Seventeenth
Century Thinkers
The European background
Desiderius Erasmus (1466 -
1536) was intensely aware of a need for change and renewal in Church and
University, religion and thought. His demand for a "return to the
sources" was an expression of dissatisfac¡©tion with what he saw around
him. In particular, he had inherited from the Italian Humanists an impatience
with what was perceived as the closed dogmatism of medieval Scholasticism. His
satire of Folly suggested the need for change, stimulating the thinkers of his
time to explore new directions.
When Christopher
Columbus (1451 - 1506) sailed westwards in 1492, it was at least partly
because he refused to accept the conven¡©tional reasons given for not doing so.
He had no idea of the presence of a vast double continent between Europe and
Asia, but he saw no reason for not trying to make a journey of exploration in a
new direction. His exploit was preceded by Vasco da Gama's journey round
the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean and it was followed by the better
publicized journeys of Amerigo Vespucci westward. Soon Magellan
would set out on a journey to circum-navigate the world; he died in the
Philippines in 1521 but his ship reached home.
The complex events known
as the Reformation (and the Counter-Reformation), provoked mainly
by Martin Luther followed by Jean Calvin, brought about huge
changes in European attitudes. The new stress laid on the Bible, and the
rejection of Tradition as a basis for believing the Church's teachings, left
each individual more or less free to search for new formulations of their
faith.
Almost unnoticed in his
lifetime, the Polish astronomer Nicolas Koppernik (in Latin Copernicus)
(1473 - 1543) published in 1543 ideas he had long been maturing, claiming that
the earth and other planets revolved about the sun. His De Revolutionibus
contradicted the theory proposed by the Alexandrian Claudius Ptolemaeus (known
as Ptolemy) in the second century A.D. in which the earth was the static centre
of the universe, with planets and sun revolving around it. Because Ptolemy's
theory had become a vital part of the symbolic cosmology taught by Aquinas and
the scholastics, it was dangerous to contradict it. It took the life's work of
Galileo to overcome the Catholic Church's fierce hostility, and even he died
before it admitted that the earth moved around the sun.
A cultural revolution of
radical proportions took place during the 16th and 17th centuries, when old
ideas and ways of thought were challenged and replaced at many levels. In
philosophy, it evolved mainly out of renaissance humanism, with its rediscovery
of Socrates in Plato's works for ever disputing static and unsatisfactory
dogmas as to what was true or real. The Greek word for "doubt" or
"inquire" is skepsis. After Plato, the Academy continued to be
known for its "scepticism" while a more extreme form of the same
attitude, called Pyrronism after its founder Pyrrho, was formulated by Sextus
Empiricus in about 200 A.D. in works widely read in the renaissance in Latin
translations. Pyrrhonism does not so much assert the impossibility of knowing
anything ("academic scepticism") as refuse to take sides in any
argument involving questions of knowledge, always suspending judgement in uncertainty.
The fundamental attitude
of academic scepticism denies the possibility of knowing anything for sure.
What we perceive with our senses appears to be something, but we may be
perceiving it wrongly. Doubt was thought by the sceptics to bring tranquility,
because the sceptic knows that he cannot know anything, and does not have to
try hard to distinguish illusion and reality. In response, Stoics and
Epicureans tried to establish in various ways a "criterion of truth"
or of certainty but their solutions failed to satisfy the renaissance.
Scepticism
is in some ways a very passive and conservative attitude; as such, it was
adopted by Erasmus in his refusal to follow Luther. He said that it was better
to follow existing practices in the Church since we cannot know for sure that
any other way is better. There can never be a reply to systematic scepticism
because it simply repeats itself, challenging the bases of language as well as
of knowledge.
At the centre of the
philosophical debate, then, is the question of knowing, known as epistemology.
The basis for knowledge, according to Aristotle, was thought to be
"experience", the information derived by our five senses. This was
normally accepted in the middle ages. The teaching of the Christian Church
about the invisible realities of God and Heaven was not considered to be
"knowledge" but faith in propositions made known by divine
revelation.
There is a famous
paradox, derived from a saying by Tertullian (160 - 240) credo quia absurdum
est (I believe because it is absurd) which has always served to stress the
difference between the unquestion¡©able teachings of Christian faith and the
information derived from direct experience. Human reason applies itself to the
latter, trying to understand; in the end, Aquinas and his followers felt,
following Aristotle, the things of God are not accessible to human reasoning.
The scepticism of Sextus
Empiricus appealed to Michel de Montaigne (1533 - 1592). The division
between Catholic and Protestant was by now established and irreconcilable; he
himself was Catholic but others in his family were Protestant. His early Essays
(Books 1 and 2, published 1580) were in a Senecan Stoic vein, designed to
produce philosophical fortitude in a vain world, in preparation for the painful
death from kidney stones he was doomed to by heredity. But a few years after
his "retirement from the world" in 1570, after reading the newly made
(1562 and 1569) Latin translations of Empiricus, he had a medal made with the
Pyrrhonian motto "Que sçay-je?" (What do I know?) and composed
his longest essay, Apologie de Raimond Sebond which formed part of the
Third Book of essays, first published in 1588.
Sebond was a 15th
century theologian whose Theologia naturalis followed the non-Scholastic
tradition of Anselm and Lull, offering rational proofs of God's existence and
giving Man a very high position in the created order, quite unlike the
Protestants who considered humanity to be totally depraved and corrupt. In the Apologie,
Montaigne deals less with Sebond than with all forms of dogmatism and
intellectual pretension. He is an unsystematic pyrrhonist, but his essay
demonstrates how like a animal Man is, weak in reason, his senses unreliable,
his morality irrational. The world is full of diversity and difference, the
whole universe is characterized by flux and change.
Taken as it stands, the Apologie
leads to despair. In the essays that followed, for the rest of his life,
Montaigne tried to lay the bases for a new understanding of what it was to be
human. Old philosophies had failed to find general solutions, a new search was
in order, starting with the individual's self-study. Montaigne was convinced
that every person is equally and fully human, a mixture of virtue and vice.
