Foulk persona non grata.9 Yet that was not the whole story, for King Kojong himself had requested that Foulk be reinstated. Bayard’s underlying concern was with Sino-American relations. He was unwilling to risk the anger of China by allowing the United States to take sides in the growing controversy over Korean independence.

Bayard further demonstrated his reluctance to be drawn into this issue during the residence of Hugh A. Dinsmore, who served as U.S. minister to Korea from 1887 to 1890. Dinsmore, like his predecessors, pushed actively for Korean independence. At one point in his service, in order to strengthen America’s influence in Korea, he requested permission from the State Department to resign from his post so that he might replace Owen N. Denny, an American advisor to King Kojong then serving as Director of Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Korean Home Ministry.10 Bayard refused Dinsmore’s request, stating that such a move “might make it exceedingly difficult for your successor to conduct business of the legation.” However, Bayard’s primary opposition had to do with the thorny issue of Korean in- [page 32] dependence. “It is to be borne in mind.” he wrote, “that this (U.S.) Government has been informed by the Imperial Government of China that they claim suzerainty over Corea and it certainly would be considered a disregard by the United States of the Chinese claim, if we consented to our representative leaving our service in order to assume the position of advisor to the Corean Government.”11 This attitude would dominate America’s official policy toward Korea up until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.

The American minister to Korea during the Sino-Japanese War was John M. B. Sill, who served in Seoul from 1894 to 1897. As such, Sill witnessed the Tonghak rebellion, the Chinese and Japanese intervention in Korea which that rebellion triggered, the implementation of the Japanese- sponsored Kabo reforms, and the murder of Queen Min by Japanese forces. As Japan’s power over the peninsula continued to increase, Sill moved repeatedly to thwart Japanese aggression and preserve Korean independence. During the Sino-Japanese War Sill had strongly supported the offer of American “good offices” to help stop the fighting, an offer the Japanese refused to consider. Following Japan’s victory in the war, Sill used the American legation to shelter Korean officials who had opposed the Japanese domination of their country.12

When news of Sill’s various activities reached Washington, President Grover Cleveland’s secretary of state, Richard Olney, sent a direct order to the U.S. minister in Seoul: “Confine yourself strictly (to the) protection of American citizens and interest. You have no concern in internal (Korean) affairs.”13 However, Sill continued to follow his own policy in Korea. On January 10,1896, an angry Olney admonished the minister: “Your course in continued intermingling with Korean political affairs in violation of repeated instructions (is) noted with astonishment and disapproval. Cable briefly any explanation you have to make, also answer whether you intend to comply with instructions given.”14 Clearly, officials in Washington were no more interested in confronting Japan over the issue of Korean independence than they had been in taking on the Chinese a decade earlier. Ultimately Sill was recalled by the McKinley administration which came to power in the spring of 1897, largely because of his continued opposition to Japanese policies in Korea.

The man who replaced Sill as America’s minister to Korea was Horace N. Allen, the famed missionary.15 Allen would hold his post in Seoul until June 1905. On the controversial issue of Korean independence, Allen for the most part attempted to straddle the fence. On the one hand, he was careful not to antagonize his superiors in Washington, who clearly were in [page 33] no mood to accept direct American involvement in Korean affairs. At one point he went so far as to state that “I have all along held that Japan should have the paramount influence (in Korea).”16 Yet on the other hand, he confided in his own diary that “I told him (Kojong) that the United States was his friend and that we were the only people who could speak a strong and disinterested word for him.”17

Whatever Allen’s diplomatic position, he had strong personal feelings toward the Korean people. When he was dumped by the Roosevelt admin-istration in 1905, he convinced himself that one of the primary reasons for his dismissal was his support of Korean rights. And in truth, Theodore Roosevelt was paving the way for the demise of the Kingdom of Korea. Roosevelt’s own attitudes toward Korea are rather well known. For example, in January 1905 he remarked to his secretary of state, John Hay: “We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own defence.”18 “It would in fact be best for the Koreans if their country was absorbed into the Japanese empire.”19 Roosevelt’s attitude toward Korea became a political reality on November 17, 1905, when Japan forced Korean officials to sign the Protectorate Treaty, thus destroying Korean independence for four decades. Just one week later, on November 24, the American secretary of state, then Elihu Root, ordered the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. legation in Seoul. The United States, the first Western nation to sign a treaty with modern Korea, was also the first Western nation to close down its legation. A unique period in Korean-American relations had come to an end.20