Since there can be no one perfect system of anything, diversity and tolerance
are essential. His later essays dwell carefully on the minute details of his
own body and daily life,
something that no one before him had done in such "scientific"
detail.
John Florio (1553 -
1625) was born in London of an Italian Protestant father; he translated
Montaigne's essays into English in a creative way, publishing them first in
1603. Shakespeare read them closely, and was surely influenced by them in many
ways. In King Lear there are many echoes of Florio's vocabulary, while The
Tempest is in part inspired by Montaigne.
Another of the modern
world's pioneer thinkers was born, like Shakespeare, in 1564, but lived far
longer. Galileo Galilei (1564 - 1642) was born in Pisa (Italy) and it is
mainly thanks to him that the Copernican vision of the universe was finally
accepted despite fierce opposition from the scholastics who dominated the
Catholic Church. The famous "recanta¡©tion" in 1633, where he is said
to have declared that the earth was the centre of the universe and did not
move, only to murmur "eppur si muove" (yet it does move), was
prompted by his Dialogue Concerning the Two World Systems of 1632 where
he affirms the truth of Copernicanism. In 1994, the Catholic Church rather
belatedly lifted its condemnation of Galileo's ideas.
At the heart of the
dispute, that marks the end of the ancient world and the start of the modern,
is a confrontation between two different understandings of "truth"
and the ways in which humanity can know it. Aquinas, like Aristotle, was an
intense idealist, not interested in pragmatic verification. For the ancient
Greeks, irregular motion was always seen as a sign of the imperfection of
matter. Under the teaching of the old system, the Moon and all the
"bodies" above it (planets and stars) were considered perfect in
matter, spherical in shape and gliding in perfectly circular orbits, moving not
in search of a greater perfection but guided by an Intelligence (angel or
Mover) in order to accomplish some end by influencing events in the imperfect
world below.
Galileo was not the
first to notice that there was something wrong in the sky, that the planets did
not in fact move as they were supposed to. His response was stronger because he
looked through his telescope and saw comets coming and going, declared that
there was change in the heavens, and rejected the old idea that heavenly bodies
and the earth were essentially different. The earth, he said, belonged among
the heavenly bodies because there was change there as here. What Aristotle said
was
simply not true.
Another point where
Galileo differed from Aristotle lay in his atomist theories, according to which
all matter is composed of the same basic particles (atoms) arranged in different
ways. For the Catholic Church this was a threatening idea because Aristotle had
assumed (following Plato's theory of forms) that each kind of body had its own
essential "substance" (the "breadness" that distinguishes
bread from cake) distinct from the "accidents" of colour, appearance,
taste. The Scholastics had used this to "explain" the meaning of
Jesus's words "This is my Body, this is my Blood" repeated during the
Mass to consecrate the bread and wine. The Catholic doctrine of
Transubstantiation depended entirely on the idea that there was a
"substance" in bread, distinct from its appearance, that could be
changed into the Body of Christ by a priest repeating Christ's words.
Galileo stood for
empirical observation of things, he practiced measuring the motion of slowly
falling bodies (metal balls rolling in grooves down a sloping surface), he
established mathematical formulae to represent the laws he found them
following. He was the first to state that once a body is moving, the law of inertia
means that it will continue to move until some new force either stops it or
changes its motion. There was no need to imagine Intelligences pushing the
stars to keep them moving.
Galileo has become the
symbol of the modern spirit of free enquiry. His was a mind full of mechanical
curiosity, always wanting to understand the mechanics of things. Until his age,
"explanations" of things seen in the universe were given in terms of
God's will and providence. Galileo's question was not Why? but How? How does it
work? It was a revolutionary question but contained the dangerous assumption
that things and phenomena are ends in themselves. The "scientific"
question never enquires about the ultimate meaning of a phenomenon; to
"explain" becomes merely giving a mathematical account of the way
things happen. God has no place in the methods underlying this enquiry.
In France, the response
to Montaigne's challenge to intellectual certainty came a generation later. René
Descartes (or Des Cartes, whence the adjective "Cartesian") (1596
- 1650) devoted his first published work to the role of scepticism in the
search for truth. His Discours de la Méthode ("Discourse on the
method of rightly conducting reason and reaching the truth in the
sciences") was published in 1637. It is cast partly in
a personal,
autobiographical style. Descartes tells how he realized after a scholastic
education at school that truth could not be found in the books he had read, or
in the old Aristotelian categories; people had to think anew for themselves. He
decides to try to assume nothing, to establish by systematic doubt what things
are completely self-evident and to build on them by reasoning.
If all knowledge depends
on sense-data and reasoning, the integrity of the individual subject is central.
Descartes reached a point where he found himself convinced of his own existence
as a reliable subject: "Je pense, donc je suis" (in Latin, cogito,
ergo sum). The subject's consciousness of being engaged in rational thought
is Descartes's touchstone of reality and truth. This thought, he believed he
could prove, is a non-physical activity, the work in the body of the mind or
soul, the immaterial "thinking substance" that exists in union with
the body yet is totally independent of it and can exist without it. The
Cartesian "dualism" of body and mind has been much debated.
Then follows his most
controversial point: since the mind can conceive of a perfect being, although
the human subject cannot claim to be perfect, there must be a perfect being,
God. Like every thinker in the seventeenth century, Descartes found himself
unable and unwilling to deny the existence of God. Only now God has become the
image of our human idea of the Perfect, and serves to guarantee the validity of
sense experi¡©ence. Because God exists, truth exists and can be reached by the
use of our God-given reason. Out of this comes the essence of Descartes's
"Method": experiment and deduction.
In 1644 Descartes
published his great Principles of Philosophy in which his main system
was developed to the full. The main importance of Descartes does not lie in his
epistemological ideas; the cogito, the argument for God, the dualism of
non-dimensional mind and physical body, have all been more or less rejected.
But Descartes was the first person to assume that matter is the same and always
obeys the same laws everywhere in the universe. The physical laws governing the
universe can be stated in mathematical-style formulae that owe nothing at all
to human sense-data, and will be equally valid everywhere. By matter, he means
anything that has "extension" (length, breadth, height) although the
particles composing it may be of differing kinds in different states. Descartes
saw too that motion was a fundamental property of matter that
might be varied but
never lost.
In the history of
European thought, Descartes occupies a central place. He laid the foundations
of the entire "scientific" process that is still fundamental to
today's world. The cosmic vision the scholastics inherited from Aristotle and
the Bible was an ancient one, never subject to verification by experimentation.
Descartes's "natural philosophy" was essentially a mechanical view of
nature, in which every aspect could be "explained" by mathematical
laws.
Francis Bacon
In England, Descartes
was preceded by an almost equally impressive and important writer, Francis
Bacon (1561 - 1626). For England, Bacon was the great herald of the
scientific revolution. This was in great part because he was a wonderful
writer, a master of prose style. His parents were in the court, and he himself
was very ambitious. His mother's sister was the wife of Lord Burghley, the most
powerful man in Elizabeth's administration, but he did not help Bacon much.
Instead, he was encouraged by the Earl of Essex during the 1590s. He turned
against Essex after the rebellion. Under King James he rose rapidly in the
legal administration until in 1618 he became lord chancellor. Yet in 1621 he
was forced to admit that he had taken bribes as a judge and had to retire from
public life in disgrace. His public career tells nothing about his enduring
significance.
Bacon was schooled in
the old rhetorical tradition, memorizing many quotations from the classics,
learning how to use them in disputa¡©tions, developing a style marked by many
aphorisms (short sayings). His legal training only encouraged him to develop
the art of using rhetoric to persuade others to think in a particular way,
while concealing the opinions of the lawyer as an individual person. Bacon was
a master of words, but was not interested in expressing personal opinions or
experience in the way that Montaigne was. Montaigne invented the word
"essay" for this kind of writing, suggesting as it does words like
"experiment, trial, test". Erasmus's Latin Adagia were a major
influence.
Bacon's Essays
are his most widely-read work yet they are often disconcerting. He first
published a collection of ten essays in 1597, under
the title (in the
original spelling) Essayes. Religious Meditations. Places of perswasion and
disswasion. He continued to write and to revise his earlier work, as
Montaigne did. In 1612 a second edition appeared, with the simpler title The
Essaies, containing thirty-eight essays, including nine from the first
edition. The final edition, published in 1625 with the title The Essayes or
Counsels, Civil and Morall, contained fifty-eight essays, twenty of them
new and most of the essays from the 1612 edition much revised.
Bacon, like Erasmus,
liked to define himself by opposition to the old Scholasticism, which for him
represented error, confused thinking, and superstition. Yet in the Essays
he is following the scholastic method of debate, which consisted basically in
presenting aphorisms from various authorities (classical, biblical, or
patristic) to support or attack a given topic. Bacon's elaborate Elizabethan
style lends great elegance and complexity to what are in fact a series of
mutually contradictory aphorisms buried in his text; the contradictions are not
given any direct resolution, the reader must think and judge the issues.
The most well-known
quotation from the Essays, and a key to reading them, is the opening of
the first essay, Of Truth:
What is truth? said jesting
Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.
The reference is to St
John's Gospel where Pontius Pilate is judging Jesus who has just said, "I
came into the world to bear witness to the truth". Pilate's question is
doubly ironic, suggesting that there is no ultimate truth at the very moment
when he is in the presence of Jesus who is believed by Christian's to be God's
own Truth. No one is going to find anything in Bacon's essays if they cannot
echo the words spoken by Pilate without the irony. In the face of so many
contradictory opinions, what is the truth about Death, or Religion, or Love, or
any of the other topics covered by Bacon? The danger is that, like Pilate, we
rush to the wrong opinion and stick there, not "staying" (taking the
time) to see the whole picture.
Bacon summarizes the
heart of the problem:
But it is not only the
difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth, nor again that
when it is found it imposeth upon men's thoughts, that doth bring lies in
favour, but a natural though corrupt love of the
lie itself. One of the
later school of the Greecians examineth the matter and is at a stand to think
what should be in it, that men should love lies where neither they make for
pleasure,as with poets, not for advantage, as with the merchant, but for the
lie's sake. But I cannot tell. This same truth is a naked and open daylight
that doth not show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so
stately and daintily as candlelights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a
pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond
or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights.
This mixture of
hard-to-find truth and attractive lies is the challenge of life. The essay Of
Truth ends with another Gospel question, only Bacon changes Christ's words
from Luke into a certain prophecy that "He shall not find faith upon the
earth". Bacon makes Christ foresee that people will prefer lies to truth,
and in his own life Bacon certainly seems to have been more untruthful than
many. The main appeal of his essays is the delight of many striking
expressions:
The joys of parents are
secret, and so are their griefs and fears: they cannot utter the one, nor they
will not utter the other. Children sweeten labours, but they make misfortunes
more bitter: they increase the cares of life, but they mitigate the remembrance
of death. (Of Parents and Children)
He that hath wife and
children hath given hostages to Fortune, for they are impediments to great
enterprises, either of virtue or mischief. Certainly the best works, and of
greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless
men, which both in affection and means have married and endowed the public. (Of
Marriage and Single Life)
The stage is more
beholding to love than the life of man. For as to the stage, love is ever
matter of comedies and now and then of tragedies; but in life it doth much
mischief, sometimes like a siren, sometimes like a fury. (Of Love)
The Essays fall
under the kind of writings considered today as "literature" but they
are not Bacon's main work. His The Advancement of Learning (1605) and
the Novum Organum (1620) are the two works by which he influenced his
age and became known as one of the fathers of modern scientific method. He
consciously and conspicuously turned his back on the past and looked towards
the future. The Advancement was first published in English, but Bacon
later revised it and translated it into Latin to give it a European readership
as De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientarum (1623) which was in turn
re-translated into English and published in Oxford in 1640. In it Bacon attacks
the ignorance and superstition of the astrologer-magicians, of the scholastics,
and even of the humanists, because they remain content with flawed and
imperfect knowledge, instead of striving to gain a better understanding of
God's works. His basic argument is that before the Fall, Adam in Paradise
possessed "pure and immaculate Natural Knowledge" by God-given
intuition. That instinctive knowledge had given him the mastery over the
Creation he had needed when he gave names to everything but which was lost with
Adam's original perfection at the Fall.