**II**

While narrating the events wnich occurred between 1882 and 1905, historians have also analyzed the forces that helped to bring about these events. In particular, historians of nineteenth-century Korean-American relations have often been forced to consider America’s possible “responsibility,, for the loss of Korean independence. Had officials in Wasnington, with their “hands-off,, Korean policy, played a critical role in the eventual destruction of the peninsular kingdom?

Early accounts of Korean-American relations written by trained historians do not seem to be overly critical of America’s official policy. One example would be a little known thesis written in 1934 by Mike Mansfield, currently America’s ambassador to Japan, entitled “American Diplomatic Relations with Korea, 1866-1910.” For the most part, [page 34] Mansfield applauded the policy of the State Department, while condemning the actions of individual Americans in Korea, like John Sill, who “seemed to forget that they might be raising issues for which the United States Government would be held responsible. Both Sill and the members of the American colony consistently refused to accept the fact that our government had no interest in the internal affairs of the kingdom.”21 Mansfield took this position, not because he was anti-Korean, but because he felt that extensive American involvement in Korean affairs would have ultimately led the U.S. down the road of imperialism—a road which Mansfield whole-heartedly opposed, and one which he associated with the Great Powers of Europe.

Fred Harvey Harrington, in his path-breaking study of Horace N. Allen, also seemed to play down any major American responsibility for the “fall of Korea.” Like many other historians, Dr. Harrington noted that a major reason for the Korean fall was the weakness of the kingdom itself. “The utter impotence, the hideous corruption of her government robbed [Koreans] of their patriotism, made it certain that Chosen would not resist attack, and constituted a standing invitation to foreign states to intervene.” When an American diplomat such as Allen “fought China in Seoul [prior to 1894], he did not pave the way for Chosen’s freedom. He merely helped to drive out one competitor and make way for another.”22 Thus the American ministers in Seoul were actually playing into the hands of Japanese expansionists by pushing for Korean independence.

In a thesis completed in 1936 entitled “A Study of the Attitude of the United States toward Suzerainty and Independence in Korea,” Harold J. Bass stated essentially the same point. “Not yet sufficiently enlightened and unified to maintain true independence,” he wrote, “Korea fell prey to the contending intrigues of Japanese, Chinese and Russian diplomats. The country was too suddenly and too artificially torn from its ancient moorings and the result was pathetic.” Bass did qualify his comments by stating: “If any criticism of America’s policy in Korea may be justly made, it is this, that having encouraged an immature child to walk, the United States should have offered some definite maternal support instead of becoming disgusted with the child’s bow-legged efforts.”23

Occasionally, an historian would find fault with a specific action taken by the State Department. Harold J. Noble, one of the first historians to specialize in Korean-American relations, had this to say about the dismissal of George Foulk in 1887: “Through no fault of his own he was withdrawn under circumstances which could be interpreted by his Korean friends and Chinese enemies only as that of official disgrace.”24 On the other hand, to [page 35] balance this view, one may read Charles C. Tansill’s account, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard. Tansill, a conservative isolationist prior to World War II, declared: “Foulk permitted his sentiment to cloud his judgment with reference to the strength of the Chosen dynasty. Some of his successors made the same mistake, and they were not supported by the American Government because American interests were too small to warrant military intervention. In Bayard’s time ... it would have been the maddest type of folly to support a weak Corean dynasty against vastly superior armaments of nations that were close enough to Corea to have a vital stake in the fate of that kingdom.”25