Bacon insists that
knowledge of the universe was not the cause of Adam's Fall, and that "the
Divine nature took delight to hide his works, to the end that they might be
found out. Therefore it is God's will that humanity should strive to come to an
ever more nearly perfect, unified understanding of every aspect of the natural
world. Bacon's fundamental programme of study he termed "The Great
Instauration". It was to be based on experimentation and step-by-step
induction as a scientific method allowing an ever more perfect form of learning
to come into being and be transmitted.
Until now, the
"authorities", the received writers of past ages, had been seen as
the giants on whose shoulders the modern dwarfs stood. It was Bacon who
overturned the giants and said that everything remained to be discovered. This
was an intellectual revolution and recent studies have stressed Bacon's
importance in the whole social revolution of his time. His rejection of the
past and his proclamation of a New Age of science leads directly to the belief
in Progress that has so marked the scientific age.
Yet Bacon built on
Aristotle. The Organon (instrument) was the name given to Aristotle's
six treatises on formal and scientific logic based on the syllogism. Bacon
denounces the syllogistic method of speculative deduction and advocates in its
place a new methodology, a "new instru¡©ment" based on scientific
deduction, itself based on direct observation of phenomena.
Bacon distrusted words
and he distrusted the mind; he was in many ways a sceptic. He demanded that
people's minds should be purified (like the pagan temples at the coming of
Christianity) by removing the
various idols that stood
for false notions of the truth. This is the most famous part of the Novum
Organum:
(51) The human understanding is of its own
nature prone to abstrac¡©tions and gives a substance and reality to things which
are fleeting. But to resolve nature into abstractions is less to our purpose
than to dissect her into parts.... Matter rather than forms should be the
object of our attention, its configurations and changes of configuration, and
simple action, and law of action or motion; for forms are figments of the human
mind, unless you will call those laws of action forms.
(52) Such then are the
idols which I call Idols of the Tribe...
Bacon's Idols of the
Tribe represent the general tendency of people to mistake words for reality
and to think that an abstraction is a reality; he is recalling the medieval
conflict between nominalists and realists, and his position has some parallels
with the English nominalist William Ockham (1285 - 1347).
Bacon's second set of
idols are the Idols of the Cave, by which he means the wrong conclusions
reached by individuals on account of their personal prejudices and limited
experience. He reveals in his writings that he was by no means free of these
himself. His distrust of words underlies the third class:
(59) But the Idols of
the Marketplace are the most troublesome of all: idols which have crept
into the understanding through the alliances of words and names. For men
believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that words react
on the understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy and the sciences
sophistical and inactive....
(60) The idols imposed by
words on the understanding are of two kinds. They are either names of things
which do not exist (...), or they are names of things which exist, but yet
confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities.
Of the former kind are Fortune, the Prime Mover, Planetary Orbits, Element of
Fire, and like fictions which owe their origin to false and idle theories....
Bacon reserves his
fiercest attack for the Idols of the Theatre, false ideas which result
from speculative thought unchecked by reference to any kind of empirical
evidence or experimentation:
(61) But the Idols of
the Theatre are not innate, nor do they steal into
the understanding
secretly, but are plainly impressed and received into the mind from the
play-books of philosophical systems and the perverted rules of demonstration.
Bacon was firmly rooted
in the Scholastic tradition that he denounced so strongly. One of his main
achievements was to propose a clear distinction between Nature and the
"supernatural" realm perceived only by Faith. Here he follows
Aristotle and Aquinas but the result of his distinction was to deny that faith
had anything to say about the physical universe. Knowledge of God comes from
the Bible: "Sacred theology must be drawn from the word and oracles of
God, not from the light of Nature or the dictates of Reason".
The world of Nature
which is accessible to observation, measure¡©ment, and mechanical description
becomes a quite separate thing. Bacon describes Nature as "God's second
book" as Christian thinkers have often done since Augustine. Galileo also
used the idea that to study and seek to understand Nature is a duty we owe to
God. The "laws" governing nature are felt to resemble those given by
God in the Bible. This suggests that God's laws are reasonable and consistent,
the source of harmony and order. Bacon insisted that by making this division
between nature and faith he was preserving the particular claims of each one.
In his time, no one thought of doubting the existence of God.
Yet by putting the
observable universe at the centre of his attention and isolating the things of
faith from the claims of reason, Bacon was preparing the way for the
secularization of learning. Very soon, the regularity of the laws of nature was
felt to be so absolute a law that even God was bound by them to such and extent
that even miracles were impossible.
In 1623 George Herbert's
elder brother Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, finished writing his De
Veritate (On Truth). After the Royalist defeat in the Civil War he also
published De Causis Errorum (On the cause of errors) and De Religione
Laici (On the faith of a layman). Herbert's view of reasonable religion was
to become very general in the eighteenth century: God exists, and should be
worshipped; worship means living a virtuous life and repenting of sin, living
in piety, because after we die there are rewards and punishments. The usual
name for such a minimal system is Deism.
It is striking that in
this view of religion there is no place for the Bible. Less than a hundred
years after the Reformation we find a great disaffection with the Bible among
thinkers. At the same time as we find writers turning away from the old fables
of classical mythology, we find more and more that a lot of them are also ill
at ease with the tales found in the Bible. Miracles are felt to be childish
tales, superstitious inventions; direct divine intervention in human affairs
has ceased to be a credible proposition. The Bible can only be read for moral
instruction, which is often found by interpreting its stranger parts in
allegorical, symbolic ways.
Sir Thomas Browne
Born in the year that
Bacon published his Advancement of Learning, Sir Thomas Browne
(1605 - 1682) lived a very simple kind of life. After the traditional classical
education at Winchester College and Oxford he travelled in Ireland, then
studied medicine in France, Italy, and the Netherlands at a time when the old
book-learning was being slowly challenged by the new experimental approaches.
He realized that
tensions had arisen between science (or natural philosophy, as it was known)
and religious faith. After returning to England in 1633 he began to compose (in
English) a book discussing and trying to help solve those tensions. He settled
in Norwich to practice medicine in about 1637 and Religio Medici was
first published without his name or permission in 1642. It was very popular and
in 1643 an official edition appeared. It was translated into several European
languages and was widely read, not always with approval among dogmatic
churchmen. Browne explores religious divisions and hostilities; then he goes on
to expound a universal love for humanity in all its diversities. Biblical ideas
are supported by many classical references and a great display of wit.
Browne had read widely
in many areas, he was a true "Metaphysi¡©cal" in being able to draw
metaphors from many sources, classical, biblical, scientific, and he wrote in
as complex a style as Bacon. He was fascinated by the search for greater truth
and during the years of the Civil War he composed Pseudodoxia Epidemica: or
Enquiries into Very many received Tenents and commonly presumed Truths often
known as Vulgar Errors published in 1646 but several times revised and
augmented later. Here he is directly following in the footsteps of Bacon, who
was always critical
of the way wrong ideas
were taken for truth. He starts by analyzing the various reasons for error in
ways similar to Bacon's idols: sin, gullibility, fallacy, credulity, authority,
Satan. Then follow six books in which he examines over a hundred familiar
errors in various scientific and historical disciplines.
The Pseudodoxia
established Browne's reputation as a very learned man, capable of informed
debate in almost every aspect of learning. During the 1650s, he wrote Hydriotaphia,
or Urn Burial (published 1658) which is now his most widely admired work.
Starting with the discovery of some prehistoric urns containing human ashes, he
meditates on the ways different cultures have treated their dead. This leads to
a meditation on the fragility of monuments, the power of time, and culminates
in a realization that only the Christian hope of Resurrection offers a solution
to the threat of oblivion. The high style of Hydriotaphia makes it one
of the finest pieces of English prose ever written. Browne published Hydriotaphia
accompanied by The Garden of Cyrus, a kind of witty showpiece about the
use of certain numerical motifs employing the number five in classical
buildings and gardens. He also wrote a number of tracts and his private letters
are also popular reading.
Browne's voice is one of
those raised to resist the excessive materialism of Bacon's views, and to
insist that faith remains central to a right understanding of nature since to
measure and observe is not the same as to understand truly. One of the most
famous passages of Religio Medici (Part I section 9) stresses the need
for a sense of religious wonder:
As for those wingy
mysteries in divinity and airy subtleties in religion which have unhinged the
brains of better heads, they never stretched the pia mater (skin around
the brain) of mine; methinks there be not impossibilities enough in religion
for an active faith; the deepest mysteries ours contains have not only been
illustrated, but maintained by syllogism and the rule of reason: I love to lose
myself in a mystery, to pursue my reason to an o altitudo ("O the
depths..." Romans 11:33). 'Tis my solitary recreation to pose my
apprehension with those involved enigmas and riffles of the Trinity, with
incarnation and resurrection. I can answer all the objections of Satan, and my
rebellious reason, with that odd resolution I learned of Tertullian, Certum
est quia impossibile est (It is certain because it is impossible). I desire
to exercise my faith in the difficultest points, for to credit ordinary and
visible objects is not faith, but persuasion.
It was the continuing
human need for the dimension of wonder expressed in Browne's o altitudo
that led thinkers later in the seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries to
stress the experience of the sublime.
The style that Browne
employed for Religio Medici reaches its finest heights in the fifth
chapter of Urn Burial. This starts with a meditation on the way the
carefully buried bones of the famous are lost while the unknown ashes in the
urns survived:
Now since these dead
bones have already outlasted the living ones of Methuselah, and in a yard
underground and thin walls of clay outworn all the strong and specious
buildings above it, and quietly rested under the drums and tramplings of three
conquests, what prince can promise such diuturnity unto his relics... Time
which antiquates antiquities and hath an art to make dust of all things hath
yet spared these minor monuments. In vain we hope to be known by open and
visible conserva¡©tories, when to be unknown was the means of their continuation
and obscurity their protection.
It ends in a great
showpiece of style:
Pyramids, arches,
obelisks were but the irregularities of vainglory and wild enormities of
ancient magnanimity. But the most magnanimous resolution rests in the Christian
religion, which trampleth upon pride and sits on the neck of ambition, humbly
pursuing that infallible perpetuity unto which all others must diminish their
diameters, and be poorly seen in angles of contingency.
Pious
spirits who passed their days in raptures of futurity made little more of this
world than the world that was before it, while they lay obscure in the chaos of
preordination and night of their fore beings....
To
subsist in lasting monuments, to live in their productions, to exist in their
names and predicament of chimeras was large satisfaction unto old expectations,
and made one part of their Elysiums. But all this is nothing in the metaphysics
of true belief. To live indeed is to be again ourselves, which being not only
an hope but an evidence in noble believers, 'tis all one to lie in St
Innocent's churchyard as in the sands of Egypt, ready to be anything, in the
ecstasy of being over, and as content with six feet as the moles of Adrianus.