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 ushered in a new age of Korean-American relations. It also helped to inspire a renewed interest in the history of American activities in Korea, an interest that has continued down to the present day. One of the first studies to reflect this new interest was that of Philip L. Bridgham, completed in the fall of 1951. Influenced by America’s contemporary involvement in Korea, Bridgham criticized the State Department’s nineteenth-century Korean policy for being inconsistent and ambiguous.26 The United States during most of that period, according to Bridgham, failed to appreciate the obligations it had incurred by signing the 1882 treaty. When Theodore Roosevelt, in the name of power politics, ultimately supported the Japanese seizure of Korea, the president “sacrificed American ideals, facilitated Japanese expansion upon the Asiatic continent, and lulled the American public to complacency in the face of a formidable opponent whose policy of covert, piecemeal aggression would one day confront the United States with a deadly threat to her own national survival.”27

Four years later, in a dissertation on the career of George Foulk, Robert E. Reordan echoed these same sentiments. Reordan also accused the U.S. government, and especially Secretary of State Bayard, of not living up to the commitments contained in the Shufeldt treaty. According to Reordan, “the dismissal of Foulk, signifying the abandonment of American support, was the turning point in Korea’s modern history, for it led to Chinese domination, thence directly to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, to the absorption of Korea into the Japanese Empire, and to all the complex aftermath of those events.”28 In the final analysis, young George Foulk, “inexperienced and somewhat impetuous though he was, exhibited the qualities of a statesman to a greater degree than his distinguished superior in Washington, if statesmanship implies vision of the future and the consideration of more fundamental factors than immediate political expediency.”29

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As memories of the Korean War began to recede, other opinions of Washington’s policies were offered. In a study completed in 1965 at the University of Michigan, Jongsuk Chay wrote with reference to the period 1894-1905: “In view of the negligible amount of [U.S] interests, it should be declared that the American policy in Korea was a correct one.” After all, it was clear that “the Americans would lend a hand only if the Koreans would help themselves, and that the Koreans could not or would not do.”30 In 1970 Yong Suk Jung penned a study which attempted to explain the broad sweep of America’s interest in Korea from 1845 to 1950. In summarizing Korean-American relations up to 1905, Jung concluded that this period “was marked by [American] interest in Korea subordinate to that in Japan and China. No active American diplomacy could be expected in Korea under such conditions.” Only after 1945 would Korea be transformed from an area of “subordinate interest” to an area of “core interest” for the United States. Had the U.S. been able to develop serious commercial interests in Korea, perhaps the Americans would have been more willing to stand by an independent Korea. But with no such commercial interests appearing, “no political commitment could be expected from the American government.”31

I think that current students of Korean-American diplomatic relations would tend to agree with Dr. Jung’s overall assessments. The broad scope of his study, the passage of time since the first historical events occurred, and the absence of any emotionalism or personal bias all serve to strengthen his interpretation. In the long run the State Department’s Korean policy had been correct; most of America’s ministers to Korea may have been well-intentioned, but they were unfortunately too close to the “action” to offer truly objective opinions of what policy the United States should pursue in East Asia.

**III**

With all of that being said, I would now like to offer my own opinion, one which in fact is designed to question the validity of America’s official Korean policy up to 1905. Traditionally, U.S. ministers in nineteenth- century Korea were accused of being too involved in day-to-day affairs in Seoul—too personally wrapped up in the plight of the Korean people—to appreciate and understand the larger picture. Yet I would argue that, precisely because they were in the field day in and day out, they often gained special insights into the peculiar problems and needs of the Korean peninsula. One of the tragedies for Korea—and for American diplomacy—[page 37] was that these firsthand observations generally had little impact on officials back in Washington who had already predetermined what America’s Korean policy should be.