It should not be thought
that Sir Thomas Browne (he was knighted by Charles II in 1671) was merely a
playful stylist. He created the language that expressed what he wanted to say.
Among the words that he was the first to use in English are 'medical',
'literary', 'electricity', 'precari¡©ous',
'hallucination'. He
followed Bacon in his enthusiasm for the new age of experiment and discovery.
It is the personal authenticity and breadth of vision that speak through Browne
that have endeared him to generations of readers. Not surprisingly, he was a
friend of many of the leading researchers of his time.
Among Browne's
acquaintances was William Harvey (1578 - 1657) who studied at Padua and
became the physician (doctor) of kings James I and Charles I. In 1628 Harvey
published De motu cordis (only translated from Latin into English in
1653) which for the first time in human history offered an accurate account of
the mechanical function of the heart and the circulation of the blood. He also
produced radically new work on the growth of the human embryo. Harvey rejected
the extremely mechanical approach to physical reality and employed a symbolism
which brought him close to such arcane poets as Vaughan.
Other figures related to
Browne include Sir Kenelm Digby (1603 - 1665) who first established that
plants need oxygen to live, wrote an early criticism of Religio Medici,
and was one of the first members of the Royal Society. Another of the 17th
century's great antiquaries who was fascinated by relics of the past was Sir
Robert Cotton (1571 - 1631) whose great library of medieval manuscripts
saved from monasteries survived a fire in 1731 to become part of the British
Library's collection. It includes the manuscripts of Beowulf, and Sir
Gawain and the Green Knight.
Another writer
contemporary with Browne is Robert Burton (1577 - 1640). Burton is
famous for his only work, the difficult and remarkable Anatomy of Melancholy.
First published in 1621, this complex study of human psychology was enlarged
with each new edition until the final version appeared in 1651. Burton suffered
from melancholy, a form of psychological distress, and was a very learned man.
His work is personal, and at the same time full of references to classical and
modern writings. Burton insists that everyone is slightly tinged by melancholy
and that the only solution is to avoid solitude and idleness. He writes in an
amused satirical tone about the failures of human learning and action. After
discussing the causes and possible cures of melancholy he studies love-melancholy
and religious melancholy in detail.
While Browne was
pursuing his quiet life in Norwich, in France another great man lived and died.
Blaise Pascal (1623 - 1662) was equally
a polymath, interested
by many topics including mathematics, physics and mechanics, morality and
religion. The difference between Browne and Pascal reflects the differences
between the intellectual and religious worlds of England and France. Pascal did
major work in mathematics and physics, he even invented a calculating machine
that anticipated the modern computer. Yet his fame rests on two religious
works, Les Provinciales (1656-7, translated into English in 1657)
against the Jesuits, and Les Pensées, incomplete thoughts on how best to
defend Christianity published in 1670 after his death. Pascal was deeply
influenced in his last years by the spiritual movement in the French Catholic
church known as Jansenism.
Thomas Hobbes
The main concern of all
the thinkers of this age was truth. The quest for truth went in two main
directions. The truth about the external world was now seen to be a matter of
measurement, while faith and ethics were inward truths discovered by some kind
of inner light and supported by Reason. Descartes divided reality into
Extension (the material world with its dimensions in space) and Thought (mind
or soul). What could be described and defined mathematically was considered
real in the truest sense. Reality was material, extended in space and moving in
various ways. At the same time, Galileo's atomic theories and Copernicus's
heliocentric model suggested strongly that the impressions received by the
senses (sense-data) might be quite misleading.
The result of this in
Descartes was a division between body and mind (spirit or soul) that could
never be bridged. The two essential certainties that Descartes reached by
intuition, that I and God truly exist, have nothing in common with the
mechanical laws governing the objects that the mind perceives outside of itself.
Since the senses are deceitful, they should not be given room to interfere with
the operations of the thinking mind, of Reason. Descartes's approach is not
poetic or symbolic.
This, pushed to its
ultimate extremes, leads to the position stated by Hobbes in Chapter 46 of his Leviathan:
The universe, that is,
the whole mass of all things that are, is corporeal, that is to say, body, and
hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely length, breadth, and depth; also,
every part of body is likewise body, and hath the like dimensions, and
consequently every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body is
no part of the universe; and because the universe is all, that which is no part
of it is nothing, and consequently nowhere.
In these words, using
concepts such as "corporeal" or "body" which he never
really queries or defines, Hobbes is rejecting every kind of speculative
approach and every suggestion that there is more to existence than matter and
motion. Although he was in name a Christian, his arguments lead straight to
atheism. Hobbes had little in common with the concerns and sympathies of Sir
Thomas Browne.
After an education at
Oxford, in the 1620s Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) was close to Sir
Francis Bacon and even worked as a kind of secretary for him. He knew Ben
Jonson and, later, Abraham Cowley; during travels in Europe he met Galileo and
Descartes. In 1647 he was appointed mathematical tutor to the future king
Charles II in exile in France but in 1652 he returned to England and submitted
to the Common¡©wealth Council of State. This did not prevent him receiving a
pension at the Restoration.
Hobbes's philosophical
writings have generally provoked intense hostility, both on account of their
contents and also because of the emotions of hatred or fear inspiring much of
them. Hobbes's tone is mostly very gruff, with none of the charm of Sir Thomas
Browne's. He really hates the scholastics and churchmen with their abstract
speculations, while he fears the chaos that selfish human passions bring to
society. Therefore his philosophy is mostly expressed in political terms,
pleading for strong government and absolute rule in a society devoid of any
transcendent Being or metaphysical system, that might challenge the rule of
law.
From 1650 onwards, he
published a variety of works devoted to matter, human nature, and society, in
both English and Latin. By far the most significant is The Leviathan, or the
Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil (1651).
Hobbes's power lies in his willingness to take his arguments to their logical
conclusion with intense single-mindedness, irrespective of what this does to
generally received opinions or systems. He demands answers as firmly based in
logic as his own
arguments, and he remains a fundamental master of tight thinking. In Hobbes,
the desire for simple solutions to complex questions reaches new extremes.
He takes the Cartesian
idea that the material universe is composed of extended matter in motion and
insists that there is no need to postulate a separate realm of
"thought" or "spirit" as Descartes did. All our
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings he considers to be the result of matter in movement
in our bodies and brains. In particular, Hobbes denied that there was a
distinct "soul", a non-corporeal "I" that could exist
without a physical body. Like Milton, he professed "mortalism".
Hobbes suggests that all
human actions begin as endeavour, a tension of the will, either an appetite
straining towards something that is expected to cause pleasure or an aversion
straining away from what may cause pain. In his introduction to the Leviathan
Hobbes claims that introspection shows this to be true. The desire for
pleasure, or to keep the pleasure we have, and the dislike of pain and death,
direct every activity of all except those rare people who by very special
education have learned to be altruistic and self-sacrificing.
All human actions, he
claims in the most famous portion of Leviathan, are prompted by
self-interest or by fear (self-preservation). Having established selfishness as
an almost universal fact, he deduces that social peace and order are constantly
threatened by "quarrel" or strife. He suggests three reasons for
strife between people: "competition", "diffi¡©dence"
(distrust), and "glory" (reputation or pride):
Hereby
it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war
as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or
in the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by
battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of time is to be
considered in the nature of war, as it was in the nature of weather. For as the
nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an
inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not
in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time
there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
Whatsoever
therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every
man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security
than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal.
In such condition there
is no place for industry,
because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the
earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that ma be imported by sea; no
commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no
arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all. continual fear, and
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short.
That last epigrammatic
phrase has provoked immense debate and helped many thinkers clarify their
fundamental opinion about the meaning and value of human existence.
Hobbes offers a very
simple solution. All people need do to avoid strife is to submit to a single
absolute ruler whose laws are decisive in every matter. For Hobbes, even
religious truth is true only because the sovereign's law declares it to be so.
The "social contract" is the name of this topic, and it developed in
17th century Europe in part as a result of protestant attempts to apply the
biblical idea of "Covenant" to human society in general. Because
Hobbes has such a negative view of human life (he always insisted that he was
born early because his mother was terrified by news of the Spanish Armada in
1588!) he proposes a form of contract that sounds like a prison sentence.
Yet the main historical
interest of Hobbes's work is not his concept of absolute dictatorship, which
only found its unfortunate fruition in the 20th century, but the expression he
gives to extreme materialist explanations of sensation and thought. In the epistemological
debate about knowledge and perception, Hobbes's denial of any non-material
essential "I" led him to look for entirely mechanical explanations of
the way we see and respond to the outside world. All perception is the echo
inside of our bodies of motions and vibrations outside of them. Hobbes did not
explain "consciousness" at all but felt no need to postulate an
immaterial soul as an explanation of anything. For Hobbes, the soul belonged to
the same category as ghosts, and he hated ghost stories, considering them to be
utter "nonsense".
The Cambridge Platonists
In the history of
thought, the great battles are often fought in teams, not always by
extraordinary individuals. A response to Hobbes's materialism was formulated in
the various writings of a group of men associated with Cambridge University
during the Commonwealth and Restoration: Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Henry
More, and Ralph Cudworth whose The True Intellectual System of the Universe
was the most important expression of the group's ideas.
While they were opposed
to Hobbes, they were also distressed by the irrational fanaticism and extremist
controversy that was tearing the Church apart. While they reasserted Plato's
notion of Forms printed in the soul enabling us to interpret reliably the
appearances perceived outside ourselves, they believed that human Reason, the
Order of the Universe, and Divine Revelation were in harmony; therefore to seek
for Truth with our reason is to seek for God and to understand the Order of the
universe is to know the mind of God its Author.
Like Milton, they did
not accept the pessimistic Calvinistic doctrine of "total depravity"
by which no one could know anything about God without special saving Grace.
Instead, they optimistically believed that human beings could advance to
perfection by using their Reason, which at the same time would show them how to
live virtuously in society. Truth and Goodness were both natural possibilities
for ordinary people in general. Their calm, reasonable attitude with its appeal
to Plato and cool reason helped prepare the way for the Deism of the 18th
century's religious thinkers.
The Royal Society
Bacon never finished
writing his fable The New Atlantis modelled on More's Utopia. In
it he describes an imaginary Pacific island of Bensalem with its
"Solomon's House" or "The College of the Six Days' Work"
which is a kind of college for the sciences, "dedicated to the study of
the works and creatures of God". He imagines a new academic society to
unite all those concerned to explore the new learning. At the time, the
universities of Oxford and Cambridge were only concerned to teach the old forms
of philosophy and saw the formation of Christian ministers as their main
function.
An independent college
had been founded near London in the 1580s by a London merchant, Sir Thomas
Gresham. It had developed a practical curriculum that included Astronomy,
mathematics, anatomy, physics for adult citizens who wanted to learn more in
areas that could help them in their work. When Oxford came under Puritan
control in the later 1640s, teachers formed at Gresham were brought in to
develop the study of the "natural sciences" there.
Bacon had justified his
programme of The Great Instauration by reference to a restoration of the
perfection Adam had enjoyed in the Earthly Paradise. This theological vision
coincided exactly with the optimistic millenarianism that was being promoted in
the early 1640s by Samuel Hartlib, Gabriel Plattes (in the Utopian work Macaria
of 1641), John Dury, and Jan Amos Comenius. Comenius called his vision
"Pansophia", it was to be the dawn of a new enlightenment spread
across Protestant Europe by which material benefits would accrue from increased
knowledge about the universe. Like Milton and many others, they were convinced
that if England led the way, this new perfection of learning in society would
encourage God to bring in the Reign of Christ and vanquish the old ignorance.