Nor was this rift between diplomats in the field and policy makers in Washington confined to nineteenth-century Korean-American relations. There have been other occasions in American diplomatic history where a similar lack of communications has resulted in major misunderstandings. For instance, in the 1940s American specialists in China such as John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent attempted to inform Washington that the Chinese Communist Party had significant popular support within China. But Americans back home had already convinced themselves that Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party were the only legitimate rulers of China. Thus, Americans were ill-prepared to understand or accept the Communist victory of 1949. By ignoring the internal dynamics of the Chinese revolution, officials in Washington paved the way for a thirty-year split—”The Great Aberration,” as Warren Cohen calls it—in Sino American diplomatic relations.32 This misunderstanding of the Chinese revolution also played an important role, at least in part, in America’s extensive and costly involvements in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

What, then, does all this signify about nineteenth-century Korean- American relations? In its most basic form, it means that officials in Washington generally paid little attention to the diplomatic reports coming out of Seoul. More specifically, it means that these officials made little attempt to develop or pursue policy options that would have been consistent with both the legal responsibilities and the spirit of the 1882 treaty. But were any such options available? It seems to me that one very strong possibility might have been the support of a neutralized, independent Korea. This in fact was a policy that several American representatives in Korea suggested between 1882 and 1905. Had the United States pursued such a policy in an energetic and imaginative diplomatic fashion—by creating a broad base of international support33—Korea could have perhaps become a “Swizerland” of the East. Had that happened, Korea’s modern history certainly would have been far less catastrophic than it turned out to be.34 Even had such a policy ultimately failed due to the international rivalries in Northeast Asia, Korea’s historical image of America, and perhaps America’s image of itself, would have been brighter. As Robert Reordan put it, “Nations have long memories and do not easily recover a trust once destroyed. Like an individual, a government can make no greater mistake than provide the occasion for a charge of faithlessness.”35

[page 38] **NOTES**

1. The treaty, of course, was informally named after Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, the chief U.S. negotiator for the treaty. For copies of the treaty in both Chinese and English, see KuHanmal choyak hwich’an (Seoul: Kukhoe tosogwan, 1965), 26:294-305.

2. See especially Kim Won-mo, ‘‘American ‘Good Offices’ in Korea, 1882-1905,” Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 41 (June 1975):93-139.

3. For studies on Foote, see Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970),pp. 52-85; Soon C. Hong, “The Kapsin Coup and Foote: The Role of an American Diplomat,” Koreana Quarterly 15 (Fall-Winter 1973) : 60-70.

4. Foote to Frelinghuysen, July 13, 1883, No. 14,in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1884),pp. 244-245.

5. For accounts of the 1883 mission, see Harold J. Noble, “The Korean ission to the United States in 1883,” Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 18 (1929): 1-27; Gary D. Walter, “1883 nyon Mihapjung’guk e p’agyon twen TaeChoson’guk t’ukbyol sajoldan e kwanhan yon’gu,” Asea hakpo 6 (June 1969): 174-222; Kim Won-mo, “KyonMi sajo1 Hong Yong-sik pokmyong mundapgi,” Sahakchi 15 (Nov. 1981):183-230.

6. Foote to Frelinghuy sen, October, 19,1883,No. 32, in George M. McCune and John A, Harrison, eds., Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, Volume I, The Initial Period, 1883-1886 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), p. 54.

7. Foote to Frelinghuysen, September 17, 1884, No. 112, in George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, eds., Korean-American Relations, p. 37.

8. For studies on Foulk, see Harold J. Noble, “The United States and Sino-Korean Relations, 1885-1887,,,Pacific Historical Review 2 (September 1933):292-304; Robert E. Reordan, “The Role of George Clayton Foulk in United States-Korean Relations, 1884-1887” (Ph. D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1955); Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887, pp. 86-186; Donald M. Bishop, “Policy and Personality in Early Korean-American Relations: The Case of George Clayton Foulk,” in Andrew C. Nahm, ed., The United States and Korea: American-Korean Relations, 1866-1976 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: The Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1979), pp. 27-63.

9. Bayard to Dinsmore, June 17, 1887, No. 21, in Spencer J. Palmer, ed., Korean- American Relations: Documents Pertaining to The Period of Growing Influence, 1887-1895 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 78-79.

10. On Denny’s career in Korea, see Robert R. Swartout, Jr., Mandarins, Gunboats, and Power Politics: Owen Nickerson Denny and the International Rivalries in Korea (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1980).