Throughout the
Commonwealth, the Baconian vision and the millenarian optimism of many Puritans
worked together to promote the growth of experimental sciences. Even when the
Commonwealth failed, the sense of being promised an ever brighter future
continued, and the very word "Restoration" spoke of much more than
the return of a king. It was felt to allude to the Restoration of Paradise, the
Golden Age often related to the time of Augustus, a time of peace, progress, and
reason.
Finally the Royal
Society of London for the Improving of Natural Knowledge was given its charter
in 1662. Not all its members were scientists, they included Dryden, Cowley,
Waller, as well as Sir Christo¡©pher Wren (architect of St Paul's Cathedral
after the great fire of 1666). The Royal Society is generally credited with
having encouraged its members to employ a simple plain style of writing. In
this it helped the English language pass from the elegance of Sir Thomas Browne
to a more modern austerity. It also reflects the way in which poetry, marked by
metaphor and wit, was being marginalized and rejected in favour of a lucid,
"prosaic" means of expression.
John Locke
Although Locke's work
and influence really belong to the period beyond the scope of this book, it
would be foolish to omit one of the most influential thinkers England ever
produced. John Locke (1632 - 1704) was educated in the traditional way at
Westminster School and at Christ Church, Oxford. He was given positions in the
university and in public service, he was also interested in medicine and was
physician to the earl of Shaftesbury but much of his time was spent in study
and writing.
In 1690 he published his
greatest work, the Essay concerning Human Understanding that remains one
of the fundamental texts in the philosophical analysis of "mind". In
the same year, he published two Treatises of Government in which he
insists that there is no divine or absolute right of kings. Contradicting
Hobbes, he insists that the king in a state is bound by the social contract,
that the people's consent to his rule may be withdrawn and a new ruler chosen
if the king fails to serve the best interests of the nation.
He was writing at the
time before 1685 when people were trying to prevent the Catholic prince James
Stuart from succeeding his brother Charles II. After this failed, the events of
1688 forced James into exile but he did not surrender the crown. Locke was
closely associated with William of Orange and published the Treatises in
support of the argument that the title of king was given by popular consent and
could be taken back by regular process. Many in England had been troubled by
the idea of recognizing Parliament's right to make and unmake kings; Locke writes
to justify this course of action.
In 1695, Locke published
another major text, The Reasonable¡©ness of Christianity, expressing a
form of natural religion without fixed creeds or traditions. He was opposed to
Catholicism but wished for a very tolerant attitude towards the various forms
of Protestantism. Locke was a leader in the development of rational Deism. His Thoughts
concerning Education (1693) were immensely popular in the following century
and influenced Rousseau's ideas on the subject expressed in Emile.
The Essay concerning
Human Understanding underwent further development in various later
editions, until the fifth in 1706. Locke believes that God has made us with the
capacity to know certain things in certain ways, which knowledge must be for
our good since God wishes us to have it. "My purpose," writes Locke,
is "to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human
knowledge; together, with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and
assent." The style is very different from the florid style of Bacon or the
harshness of Hobbes.
Locke's fundamental
assertion is that we are born with our minds a blank, like an empty sheet of
paper, tabula rasa; we receive impressions from outside which our reason
then transforms into knowledge. There is no in-born knowledge. Locke is an
empiricist and a rationalist: "Reason must be our last judge and guide in
everything." In many matters Locke is prepared to say that we cannot know
or cannot be sure of knowing rightly about the outside world. One important
word for Locke is idea which he does not use in the Platonic sense but
in Descartes's manner, to signify "the object of the understanding when a
man thinks", mind-dependant.
It was Locke who, after
Descartes, decided the direction and concerns of modern European philosophy.
For the writers and thinkers of the 18th century, Locke was fundamental
reading, though perhaps more for his political views on society than for his
difficult theories of knowl¡©edge. If the 18th century is known commonly as the
Age of Enlightenment or the Age of Reason, it is very largely thanks to John
Locke. The work of Lessing and Kant, of Voltaire and Diderot, and many others,
derives from ideas first developed in England. The successors to Locke in
England are George Berkeley (1685 - 1753), David Hartley (1705 - 1757) and
David Hume (1711 - 1776)
Sir Isaac Newton
The 18th century looked
back with gratitude to the century that produced Milton, Locke, and Newton. Paradise
Lost was the only European epic that stood comparison with Homer or Virgil.
Locke had established Reason as the basis for all knowledge. Newton was the
third great founder of the Age of Reason. Newton (1642 - 1727) was born into a
humble
family, but was able to
study at Cambridge and stayed there from 1661 until 1696, when he was given the
post of master of the Royal Mint and president of the Royal Society. He never
married.
Newton was one of the
greatest geniuses that Europe ever produced. His pioneering work in
mathematics, dynamics, astro-physics, astronomy, optics, cosmology is still a
fundamental reference today. Only in the matter of relativism (Einstein) has he
been shown to have been lacking. Yet he wrote major studies in areas such as prophecy
and alchemy, as well as theology and biblical chronology, where today these
subjects are not part of a scientist's normal concerns.
Newton's cosmic view
("Newtonianism") is expressed in three major works: Philosophiae
naturalis principia mathematica (1687), the Optiks (1704) on the
nature of light, and Arithmetica universalis (1707). He established
firmly that the cosmos was governed by perfectly rational laws "of
nature" that kept it in a marvelous pattern under God its Maker whose
glory was manifest in its great universal harmonies. This became the leading
ideology of the Enlightenment. Contemporary with Newton, and in conflict with
him in some areas, was the great German Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646 -
1716).
Further Reading
Graham Parry, The
Seventeenth Century: The Intellectual and Cultural Context of English
Literature, 1603-1700. Longman Literature in English Series. 1989.
Basil Willey, The
Seventeenth Century Background. 1934
The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy,
edited by Ted Honderich. Oxford University Press. 1995.