11. Bayard to Dinsmore, March 21, 1888, No. 67, quoted in ibid., p. 105. ,

12. For studies on Sill, see Jeffery M. Dorwart, “The Independent Minister: John M. B. Sill and the Struggle against Japanese Expansion in Korea, 1894-1897,” Pacific Historical Review 44 (November 1975):485-502; Yur-Bok Lee, ‘‘American Policy toward Korea during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895,” Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 43 (June 1976):81-97.

[page 39] 13. Olney to Sill, November 11, 1895, in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895-96 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), p. 973.

14. Olney to Sill, January 10, 1896, in ibid., pp. 975-976.

15. For the definitive study on Allen, see Fred Harvey Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944). See also Wayne Patterson, “Horace Allen and Korean Immigration to Hawaii,” in Andrew C. Nahm, ed., The United States and Korea, pp. 137-161.

16. Quoted in Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, p. 327.

17. Horace N. Allen Diary, June 1, 1903, Horace N. Allen Papers, New York Public Library, New York City, N. Y.

18. Roosevelt to Hay, January 28, 1905, in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theordore Roosevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951-54),4:1112.

19. This attitude on the part of Roosevelt ultimately led to the famous Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905, in which Roosevelt recognized Japan’s dominance in Korea in return for Japan’s recognition of American control over the Philippine Islands. See Jongsuk Chay, ‘‘The Taft-Katsura Memoradum Reconsidered,” Pacific Historical Review 37 (August 1968): 321-326.

20. Root to Morgan, November 24,1905,in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 631.

21. Michael J. Mansfield, “American Diplomatic Relations with Korea, 1866-1910” (M. A. thesis, University of Montana, 1934), p. 54.

22. Fred Harvey Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, pp. 252, 247. A Korean contemporary of Allen’s once stated:4 The office-seekers in Korea, both in and out, are almost all rotten to the core. The choice between any two men is not the choice between a rascal and an honest man but between a rascal who is for, and a rascal who is against you.” Yun Ch’i-ho, Yun Ch ‘i-ho ilgi, 6 vols. (Seoul: Kuksa p’yonch’an wiwonhoe, 1973-76), 6:19.

23. Harold J. Bass, “A Study of the Attitude of the United States toward Suzerainty and Independence in Korea” (M. A. thesis, Washington State University, 1936), pp. 47, 49. See also Robert T. Pollard, “American Relations with Korea, 1882-1895,” Chinese Social and Political Science Review 16 (October 1932):470-471.

24. Harold J. Noble, “The United States and Sino-Korean Relations, 1885-1887,” p. 303; see also Noble’s “Korea and Her Relations with the United States before 1895” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1931).

25. Charles C. Tansill, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard, 1885-1897 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1940), pp. 440-442.

26. Philip Low Bridgham, “American Policy toward Korean Independence, 1866-1910” (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1951), pp. 37-38.

27. Ibid., p. 160.

28.Robert E. Reordan, “The Role of George Clayton Foulk in United States-Korean Relations, 1884-1887,” pp. 278-279.

29. Ibid., p. 280. See also Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887, pp. 179-186.

30. Jongsuk Chay, “The United States and the Closing Door in Korea: American-Korean Relations, 1894-1905” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1965), pp. 166-168.

31. Yong Suk Jung, “The Rise of American National Interest in Korea: 1845-1950” [page 40] (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School and University Center, 1970), pp. 237-239. A revised version of this study has been published in Korea as: Chong Yong-sok (Yong Suk Jung), Miguk ui Tae Han chongch’aek (Seoul: Ilchoga, 1979).

32. See Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations, 2nd ed. Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); E. J. Kahn, Jr., The China Hands: America’s Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: The Viking Press, 1975); Gary May, China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (Washington, D. C.: New Republic Books, 1979).

33. In the fall of 1886 Russia, Great Britain, and even Japan tended to support the idea of neutralizing the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, China was unwilling at that time to go along with this suggestion, thus helping to stifle possible international cooperation. Needless to say, the United States did not take the lead in any of these discussions regarding neutralization.

34. Concerning the viability of neutrality for a small state such as Korea, see In K. Hwang, The Neutralized Unification of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1980).

35. Robert E. Reordan, “The Role of George Clayton Foulk in United States-Korean Relations, 1884-1887,” p. 277.